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Abstract 
 
Statutory audit markets across the EU have recently been reformed, with new 
Regulation on the Statutory Audits of Public Interest Entities coming into force in June 
2016.  The Regulation imposes stricter requirements on the audits of Public Interest 
Entities, as originally defined in the Statutory Audit Directive 2006, with the option for 
Member States to designate additional entities as public interest.  Thus, the exact 
definition of a Public Interest Entity applied varies across Member States.  In the UK 
the definition has not been widely extended and includes listed firms, credit institutions, 
and insurance undertakings.   
Private firms in the UK are therefore currently exempt from the more stringent audit 
regulations.  However, even based on the limited, and often mixed, evidence for the 
private company audit market, the decision to preclude most private companies from 
the definition of a Public Interest Entity, effectively excluding them from the new audit 
reforms, may not be appropriate.  This thesis, therefore, undertakes a comprehensive 
analysis of the UK audit market for private companies, in addition to examining the 
auditing choices of private companies and the economic consequences of these choices.  
The UK is specifically examined because it is one of a number of countries that have 
chosen not to extend the scope of the definition of a Public Interest Entity beyond the 
one set at the EU level.   
The findings of this research show that, similar to the audit market for listed firms, 
the private company audit market in the UK is segmented with Big Four dominance 
among the largest firms and relatively low levels of auditor switching.  As a result of 
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this audit environment, private companies that do switch auditor are found to 
experience economic consequences in terms of a reduction in their credit ratings.  
Particularly when the reasons for a switch are unknown to investors.  In addition, the 
thesis provides evidence to suggest that following an auditor switch, firms receive both 
physical and implicit discounts on their audit fees, with price recovery of these 
discounts over the following three years.  Suggesting that low-balling is also present in 
this audit market, which in turn raises concerns regarding competitive pricing and levels 
of auditor independence. 
In sum, the results of the thesis provide strong support that the definition and scope 
of a Public Interest Entity needs revisiting both within the UK and across all EU 
Member States.  Moreover, it reinforces the idea of extending some of the more 
stringent audit requirements introduced by the EU Regulation on the Statutory Audits of 
Public Interest Entities, to ensure that economically important private firms have 
sufficient oversight. 
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1  
Introduction 
  
1.1 Introduction 
Private firms constitute the most significant portion of the UK economy and the market 
for audit services, accounting for 99.8% of the Companies House register at the end of 
June 2016 (Companies House, 2016).  Compared to the availability of data for publicly 
listed companies, however, data for private companies is often incomplete and difficult 
to access.  Consequently, prior auditing research focuses primarily on public firms.  To 
date, there is therefore only limited knowledge regarding the audit market for private  
companies in terms of supplier concentration, switching frequencies and audit fees.  
Particularly since the Big Four audit firms came into power.  The lack of knowledge 
about the private company audit market in the UK has subsequently resulted in a 
shortage of research that focuses on private companies with respect to their accounting 
and auditing choices or the economic consequences of these choices (Francis et al., 
2011).   
In contrast, there have been a number of high profile regulatory investigations (e.g., 
Oxera, 2006; Competition Commission, 2013c) and academic studies (e.g., Abidin et al., 
2010; Peel, 2013) focusing on the audit market for listed companies in the UK.  As is 
the case for audit markets globally, these investigations have resulted in a number of 
ongoing concerns being raised regarding the statutory audit market for listed firms.  For 
example, the high supplier concentration of the Big Four accounting ﬁrms, and the 
potentially adverse effect this may have on audit markets and the quality of audits 
(Francis et al., 2013).  In addition to the excessive familiarity often observed between 
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the management of a company and its audit firm, resulting in risks of conflicts of 
interest and threats to the independence of statutory auditors (EC, 2014c).  Further, 
following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 questions have also been raised 
regarding the effectiveness of auditors and whether they could have played a part in 
mitigating the crisis.   
Consequently, because of the ongoing concerns from both regulators and academics 
regarding various shortcomings observed on audits market globally, in April 2014 EU 
legislation to reform the statutory audit market came into force, with the rules becoming 
applicable in June 2016.  The changes made by the reform included a revised Statutory 
Audit Directive, which sets out the framework for all statutory audits.  In addition to the 
introduction of a new EU Regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities , 
which sets out specific requirements for the statutory audits of Public Interest Entities 
only.   
The specific requirements for Public Interest Entities set out by the new Regulation 
include measures such as the mandatory rotation of audit firms, the restriction of 
particular non-audit services and fees provided and charged by audit firms, and the 
reinforcement of the role and competences of the audit committee (EC, 2014c).  In 
justifying the stricter requirements for Public Interest Entities, the EC highlighted the 
potentially ‘greater negative consequences, relative to other types of undertakings, 
resulting from misstatements for shareholders, investors and more broadly society at 
large’ (EC, 2014b, p.4).  Consequently, the possible costs of introducing the new 
specific rules are thought to be far outweighed by the benefits of avoiding audit 
problems in these entities.   
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While the regulatory changes aim to improve audit competition and quality, their 
success and impact depend on the definition of a Public Interest Entity applied across 
the various EU Member States.  When deciding whether to extend the Public Interest 
Entity definition in the UK from the one set at EU level, the Department of Business 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) and Financial Reporting Council (FRC) launched parallel 
consultation documents.  Due to the perceived additional costs and the risk of placing 
firms at a relative disadvantage to their European counterparts, the idea of extending the 
definition was met with opposition.  The Regulation in the UK is therefore only 
applicable to listed companies, banks and insurance undertakings.   
Consequently, the majority of private companies in the UK are exempt from the new 
regulations.  However, it could be said that these firms have been excluded from the 
more rigorous audit requirements without sufficient evidence to justify the decision.  As 
a result, it remains an open question whether the definition of a Public Interest Entity in 
the UK is adequate or whether, by excluding private companies it has excluded audit 
markets that potentially warrant similar regulatory changes.  
Given this, it is important to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the audit market 
for private companies in the UK in order to provide a greater level of detail about the 
structure of the audit market, in addition to private companies’ auditing choices.  In turn, 
this will enable comparisons to be made with the statutory audit market for listed 
entities.  In addition to determining whether it could be more appropriate to define a 
Public Interest Entity, for the purposes of more stringent audit regulations, based on a 
company’s size, without reference to its corporate status.  Moreover, once a more 
detailed picture of the private company audit market in the UK is available, other issues 
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related to private companies’ auditing choices and the economic consequence of these 
choices will be able to be investigated.  
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis 
Since the Big Four audit firms came into power, no research has empirically examined 
the structure of the private company audit market in detail in terms of supplier 
concentration, rates of auditor change and audit pricing.  Consequently, it is not clear 
whether segments of this audit market potentially warrant similar regulatory changes to 
those recently imposed on Public Interest Entities.   
In the audit market for private companies, the larger audit firms are thought to 
possess comparatively small market shares relative to those in the listed company audit 
market, and is therefore thought to have characteristics of a competitive market (Peel, 
2013).  Consequently, there are lesser concerns present about supplier concentration 
levels, the frequency at which firms change auditors and subsequent audit pricing.  This 
has resulted in the private company audit market receiving less attention from both 
regulators and academics.  However, while concentration measures are a good indicator 
of market structure, the link with competitiveness is more complex than often assumed 
(Beattie et al., 2003).  Moreover, there is a greater level of heterogeneity among private 
firms, which means that the assumptions regarding supplier concentration, subsequent 
switching frequencies and fee levels, may not hold across all sub-sectors of the audit 
market.   
The overarching objective of this thesis is, therefore, to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the private company audit market in the UK.  Through this, the thesis aims 
to provide a detailed review of the structure of the private company audit market, in 
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terms of supplier concentration, switching frequency and audit fees.  In doing so, this 
thesis provides the first detailed analysis of the private company audit market for a 
period during which the Big Four audit firms have been the dominant audit suppliers.  
Consequently, the thesis can also go on to investigate issues for private firms related to 
market structure.  Such as, whether there are economic consequences for private firms 
associated with changing auditor while the rotation of auditors remains non-mandatory.  
In addition to reviewing the pricing strategies of audit firms following a change in 
auditor, to determine whether auditor independence and competitive pricing concerns 
are also present in the private firm market.  By comparing the findings with the audit 
market for listed companies, the thesis can subsequently contribute to the debate over 
whether it would be more practical and more beneficial to the economy to set audit 
regulations based on company size, rather than listing status. 
The UK is one of a number of countries that have chosen not to extend the scope of 
the definition of a Public Interest Entity.  Consequently, the new, more stringent audit 
requirements recently introduced by the Regulation on the Statutory Audits of Public 
Interest Entities will not be applicable to companies in the UK unless they are a listed 
entity, a credit institution, or an insurance undertaking.  Moreover, the UK economy is 
typical of other European economies, in that private firms are the dominant form of 
entity, accounting for the majority of registered businesses.  The UK is therefore an 
ideal setting to conduct an in depth review of the private firm audit market.  
Accordingly, by using data on UK private firms, Chapters 4 to 6 of this thesis provide 
unique evidence on the structure of the private company audit market.  In addition to 
issues related to market structure, such as the consequences associated with changing 
auditor and the pricing strategies for initial audit engagements. 
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1.2.1 Regulation of the Statutory Audit for Private UK Companies 
Chapter 4 provides an in depth review of the private company audit market.  
Specifically, the chapter examines levels of supplier concentration and the frequency of 
auditor switches, in addition to considering whether the audit market for large 
independent private companies may require similar reforms to those applicable to 
Public Interest Entities (PIEs).  
Using three different measures of concentration, the k-firm concentration ratio (Cn), 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) and the Gini coefficient, the findings show, 
similar to the listed company audit market, the Big Four audit firms maintain a tight 
oligopoly of the largest independent private company audits.  In addition, the chapter 
finds the private company audit market to be characterised by low auditor switching 
rates.   
Overall, the findings suggest the need for direct regulatory intervention in the audit 
market for private UK companies.  In addition to supporting the proposition that the 
definition and scope of a Public Interest Entity needs revisiting both within the UK and 
across all EU Member States, with a view to including more economically important 
private entities.  Moreover, given the lesser audit regulations currently present for 
private companies, the findings prompt questions regarding the economic consequences 
for companies switching auditor in this audit environment.   
1.2.2 The Economic Consequences of Auditor Switching 
In response to the concerns raised in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 examines whether there are 
any economic consequences to private companies resulting from a change in auditor.  In 
addition to investigating whether there are different findings depending on the type of 
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change that has taken place.  Relative to listed firms, the reaction of capital markets to a 
change in auditor are not readily available for private companies. The economic 
consequences are therefore measured via a company’s credit ratings.  In addition to 
being available for the majority of private firms, credit ratings can play an essential role 
in private firms as they are more likely to rely on them for bank-based forms of 
financing. 
The findings show, after controlling for other known determinants of credit ratings, 
such as profitability, companies switching auditor experience a significant decrease in 
their credit ratings compared to non-switching companies.  Further, when the direction 
of an auditor switch is considered, the results show that only companies switching 
laterally between the same tiers of auditor experience a decrease in credit ratings.  This 
suggests that when the reasons for a change in auditor are harder to explain, it sends a 
negative signal about a company’s credit risk to those external to the firm. 
With credit ratings playing such an important role in the financing of private 
companies, it is therefore questioned what drives a company to switch auditor if they 
risk the chance of being penalised by credit ratings agencies.  With lesser audit 
regulations present for the private firm audit market it leads to the question as to 
whether audit firms are doing anything to attract new audit clients through specific 
pricing strategies, potentially explaining the dominance of the more economically 
significant firms by the Big Four.  This goes on to form the basis of the final empirical 
chapter, Chapter 6.  
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1.2.3 Playing Low-Ball: The Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements for UK 
Private Firms  
The findings from Chapter 5 questioned whether audit firms were using particular 
pricing strategies to attract new clients.  The currently limited knowledge of the private 
company audit market has resulted, however, in the pricing strategies of auditors in the 
private company audit market not receiving much attention from regulators or 
academics.  To date, therefore, the pricing of audit engagements following a change in 
auditor has largely only been considered for samples of listed firms.  Chapter 6 
therefore examines the pricing of initial audit engagements, namely, whether a discount 
in audit fees is present in the year following an auditor switch.  Following this, the 
chapter also considers the price recovery of any initial discounts for the three years 
subsequent to the initial engagement year, in order to identify whether any discounts are 
indicative of fee cutting or low-balling. 
The chapter finds that a discount is associated with initial audit engagements for 
private firms in the UK.  However, the results are mixed following the refinement of 
auditor switches by direction, with physical discounts present for companies switching 
laterally between audit firms of the same tier and implicit discounts experienced by 
companies upgrading their auditor.  Findings also show that during the three years 
following the initial audit engagement, for companies upgrading their auditor or 
switching laterally, there is an increase in audit fees.   
Taken together the results suggest that low-balling is present in the private company 
audit market in the UK.  Revealing why companies might be more inclined to switch 
auditor, given the negative economic consequences, and potentially raising audit 
independence concerns for this market.  This again reinforces the idea of extending 
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some of the more stringent audit requirements introduced by the EU Regulation on the 
Statutory Audits of Public Interest Entities, in order to ensure that audit markets for 
economically important entities, such as private firms, have sufficient oversight.   
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 reviews the extant literature examining the structure of the UK audit 
market and the current concerns regarding the issues around supplier concentration, 
auditor switching and the pricing of audit services.  Regulatory reports and 
empirical studies all point to an audit market increasingly dominated by the largest 
audit firms, with low rates of auditor change and potential impairment to 
independence following initial audit pricing.  However, the majority of studies focus 
on listed companies or on the largest private firms only.  Chapter 2 also, therefore, 
highlights areas where empirical research is lacking.   
 Chapter 3 presents the sample selection criteria and high-level descriptive statistics 
for the sample used throughout this thesis.  The chapter illustrates the representative 
nature of the sample in addition to providing insights to the overall structure of the 
private company audit market in the UK.  Further, the chapter provides comparative 
statistics for the listed company audit market in order to garner perspective with the 
audit market for private firms.  More detailed descriptive statistics and sampling and 
selection criteria are presented and discussed in Chapters 4 to 6. 
 Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter, which provides an in depth review of 
supplier concentration in the private company audit market and examines whether 
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the audit market for large independent private companies may require similar 
reforms to those applicable to Public Interest Entities (PIEs).  
 Chapter 5 is the second empirical chapter and empirically examines whether there 
are economic consequences for private firms associated with a change in auditor in 
terms of their credit ratings.  Further, this chapter examines whether the effect to 
credit ratings is different depending on the type of auditor change in question.   
 Chapter 6 is the final empirical chapter, which examines initial audit pricing and 
price recovery for three years following an auditor switch.  The purpose of which is 
to determine whether, similar to the listed company audit market, low-balling is a 
characteristic of the UK private company audit market.  The chapter also examines 
whether the results and the type of discount present differ depending on the type of 
switch in question.   
 Chapter 7 provides a summary and discussion of the thesis, an overview of the 
regulatory implications, and direction for further research.  
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2  
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The role of the external audit is to provide an independent assessment of the accuracy 
and fairness with which financial statements represent the results of operations in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (Hope et al., 2012).  Globally, 
regulators agree that publicly listed firms must disclose audited financial statements for 
practical reasons but also because, from a public policy perspective, it is thought the 
potential systemic risks are inherently greater for these companies.  Therefore it is 
widely accepted, that for publicly listed firms, the benefits of a statutory audit outweigh 
the costs and is subsequently a mandatory requirement (Langli and Svanström, 2013).  
When it comes to auditing in private firms there is less agreement on the exact  
purpose of an audit due to the greater level of heterogeneity among private firms and 
the different environment in which they operate (Langli and Svanström, 2013).  For 
example, relative to public firms, the degree of separation of ownership and control is 
reduced for private firms, subsequently affecting the level and type of agency conflicts 
present (Dedman et al., 2013).  In addition, private firms operate in a much more 
opaque reporting environment and are subject to a lower level of public scrutiny, which, 
in turn, reduces capital market pressures to hire a particular auditor.  Consequently, 
there is no general consensus among regulators regarding the need for statutory audits 
of private firms, which is reflected by auditing being statutory in some countries and 
voluntary in others (Langli and Svanström, 2013). 
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In the UK, historically all public and private companies have been required to ﬁle 
audited ﬁnancial statements and to make them publicly available (Freedman and 
Godwin, 1993).  However, in 1994 the UK applied the EC Fourth Directive, which 
permitted the UK government to dispense with the requirement for small, unlisted 
companies to undergo an audit.  Companies were allowed exemption from the statutory 
audit if they qualified as a small company in addition to having a turnover of up to 
£90,000 and a balance sheet total not exceeding £1.4 million for that year.   
Since then, the audit exemption thresholds for private firms have increased in size 
according to EU maxima.  Since 1 January 2016, an unlisted company in the UK may 
qualify for audit exemption if, at their balance sheet date, they satisfy at least two of the 
three following criteria for two consecutive financial years: annual turnover of no more 
than £10.2 million, assets worth no more than £5.1 million and 50 or fewer employees 
on average (BIS, 2016).1  
The supply of audit services has been looked at by researchers since the 1960s when 
the first US supplier concentration studies were published (Burton and Roberts, 1967; 
Zeff and Fossum, 1967).  The topic has been perceived to be an important research 
topic because of its potential to impact on both market competition and large audit firm 
market behaviour (Moizer and Turley, 1989; Peel, 1997; Peel, 2013).  Typically, the 
‘Big N’ audit firms have dominated the supply of audits to large, public companies.  
The term Big N came from the fact that since the 1980s the number of dominant audit 
firms has reduced in size.  Originally, the Big N audit firms were known as the ‘Big 
Eight’, which consisted of Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, 
                                                 
1
 Regardless of size, however, some companies are required to have an audit if their business is of a 
particular nature, such as authorised insurance companies or companies involved in banking or the 
issuance of e-money  (BIS, 2016).    
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Ernst & Whinney, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Peat Marwick McLintock, Price 
Waterhouse and Touche Ross.  In 1989, the Big Eight audit firms reduced to the Big Six 
following a merger between Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young to form Ernst & 
Young, in addition to a merger between Deloitte, Haskins & Sells with Touche Ross, to 
form Deloitte & Touche.  Following this, in 1998, a merger between Price Waterhouse 
and Coopers & Lybrand, to form PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) reduced the Big Six 
to the Big Five.  The Enron scandal in 2002 and the demise of Arthur Andersen then 
resulted in only the Big Four audit firms remaining: Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and PWC. 2  
In the early 1990s, when the Big Six audit firms came into force, concerns began to 
rise, however, regarding the concentration of audit firms in the public company audit 
market.  Since then, the reduction to the Big Four has only acted to intensify the 
concentration debate, with concerns raised by regulators that the structure of the audit 
market has become vulnerable to the risk of a Big Four firm exiting the market in a 
situation similar to Arthur Anderson.  In addition to the fact that the majority of 
companies that employ a large audit firm are those with the fewest alternatives to their 
current auditor should one of them exit the market (Oxera, 2006).  However, these 
concerns have largely focused on the listed company audit market, with a limited 
amount of empirical research focusing on the structure of the private co mpany audit 
market.       
In tandem with the supplier concentration issues, questions have also begun to rise 
over the low frequency of auditor switching in addition to whether there is price 
                                                 
2
 The audit firm KPMG (Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler) did not result from a merger but instead 
from the renaming of Peat Marwick McLintock to KPMG Peat Marwick in 1990 and then the further 
reduction of the name to KPMG in 1999.   
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competition between the larger audit firms for new audits (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; 
Peel, 2013).  Low switching rates and a lack of price competition can act to restrict 
competition in the market further by sustaining the high supplier concentration levels 
(OFT, 2011).  These concerns have since been heightened, both in the UK and across 
audit markets globally, by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.  With a renewed 
focus being placed on the role and effectiveness of auditing, in particular, on auditor 
independence and audit quality (ACCA, 2011).  Consequently, these issues have 
become a focus of both academic research and regulatory investigations.  The next 
subsections therefore extend the literature review by providing an overview of the 
research investigating these issues for the UK audit market. 
 
2.2 Supplier Concentration 
2.2.1 Supplier Concentration in the UK Listed Company Audit Market 
Supplier concentration is currently one of the most common and recurring concerns 
regarding global audit markets, with both regulators and academics frequently 
questioning the audit market share held by the Big Four accounting firms and the 
adverse effects this may have on both audit competition and audit quality (Francis et al., 
2013).  Consequently, there have been a number of academic studies and high profile 
reports, which have voiced concerns about the increasing levels of supplier 
concentration by the Big Four accounting firms across the UK audit market.  However, 
these studies largely focus on the listed company audit market only.   
The first study of supplier concentration in the UK audit market was undertaken by 
Briston and Kedslie (1984), who looked at all domestically listed companies in 1968.  
Based on the number of audits they found that the largest four audit firms, at the time, 
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audited approximately 20.7% of companies.  A later study by Beattie and Fearnley 
(1994) found this figure had risen to 58.9% by 1991.  Similarly, Pong (1999) also 
reported an increase in market concentration during the period 1991-1995, based on 
both the number of audits and audit fees.  The market share of the top four audit firms 
based on number of audits rose from 56.52% to 59.68% and based on audit fees, market 
share rose from 77.15% to 79.39% (Pong, 1999).  Thus, the early supplier concentration 
studies all reported trends of increasing market share in the listed company audit market 
for the larger audit firms.   
Following the collapse of Arthur Andersen, Beattie et al. (2003) analysed market 
concentration within the UK listed company audit market.  Following the collapse, the 
remaining Big Four firms increased their market share from 67% to 73% based on the 
number of audits, and from 90% to 96% based on the value of audit fees.  Moreover, in 
the ‘premier’ market segments such as the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, the levels of 
market concentration based on audit fees were significantly higher, 100% and 97.8% 
respectively.  Subsequently, because of the reduced choice of audit suppliers in these 
segments, Beattie et al. (2003) raised concerns that in the future it would become 
increasingly problematic for a company to find a top tier audit firm that is not 
associated with its competitors. 
In September 2005, because of the concerns about the state of competition and 
choice in the UK audit market, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) commissioned a study of the UK listed audit market, 
the Oxera Study (2006).  The sample used in the study covered a nine-year period from 
1995 to 2004 and included all UK-listed companies traded on the Main Market of the 
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London Stock Exchange.3  In addition, the sample also included 63 of the largest private 
UK companies in terms of turnover in the Bureau Van Dijk Financial Analysis Made 
Easy (FAME) database in 2004.4   
In line with expectations, Oxera (2006) found the audit market in the UK to be 
highly and persistently concentrated with concentration increasing over the last ten 
years mainly as a result of the merger of Price Waterhouse with Coopers & Lybrand 
(1998) and the folding of Arthur Andersen UK into Deloitte (2002).  At the time of the 
study, 99% of the FTSE 100 companies and 97% of the FTSE 250 companies were 
supplied audit services almost exclusively by the Big Four.  In comparison, the market 
share of the Big Four for the smaller listed FTSE fledgling companies was slightly 
lower at 85%.  However, even in this segment of the market the Big Four individually 
had significantly higher market shares than the mid-tier firms.5  
An academic study by McMeeking et al. (2007) investigated both audit market 
concentration and fee levels in the listed firm audit market for a similar period 1990-
2005.  In the first year of the sample, McMeeking et al. (2007) found the largest four 
ﬁrms (Coopers and Lybrand, Ernst and Young, KPMG and Price Waterhouse) 
accounted for 86.5% of the FTSE 100 audits. The PricewaterhouseCoopers and the 
Andersen-Deloitte mergers later increased the share to 90.5% and 99%, respectively. 
Concentration levels then continued to grow during the sample period and by 2004 the 
                                                 
3
 A company was included in the Oxera panel dataset for the years 1995-2004 if, in 2004, it appeared in 
the FTSE 350 index, the FTSE Small Cap index, or the FTSE Fledgling index 
4
 The sample initially hoped to include the 100 largest private UK companies in terms of turnover in the 
FAME database, however due to data availability only 63 made it into the final sample.  Oxera (2006) 
therefore acknowledged that in the case of private companies the results should be seen as indicative only 
(Oxera, 2006, p.19).   
5
 Oxera (2006) included the following as mid-tier firms: Grant Thornton, RSM Robson Rhodes, Baker 
Tilly, Moore Stephens, PKF, Smith & Williamson, Mazars and the Tenon Group. 
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Big Four conducted the audits of all of the FTSE 100 companies (McMeeking et al., 
2007, p.207).   
An empirical study by Abidin et al. (2010) looked at the auditors of all domestic UK 
companies listed on both the main and AIM markets of the London Stock Exchange for 
the period 1998 through to 2003.  Focusing on the concentration ratios based on audit 
fees, the level of concentration in the UK remained at a consistently high level during 
the sample period, characteristic of a ‘tight oligopoly’, where the leading four firms 
control between 60% and 100% percent of the market, presenting significant barriers to 
entry for the remaining firms (Abidin et al., 2010).  Further, in the first year of the panel, 
1998, the Big Five were responsible for auditing 95% of companies according to audit 
fees.  By 2003, this share had grown to 96% but only concerned the four remaining 
large audit firms.  Taken together the three studies (Oxera, 2006; McMeeking et al., 
2007; Abidin et al., 2010) show the extent of the dominance of the Big Four audit firms 
and the speed at which the listed firm audit market has reached a tight oligopoly status. 
On the 21st October 2011, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) referred the market for 
statutory audit services to large companies in the UK to the Competition Commission 
(CC) for investigation.  The OFT had been concerned about the audit market in the UK 
for some time, with John Fingleton the Chief Executive of the OFT stating: 
 
“The market for large company audits lacks sufficient competition and does not 
work well for customers.  It is highly concentrated, largely supplied by four big 
firms, with clients rarely switching between auditors.  There are also high 
barriers to entry for new and smaller competitors.” 
      (Accountancy Age, 2011) 
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For the purpose of the investigation, large companies were companies listed from time 
to time on the London FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 indices for the period 2001 to 2010.  
The final dataset used by the Competition Commission therefore comprised companies 
that were members of the FTSE 350 at any time during the period 2001 to 2011 in 
addition to companies that were members of the ‘Top Track 100’ during 2006 to 2011.  
The Top Track 100 is a league table, which ranks Britain’s largest private companies by 
sales, with a typical Top Track 100 company having sales between £700 million and £3 
billion and between 500 and 20,000 employees.   This amounted to 712 FTSE 350 
companies and a further 133 Top Track 100 companies (Competition Commission, 
2013a, appendix 2.4 p.1).   
Similar to previous studies, the investigation by the Competition Commission found 
that between 2001 and 2010 the Big Four firms consistently had a share of over 95% of 
the audits of FTSE 350 companies and over 99% of the audit fees of FTSE 350 
companies.  For non-FTSE 350 firms, in terms of the number of audits, the Big Four 
firms possessed a slightly lower market share at just over 80%.  In terms of audit fees 
their share of non-FTSE 350 companies was higher at 90%  (Competition Commission, 
2013c).  The investigation therefore revealed that the high supplier concentration levels 
in the UK listed audit market had sustained in recent years, one contributing factor of 
this being the low frequency of companies changing their auditor. 
2.2.2 Supplier Concentration in the UK Private Company Audit Market 
Few studies have actually examined the concentration of the private firm audit market 
in the UK with extant research tending to focus on listed/quoted firms, or alternatively 
on the leading (largest) companies within a particular listed market (Peel, 1997).  
Relative to the listed-firm audit market the exact market share of the Big Four among 
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private firms is harder to estimate because data covering all private firms within a 
country is not as easily accessible (Langli and Svanström, 2013).  Moreover, the private 
firm audit markets possess much greater levels of heterogeneity and cover thousands of 
client-firms, as opposed to the relatively small number of listed firms in the UK.   
In both auditor choice and agency theory literature there is a general consensus 
that there will be lower levels of supplier concentration present for private firm audit 
markets relative to listed firms (Peel, 1997).  Listed companies are thought to be both 
larger and more complex and subsequently more likely to be audited by larger (Big N) 
auditors because they require the technical expertise and resources of larger audit firms 
(Moizer and Turley, 1987; Keasey and Watson, 1991).  Due to difficulties in accessing 
data, however, relatively few studies have examined the private company audit market 
in detail, with studies instead tending to state the percentage of their sample audited by 
the Big Four firms.  However, as a result of sample composition, even these provide 
mixed findings, with the market share of the Big Four ranging from 8.3% (Clatworthy 
et al., 2009), to 19% (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) to as high as 87% (Chaney et al., 
2004).   
To date only one paper focuses solely on supplier concentration in the private 
company audit market.  Using a sample of 164,726 private firms downloaded from the 
FAME database for the year end 1994/1995, Peel (1997) examined auditor 
concentration across all corporate sectors and sub-markets.  He found 28.6% of private 
firms were audited by the Big Six between 1994 and 1995, just over half of the number 
of public firms audited by the Big Six (55.9%).  Which Peel (1997) took to demonstrate 
the significantly different characteristics of the public and private sector sub-markets 
(Peel, 1997, p.313).  However, when Peel (1997) partitioned his sample by company 
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turnover, the market share of the Big Six rose from 15.9% for the subdivision of the 
smallest to 94.1% for the subdivision of the largest private companies.  Thus 
demonstrating the significantly different characteristics of the private sector sub-
markets and reflecting the greater levels of heterogeneity between firms present in this 
market.  Moreover, the findings highlighted that for large private companies, 
concentration levels were similar to those present in the listed market and potentially a 
cause for concern.  Due to data collection problems, however, Peel (1997) was unable 
to go further in his analysis and provide a measure of supplier concentration based on 
audit fees.  Nor was Peel (1997) able to make comparisons with additional measures of 
concentration thus providing a limited and static picture of supplier concentration in the 
private firm audit market.  
 
2.3 Auditor Switching 
2.3.1 Rates of Auditor Change 
In conjunction with the continued dominance of large company audits by the Big Four, 
there have been increasing concerns expressed regarding the low frequency of auditor 
switching (McMeeking et al., 2007; Abidin et al., 2010; Peel, 2013).  This is because if 
switching rates are low then market shares are likely to be stable, and high levels of 
concentration, once established, are likely to persist (Oxera, 2006).  However, the focus 
of extant academic research concerned with auditor switching tends to be on isolating 
the micro-level factors considered determinants of auditor switching, rather than on 
switching frequencies for a representative sample of the UK audit market.  With the 
majority of prior switching determinant studies focusing on publicly held entities.   
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To date, the investigations by Oxera (2006) and the Competition Commission have 
provided the greatest level of detail regarding the frequency of auditor switching for the 
listed firm audit market in the UK.  The Oxera (2006) study found switching between 
auditors to happen infrequently, around 4.2% of companies switched their auditor on 
average per year.  However, the rates differed with company size.  For the FTSE 100 
companies switching rates were 2.1% on average, whereas for FTSE fledgling 
companies the switching rate almost tripled to 5.6%.  In the final year of the panel 
(2004) only 1% of FTSE 100 and 2% of the FTSE 250 companies changed auditors, 
while 3.1% of FTSE Small Cap companies, and 3.8% of the FTSE Fledgling companies 
switched auditors (Oxera, 2006, p.44).  The switching rates for the private firms were 
unable to be determined, likely because of data availability and the limited number of 
private firms included in their sample.  In line with low rates of auditor switching, 
Oxera (2006) also found tendering to occur infrequently in the UK listed firm audit 
market.  Almost three quarters of the companies surveyed only put out a tender once 
every five years or less and more than 70% of the FTSE 100 did not hold a single 
competitive tender in the last 15 years.   
Similarly, in their investigation into the supply of statutory audit services to large 
companies in the UK, the Competition Commission found that 31% of FTSE 100 
companies and 20% of FTSE 250 companies had employed the same audit firm for 
more than twenty years.  Moreover, 67% of the FTSE 100 and 53% of the FTSE 250 
companies had employed the same audit firm for more than ten years.  In terms of 
actual switching rates, for the FTSE 350 companies annual switching rates varied 
between 1.5% and 3.5% with an average of 2.4% between 2001 and 2010. The rates 
were found to be slightly higher for non-FTSE 350 companies whose annual switching 
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rates varied between 2.8% and 8.2%  (Competition Commission, 2013a, appendix 2.4 
p.12). 
2.3.2 Economic Consequences Associated with Changing Auditor 
Although the frequency of auditor switches is low, there is quite a large body of 
research focusing on switching determinants.  Changes in auditor can often occur for 
very valid reasons, for example the growth of a client-firm (Haskins and Williams, 1990; 
Johnson and Lys, 1990).  However, switching determinants can also be related to risk 
factors such as client-firm financial distress (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Hudaib and 
Cooke, 2005), opinion shopping (Chow and Rice, 1982; Craswell, 1988; Citron and 
Taffler, 1992; Lennox, 2000) and disagreements with auditors over reporting matters 
(DeAngelo, 1982; Magee and Tseng, 1990).   
As there are different reasons underlying an auditor switch, and switches are such 
infrequent events, the exact reaction of capital markets and the subsequent effect to 
stock prices may be uncertain.  Using an analytical model Teoh (1992) found that 
investor reactions to an auditor switch depended on the context of the switch and the 
characteristics of the switching firm.  Further, investor reactions to auditor switches 
were also found to be conditioned on the pre-switch audit opinion and other factors 
related to the costs and benefits of switching (Teoh, 1992, p.17).  Lu (2006) also 
developed an analytical model and indicated that auditor switching sends a negative 
signal to capital market participants, which can subsequently result in a negative stock 
price reduction for the client.  The reason being that ‘capital market and non-incumbent 
auditors view auditor switching as a ‘red flag’ signal and perceive that switching firms 
have failed to secure their predecessors auditors approval of the audit report’ (Lu, 2006, 
p.574). 
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Empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the reaction of capital markets 
to auditor switches.  For example, for a sample of 48 US companies obtained from the 
Corporate Profiles and Index of Corporate Events for the period 1972-1975, Fried and 
Schiff (1981) found there to be a negative market reaction to auditor switches based on 
a 21-week window.  In contrast, for a sample of 51 US companies listed on either the 
New York or American Stock Exchanges for the period 1973-1979, Nichols and Smith 
(1983) failed to find a significant reaction to auditor switches when using a shorter 
window of 8 weeks.  Similarly, during their study of voluntary auditor realignments, for 
a sample of 194 switches by US firms for the period 1973-1982, Johnson and Lys (1990) 
found there to be an absence of a significant average price reaction to auditor 
realignment announcements.   
Later studies, on the other hand, have tended to document some form of negative 
market reaction to auditor switching.  For example, for a sample of 79 US firms, Wells 
and Loudder (1997), found a significant negative market reaction to auditor resignations 
between 1988 and 1991, using a two-day window.  When considering the reaction to 
auditor resignations only, for a sample of 247 US firms for the period 1987-1996, Shu 
(2000) found that investors reacted negatively to resignations, and the price drop varied 
with litigation risk.  A later US-based study by Beneish et al. (2005) also limited their 
analysis to auditor resignations.  For their sample of 109 firms that changed auditor 
during the period 1994-1998, they only found a negative market response to resignation 
announcements where firms provided a reason for the change.  For example, if a firm 
disclosed that there had been a disagreement over an accounting treatment, or over the 
adequacy of internal controls.  
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UK-based research on the consequences of auditor switching, on the other hand is 
scarce, both for public and private firms.  During their study of UK listed firms Oxera 
(2006) asked respondents about the relative importance of factors which might act as 
barriers to switching.   One of the barriers identified was the potential costs of sending a 
negative signal to the capital market, since it might be associated with problems with 
the company’s financial statements (Oxera, 2006, p.49).  However, through their 
surveys and interviews they found that a change in auditor tended not to concern 
investors, provided the switch that occurred be between Big Four firms: 
 
“In the words of one investor, if a company moves from a Big Four auditor to a 
mid-tier firm, on ‘gut instinct’ he would feel that ‘there was an issue’. The 
switch would then require an explanation by the company … For instance, one 
audit committee chair said that meetings with the two or three largest 
shareholders would be required to explain the company’s decision to switch to a 
mid-tier firm.” 
(Oxera, 2006, p.49) 
 
Thus, Oxera (2006) concluded that companies appeared to be aware of the negative 
concerns from investors when changing their auditor but that the perceived effect on 
capital markets of changing auditor is not (or is no longer) seen as a significant barrier 
to switching (Oxera, 2006, p.49).  However, their findings are based on the replies of 50 
respondents so it is therefore unclear whether the conclusions are actually generalizable 
to the entire UK market.   
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The private company audit market is similarly lacking empirical research on the 
consequences associated with an auditor switch.  Instead research has tended to focus 
on the consequences associated with undergoing an audit voluntarily, with firms 
choosing to do so found to benefit in terms of improved credit ratings or a lower cost of 
debt (e.g., Blackwell et al., 1998; Allee and Yohn, 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Lennox and 
Pittman, 2011; Minnis, 2011; Dedman and Kausar, 2012).  Alternatively, studies have 
focused on the role of auditor choice in debt pricing in private firms (e.g., Mansi et al., 
2004; Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Fortin and Pittman, 2007).  With some studies finding 
there to be benefits associated with the choice of a higher-tier auditor (Francis, 1984; 
Francis and Wilson, 1988) and other studies providing mixed evidence (Fortin and 
Pittman, 2007; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Karjalainen, 2011).  It therefore 
remains an empirical question whether there are consequences for private firms 
stemming from a change in auditor, as this is yet to be the focus of an empirical 
investigation.   
 
2.4 The Pricing of Audit Services 
As previously discussed, because of the continued dominance of large company audits 
by the Big Four, increasing concerns have been expressed about competition issues, one 
of the concerns being whether there is competitive pricing in the audit market.  More 
specifically, whether there is competitive pricing for initial audit engagements by the 
Big Four audit firms and the ability of the non-Big Four audit firms to compete with this 
(Peel, 2013).  Although auditor switches do not occur often, when a change in auditor 
does take place the pricing of the initial audit fee offers an (observable) opportunity to 
examine whether competitive pricing is a feature of a market with an oligopolistic 
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supply structure, such as the UK (Peel, 2013, p.637).   If initial discounts are present, 
there are concerns from regulators that auditors will treat discounts as relevant costs and 
this will consequently impair auditor independence (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  On 
the other hand, there also  exists the possibility that the increase in concentration may 
have a positive influence on pricing, due to economies of scale or scope, which could 
subsequently lead to an increase in price competition (Peel, 2013).  Beattie et al. (2003) 
argue that ‘while concentration measures are a good indicator of market structure, the 
link with competitiveness is more complex than often assumed’ (Beattie et al., 2003, 
p.250).  Thus, it is not always possible, without empirical analysis, to make inferences 
about the pricing of audit services based on concentration ratios alone.    
Despite the recent investigation by the Competition Commission and the large and 
growing literature on audit pricing more generally, few studies have examined the 
pricing of initial audit engagements, fewer still relating to the UK market.  6  Pong and 
Whittington (1994) were the first study to examine the pricing of initial audit 
engagements for UK listed firms.  Using a sample of 577 quoted companies for the 
period 1981-1988 they found that only new audits conducted by non-Big Eight auditors 
attracted significant fee discounts.  Building on the work of Pong and Whittington 
(1994), Gregory and Collier (1996) examined whether there was any evidence of fee 
discounting following a change in auditor, in addition to whether there was any 
evidence of price recovery taking place in later years.  For a sample of 399 listed firms 
for the period 1987 - 1991, they found that the initial fee reduction to be both large and 
significant at 22.4% but that it did not persist over the following three years. Gregory 
and Collier (1996) also investigated whether the type of auditor change made a 
                                                 
6
 See Hay (2013) for a review of this. 
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difference to the fee reduction experienced.  They found companies that switched 
laterally between the Big Six audit firms benefitted from a discount of 20.2%, and 
companies that changed from a non-Big Six to a Big Six auditor benefitted from a 
discount of 33.6%.  Gregory and Collier (1996) therefore concluded that, in addition to 
offering initial fee discounts, large auditors forego the Big Six audit fee premium as an 
incentive for auditees of smaller firms to change to a premium auditor. 
A primary focus of the Competition Commission investigation was whether the 
oligopolistic sector of the UK audit market was competitive.  For companies that 
switched auditor during the sample period they therefore investigated the real 
percentage change in audit fees in the years after switching auditor.  For direct switches, 
in line with academic research, audit fees generally decreased in real terms the year 
after a switch and returned to the previous fee level in the third year after switching.  7 
The average (median) company obtained an 8% (17%) real decrease in audit fees in the 
first year after switching.  However, compared with the fee before the switch, by the 
third year switching firms saw a 20% real increase on average and a median increase of 
2%  (Competition Commission, 2013a, appendix 2.4 p.16).  However, the Competition 
Commission commented that they were unable ‘to reach a conclusion on whether audit 
firms were making profits above competitive levels’ (Competition Commission, 2013c, 
p.2).  This was due to difficulties such as valuing capital employed, the intangible 
nature of the asset base in this market, difficulties in cost allocation, and difficulties in 
                                                 
7
 The main sample for the analysis consisted of direct switches, where the company remained in the 
FTSE 350 both before and after the switch. ‘Direct switches’ were considered to be those not associated 
with the collapse of Arthur Andersen, merger and acquisition activity and moves to or from joint audits  
(Competition Commission, 2013c, p.55). 
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identifying costs due to the partnership ownership structure.  However, the Competition 
Commission did state: 
 
“It is our provisional view that this pattern (of reduced first-year prices and 
profitability, which rapidly increases over the subsequent two to three years) 
may indicate an adverse effect on competition (AEC) resulting from a feature or 
a combination of features in the FTSE 350 statutory audit market, since it 
demonstrates the ability of a new firm to increase its prices rapidly.” 
(Competition Commission, 2013b, p.84) 
 
Despite not being able to reach a definite conclusion regarding competitive audit pricing, 
the Competition Commission therefore remained concerned about the adverse effects on 
competition resulting from the initial price discounts for audit fees.  
Peel (2013) investigated the pricing of new audits following switches between the 
Big Four relative to their leading mid-tier counterparts for both the listed and private 
firm audit market.  To date, Peel (2013) is the only study to investigate the pricing of 
initial audit engagements for private firms in the UK.  Peel (2013) analysed a sample of 
7,651 companies, of which 6,084 were private and 1,555 were public, for the year 2007, 
with more recent data for the year 2010 downloaded to test for evidence of price 
recovery.  Peel (2013) found evidence to show quoted companies switching auditor 
benefitted from an average discount on their audit fees of 18.2%.  Moreover, when the 
switches were refined by direction Peel (2013) found larger quoted companies 
switching between the Big Four benefitted from a substantial price discount of 26.7%.  
Although quoted clients switching to the mid-tier auditors also attracted discounts, they 
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were smaller in magnitude.  For private firms, discounts appeared to be present on 
initial engagements, but Peel (2013) failed to find any evidence of price recovery.  
Similar to the conclusions drawn by the Competition Commission, Peel (2013) 
commented that it is important to note that initial discounts offer support for 
competition only to the extent that they show price reductions relative to continuing 
audits. 
 
2.5 Reform of the EU Statutory Audit Market (2014) 
As well as the concerns about the UK audit market raised in the previous sections, the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008 further highlighted some serious shortcomings in 
the stability of the entire EU economic and financial system.  This in turn raised 
questions regarding the actual effectiveness of auditors during the Financial Crisis.  
Questions focused on whether auditors could have mitigated the banking crisis of 2008 
by alerting investors to the riskiness of the assets held by banks (Lords Select 
Committee, 2010; EC, 2013a).  Post-crisis inspection reports by Member States have 
since confirmed that there had been a lack of professional scepticism by auditors, 
misstatements in audit reports and a lack of fresh thinking in the audits of major 
companies – which they largely attributed to the average long-distance relationship 
between auditors and their clients (EC, 2013a).   
Subsequently, to address both the existing concerns identified in academic studies 
and regulatory reports, and the shortcomings observed following the Financial Crisis, 
the European Commission (EC) embarked upon an extensive consultation process 
regarding how the European audit market could be improved.  The consultation broadly 
focused on the role of statutory audit as well the wider environment within which audits 
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are conducted.  In particular, through their consultation the EC were keen to determine 
whether audits provide the right information to all financial actors, whether there were 
issues around the independence of audit firms and whether there were risks linked to a 
concentrated market (EC, 2010a).  Following the launch of the consultation, a Green 
Paper on Audit Policy and the issues learnt from the Financial Crisis was issued by the 
EC in October 2010 (EC, 2010b).   
Following this, in 2011 the EC issued two further Commission proposals for a 
regulation on the quality of audits of Public Interest Entities (PIEs) and for a directive to 
enhance the single market for statutory audits (EC, 2011a; EC, 2011b). 8  By July 2014, 
the EC had reached an agreement on a reform of the audit market and, consequently, an 
amended Statutory Audit Directive and a new EU Regulation on Statutory Audit of 
Public Interest Entities entered into force. 9  The new regulation requires Public Interest 
Entities to rotate their auditors and audit firms after a period of ten years, in addition to  
prohibiting their auditor from providing certain non-audit services to them if they 
already conduct their financial audit.  The new regulation also reinforces the role and 
competences of the audit committee and strengthens the requirements of the audit report 
(EC, 2014b).   
It is hoped that introducing the more stringent regulations will address issues such as 
the lack of choice of audit firms emanating from high concentration levels in the top 
                                                 
8
 According to the Statutory Audit Directive (Article 2, point 13) the definition of a ‘public -interest 
entity’ is as follows: (a) entities governed by the law of a Member State whose transferable securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market of any Member State within the meaning of point 14 of Article 
4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC; (b) credit institutions as defined in point 1 of Article 3(1) of Directive 
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (16), other than those referred to in Article 2 
of that Directive; (c) insurance undertakings within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 91/674/EEC; 
or (d) entities designated by Member States as public-interest entities, for instance undertakings that are 
of significant public relevance because of the nature of their business, their size or the number of their 
employees. 
9
 Statutory Audit Directive 2014/56/EU amends the Directive 2006/43/EC. 
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end of the market, in addition to reducing the systemic risk posed by the dominatio n of 
the Big Four audit firms.  Further, the more frequent changes in auditor brought about 
by mandatory auditor switching should help to address the excessive familiarity 
between the management of a company and its audit firm.  This, in turn, should help 
with reducing the risk of conflicts of interest and threats to independence so that 
auditors are able to exert professional scepticism.  However, the impact of the new 
regulation will depend on the definition of a Public Interest Entity applied across the 
various EU Member States.  In the case of the UK, the definition of a Public Interest 
Entity applied is the one set at EU level and the new regulation therefore covers listed 
companies, credit institutions and insurance undertakings only.  Private firms in the UK 
are therefore only affected by the amended Directive and are not subject to the new, 
more stringent audit regulations.   
 
2.6 Summary and Discussion 
Both academic research and regulatory investigations agree that the UK audit market 
for listed companies has been highly and persistently concentrated for a number of 
years.  With levels suggesting that the market is a tight oligopoly, thus presenting 
difficulties to other firms who wish to compete in the market.  In contrast, there are 
lesser concerns regarding the audit market for private firms.  However, there is limited 
empirical literature that looks at the private company audit market in detail to test 
whether these assumptions are correct and hold across all sub-sectors of the audit 
market. 
To combat the high supplier concentration levels in the listed firm audit market, and 
the issues that come with it, the EU amended the Statutory Audit Directive and 
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introduced new EU Regulation for the statutory audit of Public Interest Entities.  With 
the new regulation come more stringent audit requirements for Public Interest Entities 
only.  The reason for this being: 
 
“the potential negative consequences of misstatements for shareholders, 
investors and more broadly society at large, are usually greater than for other 
types of undertakings. The possible costs of the specific rules concerned are thus 
far outweighed by the benefits of avoiding audit problems in those public-
interest entities”  
(EC, 2014b, p.4)   
 
However, this does not take into account the size and economic importance of some of 
the private entities excluded from these regulations.  During the last twenty years the 
number of public companies has substantially decreased in the UK, by around 48%,  
with private firms now making up the majority of firms registered at Companies House 
(The Economist, 2012).  It also does not factor in the limited empirical knowledge of 
the private company audit market.  As a result it is not clear to what extent theory and 
empirical findings based on public firms can provide insight and guidance to regulators, 
standard setters, researchers and users of (audited) financial statements when it comes 
to auditing in the private firm segment of the economy (Langli and Svanström, 2013).  
Nor can it determine whether the issues raised by public company based research are 
actually also applicable to this market and whether some of the more stringent 
regulations might benefit private firms, thereby highlighting the need for empirical 
research that examines the private company audit market in the UK in detail .    
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3  
Sample Selection and Descriptive 
Statistics 
 
The principal aim of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the core sample that 
will act as a basis for subsequent analysis in the thesis.  In the empirical chapters, 
Chapters 4 to 6, more restrictive data requirements will be applied to this core sample, 
subject to the methodologies used.  Each empirical chapter will therefore include their 
own descriptive statistics accompanied by a more in depth discussion.  The current 
chapter, therefore, outlines the filtering process used to obtain the core sample, followed 
by graphical illustration and discussion of some of the key descriptive statistics at a 
broad level. 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The data source for this thesis is the ‘Financial Analysis Made Easy’ (FAME) database, 
supplied by Bureau Van Dijk.  The database provides comprehensive financial and non-
financial information on over 8 million companies, both private and public, for the UK 
and Ireland.  For the thesis, data is downloaded from FAME for the period 2005 to 2012.  
This is because a major threshold change in 2004 exempted a large number of private 
companies from audit for the first time.10  Consequently, the sample period corresponds 
                                                 
10
 In January 2004, independent, small, private companies could qualify for exemption from an audit if 
they had sales < £5.6 million and total assets < £2.8 million.  Prior to the thresholds being raised, the 
audit exemption thresholds were much lower,  sales < £1 million  and total assets < £1.4 million (Dedman 
and Kausar, 2012).   
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to the years following these changes to prevent this having any confounding effects on 
results.   
First, to ensure any audit related decisions reflect those made by companies in the 
sample themselves, the sample used in this thesis is comprised entirely of independent 
private companies in the UK.11  This is because for companies belonging to a group, 
auditor-hiring decisions are routinely made by the ultimate owner rather than at the 
company level (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Lennox and Pittman, 2011).  The definition 
of ‘independence’ for the sample firms therefore relates to the ability of shareholders to 
remove or change an auditor.  According to the Companies Act 2006 members of a 
company may remove an auditor from office at any time but this power is only 
exercisable in accordance with Section 511 by ordinary resolution at a meeting 
(legislation.gov.uk).  An ordinary resolution is a resolution passed by the shareholders 
of a company by a simple vote or bare majority - for example more than 50% of the 
vote.  Consequently, to ensure none of the companies in the panel has a single 
shareholder with enough power to solely influence auditor choice or remove an auditor 
from a company, only companies with known recorded shareholders with an ownership 
percentage below 50% are included in the initial download. 12 
In addition to the independence requirement, to be included in the initial download 
from FAME, companies also had to meet a number of criteria.  Following similar steps 
to Clatworthy et al. (2009) companies were required to be ‘live’, i.e. at the time of 
                                                 
11
 Although data was available for Irish firms they were not included in the initial download because they 
are subject to different accounting and auditing regulations (ICAEW, 2014).   
12
 In the FAME database an ‘independence indicator’ characterises the degree of independence of a 
company with regard to its known recorded shareholders.  Included in the download were companies with 
the following independence indicators: ‘A’ - attached to any company with known recorded shareholders, 
none of which having more than 25% of direct or total ownership; ‘B’ - attached to any company with 
known recorded shareholders, none of which with an ownership percentage (direct, total or calculated 
total) over 50%, but having one or more shareholders with an ownership percentage above 25%.   
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download, FAME listed the company as ‘active’ and not have an IPO or delisting date 
present, as this indicates a change in listing status.  In FAME when a firm converts from 
one listing type to another (e.g. listed to private) all of their past information is 
classified in subsequent years under their current listing type, which could result in non-
private firms being incorrectly included in the sample (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  
Companies were also required to possess a valid SIC (2007) code and not be involved 
in the financial or utilities sectors.  In addition to having the required accounting data 
available for a full 12 months of accounts which included total assets and sales 
(minimum £1,000), a disclosed profit/loss figure, and a disclosed registered office 
location.   
Further, because an audit is not mandatory for all private firms, some of the smaller 
firms in the download will have chosen to take advantage of the audit exemption.  For 
those companies that are audited, after discussions with various members of the audit 
profession, an audit fee threshold of £1,000 was specified to lessen the chance of the 
inclusion of firms with data entry errors related to the audit fee figure. 13  During the 
data checks, it was also noted that there were some instances of a firm’s account types 
changing between consolidated and unconsolidated.  These were checked against 
another database, ICC Plum, which confirmed that the changes in account type recorded 
were correct.  Such observations were subsequently removed from the download to 
ensure reliability and to prevent any potential skewing of the data.  These data 
                                                 
13
 The members of the audit profession included a number of chartered accountants and audit partners 
either currently or previously employed by a Big Four or Mid-Four audit firm.  During the research 
process, the sensibility of any data checks related to audit information could be checked with these 
members to ensure that both the opinions of previous research and the audit profession itself were 
incorporated into the data selection process.  With regards to data entry errors, FAME specified a number 
of firms with audit fees of £100 that were checked against another database, ICC plum.  For the majority 
of occurrences, audit fees below £1,000 were confirmed to be data entry errors and reflected an amount 
paid to an accountant for accounts preparation, not an audit.   
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restrictions resulted in an initial download of 51,191 independent, private UK firms for 
the period 2005 to 2012.   
Following this, because the thesis will focus on audit related decisions, year on year 
comparisons will often be required e.g., changes in audit fees or a change in auditor.  
Thus, it is important that any firms downloaded have a minimum of two consecutive 
years of data in addition to there being no gaps throughout their panel as not to affect 
any conclusions drawn.14  Subsequently, 2,565 firms with gaps in their panels were 
removed from the sample.  To ensure the accuracy of the remaining data, following Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) several forms of verification were then used.  A firm-year was 
excluded if the accounting numbers were inconsistent, such as assets, liabilities and 
profit/loss figures.15   
Similarly, firm-years were excluded where there were instances of inconsistent or 
missing audit information.  For observations missing audit information, a sample was 
checked against another Companies House based database ICC Plum, to determine 
whether the data was actually missing from Companies House rather than from FAME.   
In the majority of cases ICC Plum was also missing the required audit information.  
Consequently, where fees were provided but the auditor name was not it is assumed that 
                                                 
14
 Although a minimum of two years of data is required, firms do not have to possess consecutive data for 
the full 8 years of the sample (2005 – 2012) because this would bring survivorship bias into the data, as 
well as dramatically reducing the sample size.  Subsequently, a firm with data for e.g. 2005, 2006, 2008, 
2009, and 2010 is removed due to missing the data for 2007 but a firm with data for 2005 to 2009 
inclusively is kept due to possessing consecutive data for more than 2 years. 
15
 The following checks were carried out which resulted in exclusion of firm-years in some cases: fixed 
assets below zero; whether the total assets figure was consistent by +/- 1000 with the definition from 
FAME (current assets + fixed assets); net assets equal to zero or missing; whether net assets was 
consistent by +/- 1000 with the definition from FAME (total assets less current liabilities) - (long-term 
liabilities); whether current assets were equal to or below zero; and whether current liabilities were equal 
to or below zero. 
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this is due to missing data and the company was removed.16  Due to the requirement 
that the companies in the sample do not have gaps in their panels, any company 
subsequently missing a firm-year observation following the previous data cleaning steps 
was removed from the sample.  After these exclusions, the sample consists of 191,306 
firm-year observations for 44,234 unique private firms.  
Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005) a trimmed sample which excludes companies 
with 1% of the accounting variables at each extreme  will be used for the thesis.17  After 
trimming, the sample consists of 164,201 firm-year observations for 38,451 unique, 
independent private companies.  Lastly, as the main focus of the thesis is the private 
company audit market the final filter is to remove any companies without audited 
financial statements.  The final sample therefore consists of 36,118 observations for 
8,314 unique companies for the period from 2005 to 2012.  Table 3.1 summaries the 
sample selection procedure.   
  
                                                 
16
 In addition, using the audit exemption size thresholds companies below (above) the size threshold and 
that are therefore able (unable) to take advantage of the audit exemption are identified. Where a company 
is above the size thresholds and therefore unlikely to be able to take advantage of the exemption from the 
mandatory audit and an auditor name is provided but fees are missing it is assumed that this is also a case 
of missing data and the company is removed.   
17
 Data trimmed on ROA, net profit margin, fees to sales, and change in fees. 
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Table 3.1 Thesis sample selection 
Sampling Process Total Observations Total Firms 
Initial download from FAME  223,687 51,191 
Less: Missing data requirements -12,799 -2,565 
Less: Inconsistent or irreconcilable data -19,582 -4,392 
Less: 1% of accounting variables at each extreme -27,105 -5,783 
Less: unaudited firms -128,083 -30,137 
Final sample  36,118 8,314 
 
 
3.2 Sample Distribution 
Table 3.2 presents the distribution of the 8,314 sample firms across their broad SIC 
(2007) industry groupings and regional distributions.  Table 3.2 Panel A shows firms 
involved in ‘business services’ activities account for a quarter of the sample (25.50%), 
which is as expected because business services sectors are often well represented in 
samples of UK private firms (e.g., Lennox and Pittman, 2011).  A further 21.78% 
operate in the ‘wholesale and retail trade’ sector, resulting in the two industries 
accounting for almost half of the sample.  Other industries that are well represented in 
the sample are ‘manufacturing’ (15.67%) and ‘construction’ (12.79%).  The industry 
composition of the sample companies remains relatively stable during the sample period.   
As sector specific expertise is thought to be an important determinant of auditor choice 
(Oxera, 2006, p.58) future research designs will control for between-industry 
differences by specifying indicator variables for each industry grouping according to 2-
digit SIC codes.  
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Table 3.2 Thesis sample distribution by industry and region  
Panel A: Sample distribution by industry sector 
Industry  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Firm  
Years 
Total Firms  
(n) 
Total  
Firms (%) 
Agriculture, hunting, farming and fishing 61 67 59 56 72 81 87 79 562 126 1.52 
Business services 999 1,195 1,170 1,124 1,205 1,121 1,179 1,088 9,081 2,120 25.50 
Construction  480 564 600 608 660 561 560 494 4,527 1,063 12.79 
Hotels and restaurants 152 196 201 210 250 221 236 222 1,688 420 5.05 
Manufacturing 505 564 567 574 870 961 1,029 998 6,068 1,303 15.67 
Mining 21 25 25 25 30 31 32 29 218 41 0.49 
Other service activities 266 316 334 327 364 389 435 401 2,832 699 8.41 
Transport, storage and communication 332 401 423 423 455 431 462 439 3,366 731 8.79 
Wholesale and retail trade 797 900 872 870 1,020 1,058 1,161 1,098 7,776 1,811 21.78 
Total 3,613 4,228 4,251 4,217 4,926 4,854 5,181 4,848 36,118 8,314   
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Table 3.2 (continued)   
Panel B: Sample distribution by region 
Region
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Firm Years Total Firms (n) Total firms (%) 
East Anglia 416 489 492 501 560 505 505 475 3,943 912 10.97 
East Midlands 218 253 247 247 315 331 368 343 2,322 524 6.30 
London 683 804 811 821 895 828 855 787 6,484 1,401 16.85 
North East 89 97 91 85 114 129 147 137 889 229 2.75 
North West 297 336 333 336 439 465 510 472 3,188 746 8.97 
Northern Ireland 36 42 53 52 133 161 170 161 808 203 2.44 
Scotland 183 209 215 225 324 353 380 369 2,258 488 5.87 
South East 887 1,061 1,113 1,096 1,052 882 938 874 7,903 1,834 22.06 
South West 248 289 273 268 320 336 355 334 2,423 557 6.70 
Wales 62 80 77 69 99 103 111 104 705 181 2.18 
West Midlands 285 329 320 296 367 401 438 410 2,846 678 8.15 
Yorkshire  209 239 226 221 308 360 404 382 2,349 561 6.75 
Total 3,613 4,228 4,251 4,217 4,926 4,854 5,181 4,848 36,118 8,314  
The broad industry classifications are based on the United Kingdom Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (SIC) which is used to classify 
business establishments and other standard units by the type of economic activity in which they are engaged. The most recent version of these codes (SIC 2007) was 
adopted by the UK as from 1st January 2008.  Region is determined by the county in which a company’s registered office is located. 
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Table 3.2 Panel B presents the sample composition by region.  The distribution of 
companies by region remains relatively stable over the sample period with the sample 
consistently dominated by two particular regions, the South East and London, 
representing 22.06% and 16.85% of the total firms respectively.  In comparison, the 
total proportion of sample firms with registered offices located in the North of the UK 
are almost equal to the percentage of sample firms located in London alone.  Due to the 
potential higher cost of living differentials expected in the two dominant regions (Peel, 
2013) registered office location will be controlled for in subsequent analysis.   
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
In the subsequent empirical chapters, since a more detailed analysis is provided for each 
sample used, the following section will only provide a high-level overview of the 8,314 
firms for the sample period 2005 to 2012.  A variety of tables and figures will be used 
to provide information about the types of firms included in the core sample and, more 
specifically, to provide a preliminary insight into the UK private firm audit market, 
which provides the basis for this thesis.  The chapter will begin by looking at the 
average size of the firms in the sample, followed by a comparison of the audit firms  
used by UK private firms, the rates of auditor change and audit fees.  
3.3.1 Firm Characteristics 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the median and average size of the sample firms in terms of 
total assets and turnover respectively.  Figure 3.1 shows total assets for the audited 
firms gradually increases across the sample period, from an average (median) value of 
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£12.4 million (£1.6 million) in 2005 to an average value of £32.8 million in 2012 (£6.7 
million).   
 
Figure 3.1 Comparison of median and average total assets for the sample 
companies 
 
The figure compares the average and median total assets for the 8,314 private firms in the thesis sample 
for the period 2005 to 2012.   
 
Similarly, Figure 3.2 shows average (median) turnover increases from £12.9 
million (£1.6 million) on average in 2005, to £28.6 million (£10.6 million) in 2012.  
One potential explanation for this could be that smaller firms did not survive the 
financial crisis, driving up the averages in later years.  On average, the sample 
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companies have total assets and turnover of £24.7 million and £20.4 million 
respectively.   
 
Figure 3.2 Comparison of median and average turnover for the sample companies 
 
The figure compares the average and median turnover for the 8,314 private firms in the thesis sample for 
the period 2005 to 2012.   
 
In comparison to the sample of independent private companies used in this sample, 
listed companies are much larger in terms of total assets and turnover.  Figure 3.3 
compares the median total assets and turnover for the companies used in the 
Competition Commission’s investigation of statutory audit services to large 
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companies.18  The median figures are used because the yearly standard deviation is 
often extremely high, indicating that the distribution of the sample is highly skewed.  
Consequently, the median is likely to provide a more accurate representation of the 
typical company used in the investigation.   
 
Figure 3.3 Competition Commission statutory audit services for large companies 
market investigation: median total assets and turnover 
 
The figure presents a comparison between the median total assets and turnover for the sample firms used 
in the investigation of the statutory audit market for large companies undertaken by the Competition 
Commission.  The investigation used a sample of 7,959 firm-year observations for 828 unique firms for 
an eleven-year period from 2000 to 2011.  However, for comparison, only the years relevant to the thesis 
sample are shown in the above figure. 
 
                                                 
18
 The data used in the statutory audit market investigation is available to download online from 
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/2011/statutory-audit-
services/audit_public_dataset.xls 
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Figure 3.3 shows the median values increase over the period under investigation.  
Across the years corresponding to the thesis sample, companies have median total 
assets of £726 million and median turnover of £546 million. 19  In comparison, the 
companies used in the Oxera study (2006) had a median turnover of £197.7 million in 
2004, the final year of the panel.  Thus suggesting it is the inclusion of the private Top 
Track 100 companies in the Competition Commission investigation that are responsible 
for driving up the average size of the companies, further highlighting the substantial 
size of some private companies.   
3.3.2 Auditor Choice  
Figure 3.4 presents the market share of the different audit firms used by companies in 
the sample according to the number of audit engagements.  To provide an additional 
level of detail, the traditional non-Big Four group of audit firms is further divided into 
the Mid Four, Small-Tier and non-major audit firms using the FRC’s ‘Key Facts and 
Trends in the Accountancy Profession’ reports for the relevant years covered by the 
sample period.  The Mid Four group includes Baker Tilly, BDO, Grant Thornton and 
PKF (UK).  As well as being differentiated from other non-Big Four audit firms in 
terms of income, these four mid-tier auditors are the only non-Big Four auditors 
covered by the ICAEW Audit Firm Governance Code.20  After the largest eight audit 
firms, the Small-Tier group includes audit firms which have appeared in the top 20 of 
                                                 
19
 The investigation finished in 2011 therefore the year 2012 is unavailable for comparison to the thesis 
sample.   
20
 The Audit Firm Governance Code, published in January 2010, applies to eight audit firms that together 
audit about 95% of the companies listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. For these 
audit firms, the code sets a benchmark for good governance which other audit firms may wish to 
voluntarily adopt in full or in part (ICAEW, 2010). 
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the FRC’s list of the major auditing firms at any point throughout the sa mple period.  
All of the remaining audit firms are included in the non-major group. 
 
Figure 3.4 Auditor choice by client firms measured by the number of audit 
engagements 
 
The figure shows the proportion of the total number of audit engagements held by the four different 
groups of audit firms for the sample of 8,314 private firms for the period 2005 to 2012. 
 
Figure 3.4 confirms that, in terms of the number of audit engagements, the Big Four 
do not dominate the sample of private firms in the same way they appear to dominate 
the listed-firm audit market.  Over the sample period, the Big Four are responsible for 
auditing, on average, 12.32% of the client firms in the sample, a very small proportion 
of the audit market in comparison to their share of the number of listed clients.  Non-
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major audit firms audit the greatest share of the number of clients during the sample 
period, 67.94% on average.21  The Mid-Four audit firms audit a share of the sample 
which is similar to that of the Big Four (11.64%) and the Small-Tier firms have the 
smallest share of the sample at 8.10%.   
In a study of the UK audit market Pong (1999) demonstrated that the basis of 
measuring supplier concentration can affect results.  Figure 3.5 therefore compares the 
yearly average turnover values for the audit clients of the four audit firm groups.  From 
Figure 3.5 the clients of the Big Four audit firms appear to be substantially larger in 
terms of turnover in comparison to clients of non-major audit firms.  The average 
turnover for clients of the Big Four is £75 million, whereas clients of the Mid-Four 
audit firms have an average turnover of £25.1 million and clients of Small-Tier and 
non-major audit firms have average turnover values of £14.4 million and £10.4 million 
respectively.  During the sample period, the clients of Big Four audit firms are 
approximately 2.9 times larger, on average, than the clients of the next four largest audit 
firms and 5.2 times larger than clients of Small-Tier audit firms.   
 
 
  
                                                 
21
 The share of the ‘non-top 20’ audit firms is thought to be largely attributable to the large number of 
audit firms contained in this group, over 7,000 individual firms. 
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Figure 3.5 Auditor choice by client firms measured by yearly average turnover 
 
The figure presents a comparison between the average client-firm size for each audit firms group for the 
sample of 8,314 private firms for the period 2005 to 2012. 
 
To complement Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6 presents the proportion of the 
private companies audited by each group of audit firm when aggregating their client-
firm revenue.  When measured by total client turnover, over the sample period the Big 
Four are responsible for auditing, on average, 45.26% of client firms.  This is a much 
larger proportion of the audit market in comparison to their share of the number of audit 
engagements.  When measured in terms of total client turnover the share of the non-
major audit firms also changes, reducing from 67.94% to 34.69%, on average.  In terms 
of aggregate revenue, the Mid-Four audit firms audit a share of the sample that is a third 
of the proportion of the Big Four (14.36%) and the Small-Tier firms have the smallest 
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share of the sample at 5.69%.  The basis of measuring supplier concentration therefore 
largely affects results, which forms the basis of the following empirical chapter, Chapter 
4. 
 
Figure 3.6 Auditor choice by client firms measured by total client turnover 
 
The figure compares the proportion of the 8,314 private firms audited by each of the four groups of audit 
firm when aggregating their client firm turnover for the years 2005 to 2012. 
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3.3.3 Rates of Auditor Change 
One of the concerns associated with the higher levels of supplier concentration in audit 
markets is the low frequency of auditor switching as it means that market shares are 
likely to remain stable.  Table 3.3 compares the proportion of private companies that 
switched auditors, on average, with the proportion of listed companies that switched 
auditors in the Oxera (2006) study and the statutory audit market investigation carried 
out by the Competition Commission (Competition Commission, 2013c).  Table 3.3 
Panel A shows that the proportion of private companies switching audit firm in the 
thesis sample remains relatively stable, with rates varying between 2.9% and 4.9% per 
year and a total of 3.6% of companies changing auditor on average.   
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Table 3.3 Comparison of auditor switching rates between listed and unlisted firms, 2001 to 2012 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Avg. 
Panel A: Thesis sample 
All sample firms (%) - - - - - 3.5 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.2 4.2 4.9 3.6 
Turnover < £6.3 m (%) - - - - - 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.5 
Turnover > £6.3 m (%) - - - - - 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.1 3.1 3.6 2.1 
Panel B: Oxera (2006) Competition and choice  in the UK audit market 
Listed companies (%) 4.9 5.5 3.4 2.8 - - - - - - - - 4.2 
FTSE 100 (%) 2.9 2.6 3.8 1.2 - - - - - - - - 2.1 
FTSE 250 (%) 3.9 4.9 2.7 1.6 - - - - - - - - 2.8 
FTSE Small Cap (%) 5.9 4.5 3.2 3.1 - - - - - - - - 4.6 
FTSE Fledgling (%) 5.8 8.5 4.6 3.8 - - - - - - - - 5.6 
Panel C: Competition Commission (2013) Statutory audit services for large companies market investigation 
FTSE 350 (%) 2.7 1.5 2.6 2.6 1.5 3.5 3.2 1.5 3.2 1.7 - - 2.4 
FTSE 100 (%) 3.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 - - 1.7 
FTSE 250 (%) 2.5 1.7 3.3 3.3 1.7 4.5 3.3 1.6 3.3 1.6 - - 2.7 
Non-FTSE 350 (%) 5.2 4.2 3.3 3.3 4.8 8.2 6.0 5.5 4.5 2.8 - - 4.8 
The table compares switching rates between three different samples of UK firms.  Panel A shows the proportion of the 8,314 firms from the thesis sample that 
change auditor, on a pooled basis and according to firm size.  Panel B refers to the sample of 739 firms used by the Oxera (2006) study commissioned by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC).  The study covers the years 1996 to 2004, but only the switching rates for the 
more recent comparable years are shown for brevity, however, average switching rates in Panel B refer to the complete panel analysed (Oxera, 2006, p.44).  Panel C 
refers to the sample of 828 companies used in the investigation of the statutory audit market by the Competition Commission.  The study covers the years 2000 to 
2011 but switching rates are only provided up to the year 2010 (Competition Commission, 2013a, appendix 2.4 p.12).  
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For comparison, Table 3.3 Panel A also shows the proportion of sample companies 
switching auditor in terms of company size.  With company size measured according to 
whether a company is above or below the median sample turnover value of £6.3 million.  
In terms of average switching rates, there is not a substantial difference, with 1.5% of 
companies below the median turnover value and 2.1% of companies above the median 
turnover value, switching auditor on average.   
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the frequency of auditor switches by listed 
firms varies with company size with rates slightly lower for smaller FTSE Fledgling 
firms for example.  Table 3.3 Panel B and Panel C report the yearly and overall average 
switching rates from the Oxera (2006) study and the Competition Commission 
investigation respectively, for years comparable to the thesis sample.  As Table 3.3 
Panel B and Panel C show, there is slightly more variation in switching frequencies 
between listed companies of different sizes.  Switching frequencies remain low, 
however, regardless of listing status, with all averages below 6%.  Private companies do 
not appear, therefore, to switch auditors significantly more frequently than listed firms.  
The average switching rate for the sample of private companies of 3.6% is similar to the 
average switching rates for listed companies (4.2%), FTSE 350 companies (2.4%) and 
the larger non-FTSE companies (4.8%) (Competition Commission, 2013a, appendix 2.4 
p.12).   
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3.3.4 Audit Fees 
Figure 3.7 Comparison of average audit fees between size quartiles, 2005 – 2012 
 
The figure shows the relationship between audit fees and company size across the sample period through 
comparison of the yearly average values of audit fees for the 8,314 firms in the sample by size quartile, 
with quartiles based on company turnover.   
 
Figure 3.7 shows the relationship between audit fees and company size across the 
sample period through comparison of the yearly average values of audit fees for the 
sample firms by size quartile, with quartiles based on company turnover.  Client size 
has been found to be the principal determinant of audit fees (Peel, 2013), which is 
reflected by the average audit fees in Figure 3.7.  Average audit fees across the quartiles 
range from £4,345 for the first quartile, compared to £8,048 for the second quartile, 
£12,818 for the third quartile, and £43,548 for the fourth quartile.  In the UK an average 
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audit for a small company typically costs around £9,500 (Financial Times, 2011), 
therefore suggesting that the companies in quartile one are very small.   
 
Figure 3.8 Comparison of median audit fees for listed UK firms, 2000 - 2010 
 
The figure presents a comparison between the median audit fees for the 739 sample firms used by the 
Oxera (2006) study commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) and the 828 sample firms used in the investigation of the statutory audit market 
by the Competition Commission (Competition Commission, 2013a, appendix 2.4 p.8-9).  The Oxera 
(2006) study covers the years 1996 to 2004, but only the audit fees for the more recent, comparable years 
are shown for brevity (Oxera, 2006, p.70).  
 
For comparison, Figure 3.8 presents the median audit fees of the firms used in the 
Oxera (2006) study and the median audit fees for the firms investigated by the 
Competition Commission.  Overall, the median audit fees for the sample of firms used 
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differ substantially when the firms are partitioned by index.  Oxera (2006) find the 
median audit fees range from £62,000 for FTSE Fledgling companies, to £165,000 for 
the FTSE Small Cap companies, to £600,000 for FTSE 350 companies.  Moreover, if 
the FTSE 100 companies are considered by themselves, median audit fees are 
substantially higher at £2.1 million (Oxera, 2006, p.70).   
The Competition Commission find the median audit fees for the sample of FTSE 350 
to be similar to the findings of Oxera (2006), with median fees ranging from £513,000 
to £769,000.  Similarly, median audit fees for FTSE 100 companies were also found to 
be substantially higher than for FTSE 250 and non-FTSE-350 companies.  With median 
audit fees fluctuating between £2 million and £3.5 million during the period under 
investigation (Competition Commission, 2013a, appendix 2.4 p.8-9).  However, the 
individual audit fees of companies in the thesis sample does range from a minimum of 
£1,000 to a maximum of £2.5 million.22  Some of the larger companies in the sample 
therefore have fees similar to FTSE 100 companies. 
Due to turnover being a first approximation of the amount of work required to audit 
a company, Figure 3.9 compares the average values of audit fees as a proportion of 
company turnover.  From Figure 3.9 it can be seen that the smallest companies have the 
highest audit fee to turnover percentage, with audit fees being around 1.23% o f 
company turnover on average.  In comparison, audit fees make up a much lower 
proportion of turnover for companies in quartiles 2, 3 and 4 with ratios of 0.37%, 0.17% 
and 0.09% respectively.  Oxera (2006) observe a similar pattern for listed firms, with 
                                                 
22
 Audit fees of this magnitude were crosschecked to ensure that the data entry was not an error.  First, the 
audit fees for the company across the panel were considered, thus the large fee could be compared to 
other years for sensibility.  Then fees were doubled checked with the ICC plum database and were found 
to be correct. 
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median audit fees representing an increasing proportion of company turnover as average 
company size decreases.  Audit fees represent 0.06% of FTSE 100 company turnover, 
0.13% of FTSE small cap turnover, and 0.20% of FTSE fledgling turnover (Oxera, 
2006, p.70). 
 
Figure 3.9 Comparison of average audit fees as a percentage of turnover between 
size quartiles, 2005 - 2012 
 
The figure shows the relationship between audit fees and company size across the sample period through 
comparison of the yearly average fees-to-sales ratio for the 8,314 audited firms in the sample by size 
quartile, with quartiles based on company turnover.   
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter provided a broad overview of the core sample, which will act as a basis for 
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between the audit markets for private and listed firms, in particular for the larger private 
firms in the sample.  Following the overview of the private company audit market in the 
UK, the aim of the following three chapters is therefore to examine the UK audit market 
for private companies in more detail.  With specific attention given to supplier 
concentration, the consequences of auditor switching and the pricing of initial audit 
engagements.   
The core sample for the thesis provides the sample for the following empirical 
chapter, Chapter 4.  For the remaining empirical chapters, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the 
core sample is further refined with more restrictive data requirements.  In Chapter 5 
additional data filters remove companies switching more than once in addition to 
companies missing credit ratings data, which results in a total of 33,498 observations 
for 7,825 unique firms.  In Chapter 6 only companies switching more than once 
throughout their panel are removed from the core sample, resulting in 35,425 
observations for 8,215 unique firms. 
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4  
Regulation of the Statutory Audit for 
Private UK Companies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
New EU regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities requires the 
mandatory rotation of audit firms and restricts the non-audit services and fees provided 
and charged by audit firms to all Public Interest Entities.  While these regulatory 
changes aim to improve audit competition and quality, their success and impact depend 
on the definition of a Public Interest Entity applied across the various EU Member 
States. Although their governance and performance is crucial for economic growth 
(Langli and Svanström, 2013), the majority of private companies within the UK  will 
fall outside the narrow scope of the definition of a ‘Public Interest Entity’ and, therefore, 
are not covered by these regulatory changes. 23  The limited knowledge about the audit 
market for these companies raises questions over whether economically important 
private firms should be exempt from some of the more stringent audit regulations 
applicable to Public Interest Entities. This chapter, therefore, provides an in depth 
review of the audit market for private firms and examines whether the audit market for 
large private companies may require similar reforms to the auditing regulations 
applicable for Public Interest Entities. 
The adverse effects on audit competition and audit quality due to high levels of 
supplier concentration is a recurring issue raised by regulators and academics (Francis 
                                                 
23
 In January 2015 private companies accounted for just over 99.7% of the effective Companies House 
register. 
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et al., 2013), with particular attention given to the audit market share held by the Big 
Four accounting firms.  For publicly listed companies, the Big Four audit firms have an 
average market share of over 90% in most EU member states (ESCP Europe, 2011).  
Likewise, in the UK, the Big Four increasingly dominate the audit market of large listed 
companies, where they currently are responsible for over 95% of audits for the FTSE 
350, and all but one of the FTSE 100 companies (Oxera, 2006).  
In addition to the potential for systemic risk resulting from high concentration levels, 
such a market is often characterised by an infrequent number of auditor switches and 
overfamiliarity between clients and their auditors, raising concerns over the quality of 
individual audits.  Consequently, the European Commission implemented a new EU 
regulatory framework in 2014 in response to an extensive consultation process, which 
amended the EU Directive on Statutory Audits of Annual and Consolidated Accounts.  
In conjunction with these changes, the European Commission further introduced new 
EU-wide Regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities, all of which 
came into effect in June 2016.   
This regulation has resulted in significant changes to the audit market as all Public 
Interest Entities in the EU are now subject to a mandatory rotation of their auditor and 
restrictions placed on the non-audit services and fees provided and charged by audit 
firms to their clients.  The success and impact of these regulatory changes will, 
therefore, depend on the definition of a ‘Public Interest Entity’ which, while defined at 
an EU level, has been broadened by Member States, leading to considerable variation 
across the different legal regimes.  In the UK the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
defines only listed companies and certain unlisted banking and insurance companies as 
Public Interest Entities, regardless of their size.   
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Therefore, even while their governance and performance is crucial for economic 
growth (Langli and Svanström, 2013), most private companies within the UK will not 
be covered by the regulatory changes.  Conversely in Denmark, for example, the 
definition is much broader and includes a size criterion, consistent with the view that 
larger organisations (quoted or unquoted) are systemically important to the Danish 
economy.  24   Relative to the wider definition applied by some Member States, the 
narrower definition of a Public Interest Entity applied by the UK has led to concerns 
that ‘…UK legislation is being manipulated to suit existing structures, rather than the 
outcomes sought by the EU legislative framework’ (ICAEW, 2015a, p.7).   
Compared to the availability of data for publicly listed companies, data for private 
companies is often incomplete and difficult to access and, therefore, the exact market 
share of private company audits conducted by the Big Four is difficult to measure 
(Langli and Svanström, 2013).  From the few studies examining private firm audit 
markets, Langli and Svanström (2013) find a large cross-country variation in the market 
share of the Big N audit firms, ranging from 18.1% in Norway to 90.2% in Finland, 
with larger companies being audited by the large audit firms.   
However, prior studies may have underestimated the concentration levels within the 
market for large private company audits by measuring market share based on the 
proportional number of audits, rather than taking into account the value of the company 
being audited.  Consequently, the audit market for large private companies may exhibit 
concentration levels and systemic risks similar to those observed in the audit market of 
public firms.  This chapter therefore, provides an in depth review of the audit market for 
                                                 
24
 Any firm exceeding 2 out of 3 criteria concerning number of employees, asset values, and turnover are 
considered Public Interest Entities. 
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private firms and examines whether the audit market for large private companies 
requires similar reforms to the auditing regulations applicable for Public Interest 
Entities.   
To undertake this study a large panel of independent private company audits in the 
UK from 2005 to 2012 is utilised.  The UK is focused on for two reasons.  First, 
concerns have been raised over the UK’s narrow definition of a Public Interest Entity 
raising questions as to whether UK legislation is being implemented in a way to suit 
existing structures.  Second, because of the difficulties in accessing data, the exact 
market share of private company audits conducted by the Big Four is often difficult to 
measure. Supplier concentration in audit markets is best measured using audit fee data 
however, audit fee data are not publicly available in many countries (Willekens and 
Achmadi, 2003).  Relative to other Member States, UK private company data is more 
accessible, therefore proprietary data, including audit fees, for a large sample of 
independent private companies is downloaded and analysed. 
The results show that, when supplier concentration levels are measured by the 
number of audit appointments, the market share of larger audit firms is significantly 
understated compared to when supplier concentration is measured by either audit fees or 
client-firm size.  The Big Four, therefore, appear to audit the majority of private 
companies that will provide them with the greatest economic rents.  Further, when the 
sample is partitioned by firm size, the market share of the Big Four is found to exceed 
economists’ ‘tight oligopoly’ threshold of 60% (Shepherd and Shepherd, 2003) for the 
largest independent private companies.  Regardless of listing status, therefore, audit 
markets appear to be segmented with Big Four dominance among the largest public and 
private firms. Moreover, similar to the public firm audit market, switching rates for 
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private firms are found to be low suggesting that, if no direct regulatory intervention is 
planned, the private company audit market will continue to exhibit high levels of 
concentration for larger sized entities.  
Given the economic importance of private companies, further consideration should 
be made of the risks associated with excluding them from the more stringent audit 
regulations applicable to other Public Interest Entities.  In the UK, these firms have 
been excluded from the more rigorous audit requirements without sufficient evidence to 
justify these decisions. Therefore, the definition and scope of a Public Interest Entity 
needs revisiting both within the UK and for all EU Member States, given the variation 
in definitions of Public Interest Entity and the limited knowledge of private audit 
markets across Europe. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  The next section outlines the 
recent audit reform by the European Union and discusses prior literature.  Section 4.3 
outlines the sample selection process and provides descriptive statistics, while Section 
4.4 details the methods used to measure concentration, Section 4.5 provides the results 
and discussion, and Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Regulatory Background and Prior Literature 
For a number of years, regulators, market participants and academics have raised 
concerns that a high level of supplier concentration within audit markets by the 
dominant audit firms, coupled with low levels of auditor switching, may impair 
independence and audit quality (e.g., Beattie et al., 2003; Oxera, 2006; Abidin et al., 
2010; Francis et al., 2011).  More recently, auditors have been criticised for not doing 
more to mitigate the effects of the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis by alerting 
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investors to the risks associated with the assets held by banks (House of Lords, 2010).  
Post-crisis, inspection reports by Member States revealed that the lengthy relationships 
between auditors and their clients had resulted in the auditors exercising low levels of 
professional scepticism and performing inadequate procedures for the audits of major 
companies (EC, 2013b).   
4.2.1 European Regulation on the Statutory Audits of Public Interest Entities 
The European Commission (EC), therefore, embarked upon an extensive consultation 
process, culminating in the release of the Green Paper on Audit Policy in October 2010 
which raised concerns over the Big Four dominance of audit markets  (EC, 2010b).  
Consequently, in 2011, the EC proposed significant audit regulatory changes (EC, 
2011a; EC, 2011b) and, in 2013, the European Parliament and EU Member States 
reached agreement on a number of audit reforms (EC, 2013b).  These reforms were then 
approved by the European Parliament in 2014, who issued a revised Statutory Audit 
Directive and a new EU Regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities, 
with effect from June 2016 (EC, 2014a). 25  According to the Statutory Audit Directive 
2014/56/EU (Article 2, point 13) the definition of a ‘Public Interest Entity’ is as follows: 
  
a) entities governed by the law of a Member State whose transferable securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market of any Member State within the 
meaning of point 14 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC;  
                                                 
25
 Statutory Audit Directive 2014/56/EU amends the Directive 2006/43/EC. 
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b) credit institutions as defined in point 1 of Article 3(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council (16), other than those referred to 
in Article 2 of that Directive;  
c) insurance undertakings within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 
91/674/EEC; or 
d) entities designated by Member States as public-interest entities, for instance 
undertakings that are of significant public relevance because of the nature of 
their business, their size or the number of their employees.  
 
The Statutory Audit Directive sets out the auditor’s duties and regulates all statutory 
audits in the EU, regardless of whether the audited entity is a Public Interest Entity. 
However, the new EU Regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities only 
enforces stricter legal requirements for the statutory audits of ‘Public Interest Entities’ 
(PIEs). The requirements for Public Interest Entities include the mandatory rotation of 
the auditor for Public Interest Entities after a period of ten years, joint audit and 
tendering incentives, a list of non-audit services that audit firms may not provide to 
their clients and a cap on the fees charged for non-audit services that are provided.26  
Justifying their decision for stricter audit regulation of Public Interest Entities, the 
EC argue that undetected material misstatements have disproportionally greater 
consequences for society, the shareholders and investors of these firms than for other 
undertakings (EC, 2014b, p.4). Any costs associated with complying with the new EU 
                                                 
26
 Member States can allow Public Interest Entities to extend the audit engagement (1) by an additional 
10 years upon tender; (2) or by an additional 14 years in case of joint audit (EC, 2014b).  Prohibited non-
audit services includes: tax, consultancy and advisory services;  if an firm provides non-audit services for 
three of more years fees are limited to no more than 70% of the average fees paid in the last three years 
by the audited entity. 
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Regulation should, therefore, be outweighed by the greater audit assurance resulting 
from reducing the overfamiliarity between auditors and their clients, increasing the 
choice between audit firms, and lowering the levels of concentration in the top-end of 
the audit market (EC, 2014a). 
4.2.2 Defining a Public Interest Entity 
However, the imprecise definition of a Public Interest Entity provided by the EC has led 
to a variety of interpretations across EU Member States, which could limit the intended 
impact and success of these reforms (FEE, 2014).  For example, Table 4.1, which 
summarises the definitions of Public Interest Entities across EU Member States, shows 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden applying the 
minimum requirements.  While Denmark, Italy and Spain expand the definition to 
include other entities such as investment companies, large non-listed companies, state 
owned companies, and pension funds.  Table 4.1, further, shows that the definition of a 
Public Interest Entity has not been widely extended within the UK.   
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Table 4.1 Overview of the definition of a ‘Public Interest Entity’ (PIE) applicable across Europe 
Country 
Expand on 
2006 EU 
PIE 
definition? Other designated entities on a national level (if applicable) 
Total 
number of 
PIEs  
Total number of 
listed  
companies 
Bulgaria Yes Pension funds; State owned companies; Other. 900 - 
Croatia Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; State owned companies; Asset 
management companies; Electronic money institutions. 
500 174 
Cyprus Yes Size criterion. 350 104 
Czech Republic Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion. 321 64 
Denmark Yes UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; State owned companies; Government. 900 200 
Estonia Yes Size criterion; State owned companies; Government. 149 13 
Finland Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies. 600 120 
France No - 2,533 498 
Germany No - 1,600 800 
Greece Yes The option to expand the definition of a PIE to other designated entities is available but not 
currently used. 
342 250 
Hungary No - 102 55 
Iceland Yes Pension funds. - - 
Ireland No - 2,000 55 
Italy Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; Asset management companies; 
Electronic money institutions; Other. 
1,430 260 
Latvia Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Asset management companies. 75 33 
Lithuania Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Other. 154 20 
Luxembourg Yes The option to expand the definition of a PIE to other designated entities is available but not 
currently used. 
- 23 
Malta Yes The option to expand the definition of a PIE to other designated entities is available but not 
currently used. 
94 22 
Netherlands Yes The option to expand the definition of a PIE to other designated entities is available but not 
currently used. 
1,200 125 
Norway No - 414 218 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
Poland Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Electronic money institutions; Other. 500 450 
Portugal Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; State owned companies; Other. 1,300 77 
Romania Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; State owned companies; Government; Electronic 
money institutions; Other. 
500 198 
Slovakia Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; State owned companies; Asset 
management companies; Other. 
600 60 
Slovenia No - 70 70 
Spain Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; Electronic money institutions; 
Other. 
8,000 150 
Sweden No - 450-500 450-500 
UK Yes Credit institutions (a bank and building society but not a credit union) and insurance 
undertakings. 
2,300 2,300 
Source: The information in the table is taken from the FEE Survey on the Definition of Public Interest Entities (PIEs) in Europe (FEE, 2014).  The FEE collected 
data from FEE Member Bodies from EU Member States, Iceland and Norway.  The number of PIEs and listed entities was originally provided to the FEE by 
Member Bodies and may therefore represent an approximate estimation. Listed entities, credit institutions, insurance undertakings and other designated entities refer 
to the extent of the EU definition.  Other designated entities on a national level include: pension funds, undertakings for collective investments in transferable 
securities (UCITS), investment companies, size criterion, State owned companies, Government asset management companies , and electronic money institutions. 
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When deciding the scope of the Public Interest Entity definition in the UK, the 
Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) and FRC launched parallel 
consultation documents.  While the BIS did not propose to widen the definition, the 
FRC suggested including entities, currently outside the scope of the Public Interest 
Entity definition, but which may be of sufficient public interest to warrant applying 
some, but not all, of the more stringent requirements applicable to Public Interest 
Entities (FRC, 2014b, p.25).   
Nevertheless, the idea of extending the Public Interest Entity definition was opposed 
due to the perceived additional costs and risk of placing these firms at a relative 
disadvantage to their European counterparts.  However, since the FRC’s definition of a  
‘listed entity’ is broader than the EU’s, the focus of the discussion was aimed towards 
the application of the definition to smaller companies listed on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM), rather than the effect of extending this regulation to larger  
private firms.  27  Therefore, in its current form, the Regulation will not apply to the 
majority of private companies in the UK, despite their overall importance to the wider 
economy and the market for audit services.  
As a result, the European Commission has raised concerns over the UK’s definition 
of a Public Interest Entity, suggesting that UK legislation was manipulated to suit 
existing structures rather than the intended outcomes of the EU legislative framework 
(ICAEW, 2015a, p.7).  Moreover, the ICAEW has questioned the sense of using the 
new Public Interest Entity definition alongside the existing classification of a ‘major  
audit’ within the UK, which will lead to some large private entities being classed as 
                                                 
27
 The FRC defines a listed entity as ‘an entity whose shares, stock or debt are quoted or listed on a 
recognized stock exchange, or are marketed under the regulations of a recognized stock exchange or other 
equivalent body (FRC, 2014b, p.21) 
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major audits for an Audit Quality Review (AQR), while being excluded from the 
regulatory requirements applicable to Public Interest Entities. 28   The ICAEW has, 
therefore, recommended the FRC re-examine the regulatory framework for corporate 
entities in the UK with a view to incorporating non-quoted firms within the definition of 
a Public Interest Entity given the risk to the UK economy in light of their financial 
failure (ICAEW, 2015a, p.7).    
Alternatively, the FRC may consider adopting a tiered approach which could see 
some of the new regulatory requirements, currently only applicable to Public Interest 
Entities, being applied to larger private entities (ICAEW, 2015b, p.7).  Given the 
limited understanding and knowledge of the private company audit market, excluding 
all private companies from the more stringent audit regulations applicable to Public 
Interest Entities seems premature, particularly given the substantial size of some of 
these firms.29  
4.2.3 The Private Company Audit Market 
Despite their often substantial size and economic importance little is known about the 
accounting and auditing choices of private firms (Francis et al., 2011, p.489).  To date 
only one paper focuses solely on supplier concentration in the private company audit 
market.  Peel (1997) finds 28.6% of his large sample of private firms were audited by 
the Big Six between 1994 and 1995, and when dividing the sample by company 
                                                 
28
 A ‘major audit’ is an audit conducted under UK law in respect of a Public Interest Entity; or any other 
person in whose financial condition there is a major public interest. This includes UK unquoted 
companies, groups of companies, limited liability partnerships or industrial and provident societies with 
Group turnover in excess of £500million (FRC, 2014a).  
29
 In the UK, the ‘Top Track 100’ ranks Britain’s largest private companies by sales, a typical Top Track 
100 company has sales ranging between £700 million and £3 billion and has between 500 and 20,000 
employees.  In 2012, the Top Track 100 included private companies with turnover ranging from £617 
million to £25,400 million (Fast Track, 2014), of which the Big Four were responsible for auditing just 
over 80%, with the remainder of firms mostly being audited by the Mid Four. 
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turnover, the Big Six market share rose from 15.9% for the subdivision of the smallest 
to 94.1% for the subdivision of the largest private companies.  However, due to data 
collection problems Peel (1997) was unable to go further in his analysis and provide a 
measure of supplier concentration based on audit fees, nor was he able to make 
comparisons to additional measures of concentration thus providing a limited picture of 
the private firm audit market.  
While a small number of studies have examined the private company audit market 
share of the larger audit firms, their data collection methods and sample compositions 
vary greatly (Moizer and Turley, 1987; Abidin et al., 2010).  For example, in a study on 
audit pricing, Chaney et al. (2004) find around half their sample of 15,484 private firms 
use a Big Five auditor between 1994 and 1998 and, similar to Peel (1997), report the 
Big Five audit 87% of the largest private companies, compared to 28% of the smallest.  
However, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) report the Big Five audit only 19% of their 
sample of 54,778 private companies between 1990-2000 when investigating the 
earnings quality of private UK firms. Moreover, Clatworthy et al. (2009) report an even 
lower Big Four market share of 8.3% when studying whether a Big Four premium 
exists in the private firm audit market in 1994 and suggest that the difference between 
their findings and Chaney et al. (2004) may be attributable to the different data 
collection methods from the Bureau Van Dijk ‘Financial Analysis Made Easy’ (FAME) 
database. 
These studies may, further, be misstating the real market share of the large audit 
firms since they measure market share primarily using the number of clients audited by 
each firm rather than the audit fees earned from these clients, which provides a better 
measure of the output required by each auditor (Moizer and Turley, 1989).  Moreover, 
Chapter 4:  Regulation of the Statutory Audit for Private UK Companies 71 
 
the reported audit market share of the large audit firms may be misrepresented due to 
the sample of private companies used. For example, Lennox and Pittman (2011) find 
the Big Four audit between 6% and 7% of their sample of 5,139 private companies in 
2003 and 2004, yet their sample is only comprised of smaller private companies which 
were recently exempt from a statutory audit. Finally, the reported private company audit 
market share will depend on the independence of the private companies within the 
sample since auditor hiring decisions are routinely made by the holding company rather 
than the subsidiary (Lennox and Pittman, 2011).   
This limited, and often mixed, evidence for the private company audit market, 
therefore, suggests that the decision to preclude most private companies from the 
definition of a Public Interest Entity, effectively excluding them from the new audit 
reforms, may be hasty, particularly since these reforms were introduced to improve both 
audit competition and quality.  The greater heterogeneity and wide-ranging size of 
private firms makes the role of auditing less obvious and a constant market share across 
all sub-sectors by the large audit firms less likely. Consequently, the audit market for 
large private companies may exhibit concentration levels and systemic risks similar to 
those observed in the public company audit market, yet there is no planned regulatory 
intervention to address this.  Therefore, given the recent audit reforms for ‘Public 
Interest Entities’, an in depth review of the audit market for private firms is timely and 
necessary to determine whether economically important private companies should be 
subject to similar audit requirements as applicable to Public Interest Entities. 
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4.3 Data 
4.3.1  Sample Selection 
Consistent with prior studies examining the audit market for private UK companies, the 
data is extracted from the Bureau Van Dijk ‘Financial Analysis Made Easy’ (FAME) 
database.  To ensure that no firms in the sample have an individual shareholder with 
sole power to influence the choice of auditor, to begin with all active independent, 
private companies with audited financial statements for the period 2005-2012 are 
downloaded. 30  Next, any firms identified as switching status from a private to public or 
public to private company during the sample period are removed.  Further, to identify 
and remove firms within the financial or utilities sectors (e.g., Firth, 1997; Lennox and 
Pittman, 2011; Dedman and Kausar, 2012) only those companies with a valid SIC 
(2007) code are retained.  Firms in these industries have unique operating reporting 
requirements and include unlisted credit institutions and insurance undertakings, which 
are already classified as Public Interest Entities.   
From this sample, all firms without the necessary annual accounting data such as 
total assets, a minimum turnover of £1,000, a disclosed profit or loss figure, a minimum 
audit fee of £1,000, and a registered office location for a minimum period of two 
consecutive years are removed. 31   A firm’s registered office location is taken into 
consideration because audit fees of firms located in particular regions, for example 
                                                 
30
 The FAME database characterises the degree of independence of a company with regard to the 
ownership of shareholders and included in the download are companies that do not possess a single 
shareholder with enough power to solely influence auditor choice.  This is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
31
 Oxera (2006) finds median audit fees as a percentage of company turnover for FTSE 100 firms to be 
0.05%, increasing to 0.20% for the smaller FTSE fledgling companies.  In a sample of smaller private 
firms, audit fees as a percentage of sales is expected to be higher than those for listed firms and a fees to 
sales ratio of 10% would provide us with a minimum fee threshold of £1,000 (based on the minimum 
turnover in the final sample being £13,000).  
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London, are expected to reflect the higher cost of living differentials (Peel, 2013), 
which may affect market share when based on fees.  Following Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) all firm-years where either the key accounting or audit information is missing or 
internally inconsistent are excluded.  Finally, all key accounting variables are trimmed 
at the 1% and 99% levels leaving a final sample of 8,314 independent companies and 
36,118 observations. 32 
The audit firms within the sample are initially classified into Big Four and Non-Big 
Four.  However, since the Big Four audit firms compete, to a large extent, with non-Big 
Four audit suppliers in the market for private company audits  the traditional distinction 
between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms may be inadequate for an audit market 
study which focuses on private independent company audits (Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2008; Dutillieux et al., 2013).  Due to the level of detail required for an 
investigation into the private company audit market, the sample of non-Big Four audit 
firms are therefore further divided into three groups of Mid Four, Small-Tier, and non-
major audit firms.  This is done using the FRC’s ‘Key Facts and Trends in the 
Accountancy Profession’ reports for the relevant years covered by the sample period.  
  
                                                 
32
 For example, profit to sales ratio, fees to sales ratio, return on assets and percentage change in audit 
fees. 
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Table 4.2 Classification of the major UK audit firms and their key characteristics 
Audit firms  
UK audit fee 
income 
(£ millions) 
Number of 
UK offices 
Number of 
UK partners 
Big Four     
Deloitte 381.6 23 991 
Ernst & Young 315.8 20 549 
KPMG 414.3 22 602 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 560.8 40 863 
 
Mid Four a    
Baker Tilly 55.7 28 107 
BDO 86.4 13 196 
Grant Thornton 93.4 25 203 
PKF (UK) 52.7 23 70 
 
Small-Tier b    
Buzzacott 6.9 1 23 
Chantrey Vellacott DFK 8.0 10 46 
Crowe Clark Whitehill 
c
 21.3 9 72 
Haysmacintyre 7.9 1 23 
HLB Vantis Plc 
d
 5.5 19 143 
HW Group 9.4 51 117 
Kingston Smith 10.4 6 60 
Littlejohn 6.4 1 31 
Mazars 38.3 16 115 
MHA Macintyre Hudson 10.1 10 42 
Moore Stephens 12.6 34 156 
RSM + Tenon Group 
e
 30.1 42 244 
Saffery Champness 6.0 10 59 
Smith & Williamson 12.8 11 254 
UHY Hacker Young 9.6 22 83 
Source:  The UK audit fee income is the average of the yearly fee income from audit for the period 2005 - 
2012 according to figures from the FRC’s Key Facts and Trends in the Accountancy Profession.  The 
number of UK offices and number of partners are correct as at 2012. 
a
 Over the sample period the four largest Mid-tier audit firms do not change and in descending order of 
size are: Grant Thornton, BDO, PKF (UK) and Baker Tilly (correct at 2012, the final year of the panel).  
As well as being differentiated in terms of income, the Mid Four and the Big Four are the only audit firms 
covered by the ICAEW Audit Firm Governance Code at the time of the study.   
b
 Audit firms which have appeared in the top 20 of the FRC’s list of the major auditing firms at any point 
throughout the sample period.  Also included in the group but not individually listed was RSM Robson 
Rhodes prior to its merger with Grant Thornton on 29th April 2007. 
c
 Horwath Clark Whitehill prior to rebrand on 1 October 2010. 
d
 HLB Vantis - number of UK offices and number of partners prior to entering administration on 29th 
June 2010. 
e
 RSM + Tenon Group - resulting from a merger between RSM Bentley Jennison and Tenon Audit on 
29th December 2010, therefore the top 20 group also includes RSM Bentley Jennsion and Tenon Audit.   
On the 22 August 2013 the operating companies in the RSM Tenon group were acquired by Baker Tilly; 
the number of UK offices and number of partners listed is for RSM Tenon 2012 (most recent form of 
group).   
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Table 4.2 reports the categorisation of the Big Four, Mid Four, and Small-Tier audit 
firms, along with their average annual audit fee income, number of UK offices and 
number of UK partners for the sample period.  In total, these firms report a combined 
average annual audit fee income of £2.2 billion of which the Big Four firms earn 78% 
(£1.7 billion).  By comparison, the Mid Four earn 13% (£288 million) of the total audit 
fee income, with the remaining 9% (£195 million) being shared between the Small -Tier 
firms.  In terms of audit fee income, therefore, the Big Four are the market leaders. 
However, there are still significant differences between the four individual firms.  
For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers average annual audit fee income is £560.8 
million, over 1.7 times greater than Ernst & Young’s average income of £315.8 million. 
Compared to the Big Four, the Mid Four firms earn a far lower average income from 
audit fees with Grant Thornton earning the highest income of £93.4 million while, at 
£52.7 million, PKF (UK) earned the lowest.  Finally, for a Small-Tier audit firm, their 
average audit fee income ranges between £6.8 million and £38.3 million, substantially 
lower than the lowest Mid-Four income and confirming the importance of expanding 
the classification of non-Big Four audit firms. 
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4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics by Year: 2005-2012 
Table 4.3 Yearly descriptive statistics by audit firm grouping 
 
Year 
        
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Avg. 
Panel A: Big Four clients 
Obs. 444 471 496 494 570 629 690 655 556 
Turnover (£'000) 47,900 53,200 64,400 81,300 75,200 80,100 86,800 94,600 75,000 
Total Assets (£'000) 52,500 70,600 125,000 145,000 142,000 138,000 141,000 147,000 124,000 
Employees 410 408 466 528 525 534 570 636 520 
Audit Fees (£'000) 30.49 35.92 44.18 53.01 51.11 54.02 59.22 60.89 49.99 
Co.’s reporting non-audit fees (%) 57.43 56.48 59.07 63.77 64.74 65.66 66.67 68.85 63.43 
Non-audit fees proportion (%) 89.41 87.47 90.97 102.56 102.46 80.02 79.38 78.61 87.83 
Auditor switches (%) 
 
2.55 2.82 2.63 3.51 3.97 4.64 4.12 3.21 
 
Panel B: Mid Four clients 
Obs. 372 404 453 474 568 624 672 636 525 
Turnover (£'000) 18,800 18,700 22,000 26,700 25,400 25,900 27,800 30,000 25,100 
Total Assets (£'000) 16,200 16,800 21,900 23,000 22,200 22,600 23,100 26,700 22,100 
Employees 199 198 222 246 224 218 221 233 222 
Audit Fees (£'000) 17.25 17.83 20.49 23.19 23.89 24.28 24.95 27.08 22.99 
Co.’s reporting non-audit fees (%) 41.40 45.30 50.33 51.90 54.05 52.40 55.36 60.22 52.34 
Non-audit fees proportion (%) 88.04 87.45 83.83 73.77 70.33 63.34 73.44 67.80 73.83 
Auditor switches (%)   3.47 3.97 4.64 3.52 2.56 4.32 5.35 3.64 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
Panel C: Small-Tier clients 
Obs. 309 368 377 395 491 572 616 574 463 
Turnover (£'000) 10,500 13,200 15,100 17,500 16,600 15,800 18,100 20,100 16,400 
Total Assets (£'000) 9,207 10,700 12,900 14,900 16,800 16,100 17,600 19,500 15,400 
Employees 152 154 159 164 142 127 145 155 148 
Audit Fees (£'000) 12.52 13.72 14.88 16.51 16.92 16.29 16.51 17.52 15.91 
Co.’s reporting non-audit fees (%) 26.21 25.54 31.83 38.23 39.92 39.86 40.10 40.94 36.52 
Non-audit fees proportion (%) 104.49 100.73 91.90 97.64 100.71 90.02 85.55 88.50 93.12 
Auditor switches (%) 
 
6.25 5.04 4.30 2.65 4.02 6.66 5.05 4.46 
          
Panel D: Non-major clients 
Obs. 2,488 2,985 2,925 2,854 3,297 3,029 3,203 2,983 2,971 
Turnover (£'000) 6,092 5,800 6,659 7,822 9,614 13,000 14,300 15,500 9,992 
Total Assets (£'000) 5,050 5,294 6,100 7,080 7,816 10,100 10,800 11,500 8,058 
Employees 111 120 118 129 118 119 122 129 122 
Audit Fees (£'000) 7.17 7.05 7.65 8.40 10.24 12.80 13.47 14.06 10.22 
Report non-audit fees (%) 12.66 13.03 14.26 16.29 21.60 28.10 31.38 32.52 21.56 
Non-audit fees proportion (%) 93.61 94.61 91.77 101.47 108.86 103.59 107.14 104.20 105.6 
Auditor switches (%)   3.35 3.11 3.08 2.67 3.07 3.62 4.96 3.05 
The sample consists of 36,118 firm year observations for 8,314 unique private companies for the period 2005-2015.  Variable definitions are as follows: Obs., 
number of observations per year; Turnover, average turnover in thousands; Total assets, average total assets in thousands; Employees, average number of employees; 
Audit fees, average total audit fees in thousands; Report non-audit fees, the proportion of companies reporting a figure for non-audit fees; Non-audit fees proportion, 
average of non-audit fees as a percentage of audit fees; Auditor switches, the proportion of companies switching auditor.  The final column shows averages for the 
entire eight year panel. 
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Table 4.3 reports the descriptive statistics by audit firm group presenting the mean of 
each variable on both an annual and aggregate basis.  Consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Peel, 1997; Clatworthy et al., 2009) companies audited by the Big Four are 
significantly larger than clients of the non-Big Four audit firms.  For example, in Panel 
A, Big Four audit clients generate an average turnover of £75 million, while, in Panel B, 
Mid-Four clients generate a significantly lower turnover of £25.1 million. 33 Further, the 
average turnover of a Small-Tier or non-major audit client is lower still at £16.4 million 
and £10 million respectively.  Other measures of client firm size, such as total assets 
and number of employees, continue to highlight the significant differences between the 
audit clients of each group of audit firms. For example, an average Big Four audit client 
employs just over 500 staff, while an average client of a non-major audit firm employs 
less than 130 people. 
The size of the audit client is an important determinant of audit fees as this reflects 
the amount of audit effort required (Pong and Whittington, 1994; Chi, 2004; Feldman, 
2006; Oxera, 2006; McMeeking et al., 2007).  Consistent with this, Table 4.3 shows the 
Big Four audit firms receive an average audit fee of £49,992, almost five times the 
average fee of £10,219 paid to a non-major audit firm. 34  In addition to audit services, 
clients may purchase non-audit services from their auditor which, while relatively 
similar across all audit groups, shows the average non-audit fees paid by private 
companies are either close to or above the 70% limit to be applied to Public Interest 
                                                 
33
 Clatworthy et al. (2009)  report average turnover (total assets) of £39.41 million (£35.62 million) for 
Big Four auditees.  Although similar steps were taken during downloads there are differences between the 
average size of the companies which likely results from the higher audit fee threshold used in the current 
paper (£1,000) in comparison to the smaller threshold (£100) used by Clatworthy et al. (2009) which will 
result in the exclusion of smaller client-firms.  The nature and timing of each sample will also affect the 
firm composition due the requirement in the current paper for firms to possess consecutive years of 
accounting data.    
34
 In comparison, Clatworthy et al. (2009) report average audit fees of £29,050 for Big Four clients.   
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Entities (EC, 2014b, p.8).35  Moreover, as the type of non-audit services provided 
cannot be determined, it may be possible that some of these non-audit services are soon 
to be prohibited for audit clients qualifying as Public Interest Entities. 
In addition to concerns about concentration, both EU and UK investigations raised 
concerns about the low levels of auditor switching and the lengthy auditor tenures for 
listed companies.  Auditor switches are infrequent events with only 2% of FTSE 100 
companies and 4% of all listed companies switching auditor between 1995 and 2004 
(Oxera, 2006) while 31% (67%) of FTSE 100 companies and 20% (52%) of FTSE 250 
companies employed the same auditor for more than 20 (10) years (Competition 
Commission, 2013c).  The findings in Table 4.3 show that the audit switching rates for 
private companies are just as low with an average of between 3.05% to 4.46% switches 
across the four groups of audit firms.   
Moreover, while the exact length of the auditor-client relationship cannot be 
determined from FAME, the low switching rate implies that the auditor tenures for 
these private companies could be similar to those already documented for listed 
companies, which is unlikely to change without similar regulatory intervention 
applicable to Public Interest Entities.  The low switching rate also raises questions 
regarding the reaction of those outside the company when a company does decide to 
change auditors and whether it may send a negative signal.  
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics by Company Size 
Given the importance of auditee size in determining the choice of auditor, the sample is 
partitioned into deciles based on each company’s turnover and further statistics are 
                                                 
35
 Small and medium sized companies are not required to disclose the fees received by auditors in respect 
of non-audit services, the proportion of companies reporting non-audit fees is reported in Table 3. 
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reported in Table 4.4. Panel A shows average total assets (turnover) increase from 
£313,000 (£848,000) in the first decile rising up to £196 million (£120 million) in the 
largest decile, nearly ten times larger than the average total assets of a private company 
in the ninth decile. Further, highlighting the significant size of the average private 
company in the largest decile, in un-tabulated results, collectively, in 2012, companies 
in this decile employed approximately 430,000 people and contributed more than 5% of 
the UK GDP based on sales revenue.36 
Consistent with fees being determined by size, Panel B reports average audit fees 
rising from £3,125 for the smallest private companies up to £76,931 for the largest, 
comparable to the £84,900 average audit fees paid by FTSE Fledgling companies in 
2004, but notably lower than the audit fees paid in the FTSE Small Cap or FTSE 100 
(Oxera, 2006).  Given audit fees relate closely to the size of the auditee, the audit fees-
to-sales ratio allows a better comparison between the audit fees of listed and non-listed 
firms. Panel B, therefore, reports the fee-to-sales ratio for each decile, which shows a 
steady fall from 1.32% in the first decile to 0.17% in the tenth, most likely due to fixed 
costs and audit scale economies (Abidin et al., 2010).   
                                                 
36
 In 2012 real GDP for the UK was £1.5 trillion (Office of National Statistics, 2013) and the total 
turnover of the sample firms included in decile ten for the year 2012 totalled £75.4 billion. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics by company size according to turnover  
  
 Size Decile   
 
Small                 Large 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Panel A: Client-firm characteristics  
Observations 3,616 3,612 3,612 3,612 3,609 3,613 3,612 3,612 3,612 3,608 
Total Assets (£’000) 313 1,092 1,763 2,502 3,432 4,804 6,822 10,700 20,200 196,000 
Turnover (£’000) 848 2,922 4,087 5,352 6,779 8,637 11,100 16,400 27,900 120,000 
Employees 31 74 64 67 79 86 109 140 230 774 
 
Panel B: Audit related characteristics 
Audit Fees (£’000) 3.13 5.21 6.09 7.53 8.85 10.34 12.89 16.47 24.52 76.93 
Fees-to-sales ratio 1.32 0.70 0.58 0.43 0.39 0.32 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.17 
Report non-audit fees (%) 9.43 13.93 17.64 21.71 23.66 28.51 32.06 41.22 58.36 71.90 
Non-audit fees proportion (%) 106.44 100.28 103.91 103.55 90.58 101.05 83.64 81.34 79.94 100.34 
Auditor switches (%)  2.16 2.77 2.63 3.07 2.94 3.54 3.57 4.18 4.32 3.63 
           
The sample consists of 36,118 firm year observations for 8,314 unique private companies for the period 2005-2015.  The size deciles are according to company 
turnover.  The number of companies present in each size decile vary for each year of the sample (i.e. one decile always contains 10% of the sample for that year) 
with the same firm potentially appearing in different deciles depending on yearly sample composition.  To control for this, when reporting results by decile, the 
figures in the table are calculated on both a yearly and an aggregate basis, with the average of the yearly figures being compared with the aggregate figures.  As the 
results are similar, only the aggregate figures are reported for brevity but annual results are available on request.  Variable definitions are as follows: Obs., number of 
observations per year; Turnover, average turnover in thousands; Total assets, average total assets in thousands; Employees, average number of employees; Audit fees, 
average total audit fees in thousands;  Fees-to-sales ratio, average audit fees expressed as a proportion of sales as a percentage; Report non-audit fees, the proportion 
of companies reporting a figure for non-audit fees; Non-audit fees proportion, average of non-audit fees as a percentage of audit fees; Auditor switches, the 
proportion of companies switching auditor.  The averages shown are the aggregate means for each decile. 
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By comparison, in 2004, audit fees represented 0.05% of the median turnover of 
FTSE 100 companies, 0.13% of the FTSE Small Cap, and 0.20% of the FTSE Fledgling 
(Oxera, 2006), similar to the fees-to-sales ratio of 0.17% for the largest private 
companies. Client size, therefore, appears to drive audit fees irrespective of listing 
status.  Further, Panel B shows private companies purchase a large proportion of non-
audit services, regardless of their size.  Together with the low switching rates, this raises 
concerns regarding the overfamiliarity of auditors and their clients and highlights the 
need for regulators to re-examine the audit regulatory requirements applicable to these 
companies.   
In summary, the audit market for private independent companies appears to share 
many characteristics found in the audit market for listed companies. Consequently, 
given the substantial size and subsequent economic importance of these entities, the 
audit market for private companies may require similar reforms to the auditing 
regulations for Public Interest Entities.  To provide a more detailed understanding of the 
audit market for private companies the chapter proceeds by examining the audit choice 
of private firms and audit market concentration levels in more detail. 
 
4.4 Measuring Audit Market Concentration 
Audit market concentration has traditionally been measured using the k-firm 
concentration ratio (Cn) and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) (e.g., McMeeking 
et al., 2007; Abidin et al., 2010) while the Gini-coefficient, traditionally used in 
economic related literature to measure wealth inequality, is used more recently (e.g., 
Quick and Wolz, 1999; Abidin et al., 2010).   
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Therefore, since the Cn is the most widely used method, the first measure of 
audit market share is defined as follows: 
 
 𝐶𝑅𝑘 = 
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑘
1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
1
          (4.1) 
 
Where CR is the concentration ratio calculated for k audit firms, n is the total size of 
the market, and xi is the size of the audit firm measured by a proxy e.g., clients, fees, 
total assets. Modern industrial economics use the level of concentration present in a 
market to classify it into one of four categories. 37   However, this is not a perfect 
measure of market concentration since it only accounts for the market share of the 
largest n firms, ignoring all others (Pong, 1999).  The HHI is, therefore, a better 
measure of market concentration as it accounts for all active firms and provides a better 
indication of the relative market control of the largest audit firms (Wootton et al., 1994; 
Pong, 1999), which is defined as follows: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
1
(∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
1 )
2       (4.2) 
 
Where HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, n is total size of the market, and xi is 
the size of the audit firm. The HHI can range from 0, for an industry with many active 
firms of equal size, to 10,000, for an industry with only one active firm.  However, there 
                                                 
37
 The research field defines four main categories of market: (1) monopoly – one firm has a market share 
of 100%, (2) a dominant firm – one firm has a market share between 40% and 99%, (3) a tight oligopoly 
– four firms possess a 60% market share, and (4) effective competition - four firms have less than 40% 
market share and entry into the market is free (Shepherd and Shepherd, 2003, p.13).   
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are different interpretations of what threshold indicates a highly concentrated market. 
For example, the US Department of Justice classify markets as competitive if the HHI is 
below 1,000, moderately concentrated from 1,500 to 2,500, and highly concentrated if 
above 2,500. Conversely, Europe considers a market with a HHI exceeding 1,000 as 
concentrated, and highly concentrated when greater than 2,000 (Barty and Ricketts, 
2014). Moreover, the HHI still gives greater weight to large firms and, despite the 
differences which exist between the Cn and HHI, the two measures can be highly 
correlated (Pong, 1999).  For the third measure of concentration the Gini coefficient is 
therefore used, which is a market wide measure of concentration that does not place 
greater weight on larger audit firms, nor is it easily affected by changes in population 
size, as follows: 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  
2
  𝑛2𝑥̅   
 ∑ [(𝑖 − 
𝑛+1
2
) 𝑥𝑖]
𝑛
𝑖=1        (4.3) 
 
Where Gini is the Gini coefficient, ?̅? =  
1
𝑛
 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , n is the total size of the market, and 
xi is the size of the audit firm. The Gini coefficient can range from 0, for a market with 
perfect equality, to 100 for a market with perfect inequality.   
For all three models of market concentration, different measures of market size 
can be used. While prior audit studies generally use the number of audits as their main 
proxy, largely due to the minimal data required,  this may understate an audit firm’s real 
value of their market share (Moizer and Turley, 1989).  Using audit fees as an 
alternative measure, therefore, is less likely to understate a firm’s market share and  
should provide a more accurate representation of an audit firm’s output since the 
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measure is not sensitive to the overall population size (Pong, 1999). Moreover, where 
audit fee information is missing, total assets or total sales may be used as a suitable 
proxy for client firm size (Moizer and Turley, 1987).  To provide a detailed report of the 
concentration within the audit market for private UK firms all four measures of market 
size based on the number of audits, audit fees, and company size according to total 
assets and total sales are applied. 
 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Audit Market Concentration by Year: 2005-2012 
Table 4.5 reports the level of auditor concentration from 2005 to 2012 using the three 
measures of concentration calculated using Equations (4.1) to (4.3) and based on the 
four measures of market share.  The findings in Panel A, using market share based on 
the number of audits, shows audit market concentration levels are relatively low 
compared to the listed company audit market where the Big Four audit over 95% of the 
FTSE 350, and all but one of the FTSE 100 companies (Oxera, 2006).  For the sample 
of private companies, the Big Four audit 12% of the private company market, 
comparable to the 8.3% reported by (Clatworthy et al., 2009) in their cross-sectional 
study of private UK firms in 1994. However, when combined, the Big Four and Mid 
Four audit firms (Big Eight) account for 24% of all private company audits, implying 
these two groups each audit a similar numbers of clients and highlighting the need to 
examine market share based on the value of these clients. 
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Table 4.5 Auditor concentration in the UK private company market: 2005 – 2012 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
Panel A: Market share based on number of audits  
CR4 12.29 11.14 11.67 11.71 11.57 12.96 13.32 13.51 12.27 
CR8 22.59 20.70 22.32 22.95 23.10 25.81 26.29 26.63 23.80 
CR20 31.14 29.40 31.19 32.32 33.07 37.60 38.18 38.47 33.92 
HHI 104 94 105 108 98 114 119 124 108 
Gini  55.82 55.82 55.82 55.82 55.82 55.82 55.82 55.82 55.82 
 
Panel B: Market share based on audit fees 
CR4 32.50 33.68 37.03 38.69 34.37 34.95 36.83 36.56 35.58 
CR8 47.91 48.03 52.71 54.93 50.37 50.54 51.95 52.35 51.10 
CR20 57.20 58.08 62.19 64.57 60.17 60.12 61.12 61.56 60.63 
HHI 349 374 464 488 394 402 438 436 418 
Gini  83.63 83.63 83.63 83.63 83.63 83.63 83.63 83.63 83.63 
 
Panel C: Market share based on total assets 
CR4 52.09 55.62 65.53 65.99 63.38 61.60 61.58 60.73 60.81 
CR8 65.56 66.99 76.02 76.02 73.30 71.63 71.39 71.44 71.54 
CR20 71.92 73.55 81.15 81.42 79.76 78.19 78.25 78.47 77.84 
HHI 769 885 1,662 1,532 1,219 1,178 1,134 1,084 1,183 
Gini 91.88 91.88 91.88 91.88 91.88 91.88 91.88 91.88 91.88 
 
Panel D: Market share based on total sales 
CR4 45.60 45.71 47.61 48.92 44.13 43.80 44.18 44.66 45.58 
CR8 60.56 59.50 62.48 64.35 58.97 57.86 57.96 58.41 60.01 
CR20 67.52 68.40 70.98 72.79 67.37 65.70 66.18 66.71 68.21 
HHI 620 628 676 745 574 581 577 578 622 
Gini  93.77 93.77 93.77 93.77 93.77 93.77 93.77 93.77 93.77 
Variable definitions: CR4, k-firm concentration ratio calculated for the Big Four audit firms; CR8,  k-firm 
concentration ratio calculated for the Big Eight (Big Four and Mid Four) audit firms; CR20, k-firm 
concentration ratio calculated for the top 20 audit firms (Big Eight and Small-Tier firms); HHI, the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index; Gini, Gini-coefficient.  The table was repeated for a sample which excluded 
companies with registered offices in London (16.7% of total companies) because audit fees of firms 
located in particular regions, for example London, are expected to reflect the higher cost of living 
differentials (Peel, 2013) which may affect market share when based on fees.  When market shares are 
recalculated excluding these companies, the results are unchanged. 
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Panel B, therefore, reports the concentration statistics based on audit fees and shows 
the market share of the Big Four triples to 36%, while the Big Eight more than doubles 
to 51%.  This difference between the market shares reported in Panel A and B is due to 
the disproportionally larger size of the average private company audited by the Big Four, 
as detailed in Table 4.3. The results show that the Big Four (Big Eight) audit an even 
greater respective share of 60.81% (71.54%) of private companies when market share is 
based on total assets in Panel C, or 45.58% (60.01%) when using total sales in Panel D.  
In contrast to the low market concentration levels based on the number of audits, a 
market share of 60% based on our alternative measures raises concerns that the audit 
market for private companies may exceed the tight oligopoly threshold.  This is 
consistent with evidence from the public company audit market which reports the Big 
Four audit firms focusing on larger, less risky clients (Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; 
Rama and Read, 2006; Hogan and Martin, 2009; Abidin et al., 2010).  
Next, the HHI is calculated using Equation (4.2) and the different measures of 
market share in Panel A to D of Table 4.5.  With the exception of 2007 to 2012 when 
market share is based on total assets, the HHI for the remaining years and market share 
measures are consistently below 1,000 and, therefore, below the European threshold for 
a concentrated market.  In contrast to the concentration ratio, the HHI suggests lower 
concentration in the audit market for private firms. However, when comparing the two 
measures it is important to note that the HHI is a market-wide concentration measure, 
accounting for all active audit firms, whereas the concentration ratio only accounts for 
the market share of the largest n firms, ignoring all others (Pong, 1999).  The private 
market differs to the listed-firm market in that it contains a large number of diverse 
companies with different audit requirements, as detailed in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.  As 
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a result, a larger number of active audit firms compete to meet this demand.  Therefore, 
while this reduces the HHI, it also highlights the importance of examining the market 
concentration based on company size.    
Calculating the Gini coefficient using Equation (4.3) shows considerable inequality 
across auditor participants for all four measures of market share ranging from 55.82 
when market share is based on the number of audits to 93.77 when based on total sales 
for the pooled sample.  By comparison, Abidin et al. (2010) reported a Gini coefficient 
between 86.12 and 96.09 between 1998-2003 for market share measured based on either 
the number of audits or audit fees for their sample of listed UK companies.  The similar 
levels, therefore, suggest a similar inequality in the audit market for private companies 
as that already documented within the audit market for listed companies.  In sum, the 
results in Table 4.5 show an increased dominance of large audit firms as the size of 
private companies increases, a finding well established for listed companies by prior 
studies (e.g., Abidin et al., 2010). The final analysis, therefore, partitions the sample of 
private companies in order to re-examine the concentration of the audit market for 
private firms across size deciles. 
4.5.2 Audit Market Concentration by Company Size 
Table 4.6 reports audit market concentration, using Equations (4.1) to (4.3), across size 
deciles based on total assets and measuring market share based on the number of audits 
and audit fees.   
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Table 4.6 Auditor concentration by company size according to turnover 
  Size decile                  
 
Small                 Large 
 
1 
(n= 3,616) 
2 
(n= 3,612) 
3 
(n = 3,612) 
4 
(n = 3,612) 
5 
(n= 3,609) 
6 
(n = 3,613) 
7 
(n= 3,612) 
8 
(n = 3,612) 
9 
(n= 3,612) 
10 
(n= 3,608)   
 
Panel A: Market share based on number of audits  
CR4 4.95 4.49 6.06 6.01 7.09 9.16 11.02 12.76 18.99 42.68 
CR8  10.20 10.27 11.57 13.90 17.10 21.23 24.89 30.40 38.23 61.81 
CR20 18.39 17.69 19.93 23.50 28.29 33.10 35.35 43.36 50.78 71.70 
HHI 117 69 48 47 65 88 113 173 245 586 
Gini  55.18 51.43 49.81 50.78 55.10 57.93 60.01 64.82 68.22 77.42 
 
Panel B: Market share based on audit fees 
CR4 8.93 7.34 6.66 7.27 8.61 10.30 13.14 15.01 24.37 62.46 
CR8  18.61 18.98 15.78 18.87 22.30 25.22 30.07 33.70 44.61 77.33 
CR20 31.01 29.58 26.18 29.32 34.40 38.35 41.50 48.10 55.91 83.71 
HHI 103 82 63 76 99 122 162 215 316 1,095 
Gini  64.79 66.29 62.76 64.22 66.79 67.71 70.60 72.80 75.06 89.10 
           
The sample consists of 36,118 firm year observations for 8,314 unique private companies for the period 2005-2015.  The size deciles are according to company 
turnover.  The number of companies present in each size decile vary for each year of the sample (i.e. one decile always contains 10% of the sample for that year) 
with the same firm potentially appearing in different deciles depending on yearly sample composition.  To control for this, when reporting results by decile, the 
figures in the table are calculated on both a yearly and an aggregate basis, with the average of the yearly figures being compared with the aggregate figures.  Variable 
definitions: CR4, k-firm concentration ratio calculated for the Big Four audit firms; CR8,  k-firm concentration ratio calculated for the Big Eight (Big Four and Mid 
Four) audit firms; CR20, k-firm concentration ratio calculated for the top 20 audit firms (Big Eight and Small-Tier firms); HHI, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index; 
Gini, Gini-coefficient.  The averages shown are the aggregate means for each decile. 
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Table 4.6 Panel A shows significant differences for the concentration ratios 
measured using the number of audit clients across the size deciles.  While the Big Four 
are only responsible for auditing approximately 5% to 19% of companies in the first 
nine deciles, comparable to the pooled sample in Table 4.5 Panel A, the Big Four share 
more than doubles to 43% for the largest decile of private companies.  However, while 
the Big Four audit almost half of the largest private companies the HHI of 586 in Table 
4.6 Panel A implies a number of additional audit firms competing in decile 10. Yet, the 
Gini of 77.42 suggests considerable inequality across these participants and highlights 
the need to examine market concentration using alternative measures.  
Using audit fees, therefore, to measure market share, show a similar trend in Panel B 
with the Big Four share rising from 9% to 24% across the first nine deciles, but more 
than doubling to 63%, exceeding the tight oligopoly threshold, for the largest decile of 
private companies.  Moreover, while the Big Four and Mid Four appear to have an 
equal market share of the private company audit market across the first nine deciles, the 
Big Four are responsible for the majority of audit fees earned from the largest private 
companies. The Big Four, therefore, appear to dominate the audits of larger private 
companies, which provide the greatest economic rents.   
Moreover, in Table 4.6 Panel B, while the HHI is below the CMA standard for a 
concentrated market in the first nine deciles, the HHI of 1,095 for the largest decile is 
considered concentrated according to CMA standards.  To put this into context with the 
listed company audit market, the HHI based on audit fees was 2,561 for the FTSE 100 
and 1,739 for the FTSE Fledgling for the year 2004 (Oxera, 2006).  This again 
highlights the dominance of a few large audit firms in the audit market for the largest 
private companies.  Regardless of listing status, therefore, audit markets appear to be 
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segmented with the Big Four dominating the audits of the largest private companies and, 
consequently, it may be inappropriate to define a Public Interest Entity for the purposes 
of more stringent audit regulation based on a company’s corporate status without 
reference to its size.  The findings, therefore, highlight the need for regulators to revisit 
the audit regulatory requirements for large private companies and consider revising 
their definition of a Public Interest Entity to include more of these economically 
important firms. 
4.6 Summary and Discussion 
New regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities came into effect in 
June 2016 requiring the mandatory rotation of a company’s auditors every ten years, 
prohibiting the provision of certain non-audit services by audit firms to their clients and 
capping the fees charged for non-audit services that are provided.  These reforms should 
result in greater levels of audit assurance by reducing the overfamiliarity between 
auditors and their clients, increasing the choice between audit firms, and lowering the 
levels of concentration in the top-end of the audit market. However, rather than 
affecting all companies, these changes only apply to those firms defined as ‘Public 
Interest Entities’.  Which, according to the European Commission, are companies where 
undetected material misstatements would have disproportionally greater conseque nces 
for society, shareholders and investors compared to any other undertakings.  
The imprecise nature of this definition has led, therefore, to a variety of 
interpretations across EU Member States, which could limit the intended impact and 
success of these reforms.  Moreover, the narrow definition of a Public Interest Entity 
applied in the UK has been met with unease from the European Commission and 
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questions have been raised as to whether UK legislation is being implemented to suit 
existing structures (ICAEW, 2015a).  This leads to the question as to whether the 
definition of a Public Interest Entity in the UK is justified or whether, by excluding 
private companies from the definition, it results in the exclusion of audit markets that 
potentially warrant regulatory changes similar to Public Interest Entities.   
Using a large panel of independent private company audits in the UK from 2005 to 
2012, the chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the private company audit 
market.  The key findings show that concentration measures based on the number of 
audit appointments significantly understates the market share of the larger audit firms 
when compared to concentration measures based on audit fees or auditee size. 
Therefore, larger audit firms, and most notably the Big Four, audit the majority of 
private companies that provide the greatest economic rents.  Further, partitioning the 
sample by auditee size reveals an audit market where the Big Four maintain a tight 
oligopoly of the largest independent private company audits.  Regardless of listing 
status, therefore, audit markets appear to be segmented with Big Four dominance 
among the largest public and private firms.  
Currently, the UK has excluded private companies from more rigorous audit 
requirements. However, given the findings regarding supplier concentration and the 
economic importance of private companies, it may be inappropriate to define a Public 
Interest Entity for the purpose of more stringent audit regulations based on a company’s 
corporate status, without reference to its size.  Regulators therefore need to reconsider 
the risk of excluding these businesses from the more stringent audit regulations 
applicable to other Public Interest Entities.  The definition and scope of a Public Interest 
Chapter 4:  Regulation of the Statutory Audit for Private UK Companies 93 
 
Entity needs revisiting both within the UK and across all EU Member States, with a 
view to including more of these economically important private companies. 
In addition to analysing the audit market for private UK firms in terms of supplier 
concentration, the chapter also looked at the frequency of auditor switching.  The 
findings show that switching rates for private companies are comparably low to those 
reported for the public firm audit market.  This suggests that the private company audit 
market will continue to exhibit high levels of concentration for larger sized entities 
unless direct regulatory intervention is planned.  Moreover, with switching occurring so 
infrequently, it prompts questions regarding the consequences for a firm trying to 
switch auditor in such an environment.  Existing studies have found that listed firms, 
who operate in a similarly concentrated audit market with low switching frequencies,  
generally experience adverse capital market effects following a change in auditor.  
However, to date, it is unknown whether private firms face negative market reactions to 
auditor switches, and if they do face a negative reaction, it is unknown exactly how this 
affects private firms.   
To determine whether this is the case the following empirical chapter, Chapter 5, 
therefore examines whether there are any economic consequences for private companies 
following a change in auditor.  In the case of listed firms, capital market reactions have 
been measured via the change in share price following a change in auditor.  As private 
companies do not have a share price, economic consequences will be measured via the 
change in a company’s credit ratings.  As well as being available for the majority of 
private firms, given their reliance on bank-based forms of financing, credit ratings are 
hugely important for private companies. 
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5  
The Economic Consequences of Auditor 
Switching 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In a recent review of auditor switching studies, Stefaniak et al. (2009) questioned 
whether firms switching auditor encountered capital market repercussions and, if so, 
what were they?  They found evidence to suggest that listed firms generally experience 
adverse capital market effects following a change in auditor (e.g., Fried and Schiff, 
1981; Fisher and Fisher, 1993; Lu, 2006) such as a decline in client’s stock price (e.g., 
Knechel et al., 2007; Weiss and Kalbers, 2008).  However Stefaniak et al. (2009) did 
not find any prior studies which looked at this issue for private companies.  The studies 
focusing on the consequences of auditor switching are predominantly based on samples 
of publicly listed firms in the US.   
This is likely because, in comparison to the more opaque private firm market, it is 
easier to investigate the economic consequences for listed firms resulting from an 
auditor switch through analysing the reactions of capital market participants.  
Subsequently, little is known about the reaction to auditor switches by private firms and 
whether changing auditor holds any economic consequences.  However, given the 
similarities between the listed and private company audit markets found in Chapter 4, 
this has become an increasingly important research topic.  Consequently, this chapter 
considers the effect of switching auditor on the credit ratings of UK private companies.   
Private firms constitute the majority of the EU economy and the EU market for audit 
services (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008) and recent data illustrates that over the 
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past 20 years the number of publicly listed companies has declined across a number of 
Western economies (Economides et al., 2016).  For example, since 1997 the number of 
public companies has fallen by 38% in America and by 48% during the last decade in 
Britain (The Economist, 2012).  With public companies in the UK only accounting for 
0.3% of the Companies House register at the beginning of 2013.  As a consequence, the 
performance of private firms impacts on the performance of the wider EU economy 
resulting in them being important for both employment and economic growth (Langli 
and Svanström, 2013).   
In terms of financing, banks are often the main source of financing for private firms, 
with bank overdrafts, credit cards and leasing/hire purchase the most commonly used 
forms of finance for UK small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular (Cosh and 
Hughes, 1998; Cosh et al., 2009).  Access to such forms of finance is largely dependent 
on a company’s credit rating.  Although prior studies have considered the e ffects of a 
voluntary audit (Lennox and Pittman, 2011; Dedman and Kausar, 2012) or the choice of 
a particular  auditor (Fortin and Pittman, 2007) on a company’s credit ratings, it is not 
yet known whether a change in auditor has any effect.  Given their economic 
importance, coupled with the findings from public firm based research, there needs to 
be more empirical evidence on whether there are any economic consequences for 
private firms associated with switching auditor.  If a change in auditor does result in 
adverse economic consequences, such as a change to a company’s credit ratings, it is 
important that private companies are properly informed due to their reliance on bank-
based financing.   
Extant literature classifies the determinants of auditor switching into three broad 
groups - auditor initiated resignation, client initiated change or mandatory legal 
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requirements for auditor rotation.  In the case of non-mandatory auditor switching, 
changes in auditor can often occur for very valid reasons, for example the growth of a 
client-firm (Haskins and Williams, 1990; Johnson and Lys, 1990).  However, studies 
have also looked at determinants of non-mandatory auditor switches related to risk 
factors such as client-firm financial distress (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Hudaib and 
Cooke, 2005), opinion shopping (Chow and Rice, 1982; Craswell, 1988; Citron and 
Taffler, 1992; Lennox, 2000) and disagreements with auditors over reporting matters 
(DeAngelo, 1982; Magee and Tseng, 1990).  There are, however, inherent difficulties in 
determining the precise reason(s) for an auditor switch.  Moreover, in certain 
circumstances the reason provided for the switch may actually mask the true underlying 
determinant of the switch (McConnell, 1984; Krishnan, 1994). 
As there are different reasons underlying an auditor switch, the exact reaction of 
capital markets and the subsequent effect to stock prices may be uncertain (Shu, 2000).  
For example, in their study of voluntary auditor realignments Johnson and Lys (1990) 
failed to find a significant reaction to auditor changes.  Whereas DeFond et al. (1997) 
and Wells and Loudder (1997) find that auditor resignations in particular are met with a 
negative reaction in stock prices.  However, as highlighted by Stefaniak et al. (2009), 
prior studies are predominantly based on samples of publicly listed firms in the US 
where the reason for a switch (e.g., Fried and Schiff, 1981) and the side which initiated 
it (auditor resignation or client dismissal) is often known to researchers via a form 8-
K.38  
                                                 
38 Form 8-K is the current report US companies must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to announce major events that shareholders should know about.  If an auditor is dismissed or 
resigns this then triggers Item 4.01 of Form 8-K, resulting in a company having to file a Form 8-K in the 
next four days following this (SEC, 2016).   
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In the UK, on the other hand, information on the instigator of an auditor switch or the 
reason underlying it is often not readily available to researchers.  Since the 6th April 
2008, according to Sections 522 to 525 of the amended Companies Act 2006, auditors 
and companies have been required to send statements and notices to the ‘appropriate 
audit authority’ when an auditor ceases to hold office.  However, the requirements 
differ depending on whether a company is a listed or a public interest company, with a 
lesser set of requirements applicable to private companies.  Moreover, in 2015 UK 
auditor cessation requirements were simplified, with companies no longer required to 
notify Companies House when an auditor resigns or is removed from office by 
shareholder resolution.  This is more in line with that fact that companies are not 
required to inform Companies House of the appointment of an auditor.  Thus UK 
auditor change information, especially information on the party instigating the change, 
is not readily available from Companies House based databases.   
When a client firm switches auditor it can result in extensive costs, not only for 
themselves but also for the auditor.  DeAngelo (1982)  claims the low rate at which 
firms change auditors is evidence of these significant switching costs.  As a result, in 
addition to the inherent difficulties in determining the precise reason for the switch, 
concerns can therefore often be raised by both regulatory bodies and investors as to the 
true underlying reason for the switch (Kwon and Pan, 2010).  This is why switching 
auditor may influence outcomes, such as a company’s stock price or cost of capital.   
However, in the case of private firms in the UK it remains an empirical question 
whether there are consequences for private firms stemming from a change in auditor, as 
this is yet to be the focus of an empirical investigation.   
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Consequently, this chapter considers the effect of switching auditor on the credit 
ratings of UK private companies.  The contributions of which are threefold.  First, the 
analysis will provide evidence on whether there are economic consequences to private 
firms resulting from a change in auditor whilst also controlling for any changes in the 
level of auditor assurance, i.e. a change between two different tiers of audit firm.  
Although a few studies have touched upon the subject in detail, extant evidence 
suggests that, in the case of private companies, it is the external audit itself and not 
necessarily the choice of audit firm which appears to be of informational value to credit 
stakeholders (Fortin and Pittman, 2007; Kim et al., 2011; Lennox and Pittman, 2011).  
Moreover, relative to the public firm audit market, as Chapter 4 showed, the private 
firm audit market is more heterogeneous with the larger audit firms, such as the Big 
Four, having a more varied market share of clients depending on the segment of the 
market under consideration.  Thus, in the case of private firms, credit rating agencies 
may place more of an emphasis on the act of switching auditor, rather than on the type 
of audit firms involved in the switch.   
Second, comparing credit scores after an auditor change are more likely to provide 
an informative and less noisy measure of audit assurance, relative to alternative 
measures such as the cost of capital or interest rates (Dedman and Kausar, 2012).  For 
example, some companies do not require a loan and subsequently do not have an 
interest rate measure.  Further, for those firms with loans, there is also the chance that 
they are not necessarily renegotiated each year.  Thus it is not always possible to 
compare average interest expense rates immediately following a change in audit firm.  
In addition, in the case of private companies, a director’s ability to provide personal 
security for business loans may influence the availability and cost of capital for private 
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firms, a factor which does not affect company credit ratings constructed from publicly 
available information (Dedman and Kausar, 2012, p.401).  Relative to alternative 
measures, credit ratings are therefore a major informative source for lenders, in addition 
to being updated regularly by credit scoring agencies (Lennox and Pittman, 2011).   
Third, when it comes to a client-firm choosing an auditor there exists an element of 
self-selection which subsequently results in the potential for coefficient bias in 
estimation procedures such as ordinary least squares (OLS) (Maddala, 1991; Chaney et 
al., 2004; Clatworthy et al., 2009; Lawrence et al., 2011; Eshleman and Guo, 2014).  
Much of the accounting literature uses the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure to 
address the issue of self-selection (e.g., Chaney et al., 2004; Mansi et al., 2004; Pittman 
and Fortin, 2004).  However, the successful application of the Heckman model relies on 
the identification of exclusion restrictions, which in practice is very difficult to do, 
being referred to as an ‘intractable task’ by Lennox and Pittman (2010).  The two-step 
Heckman procedure is also susceptible to econometric problems, with the model 
recently shown to be sensitive to both model specification and sample composition 
(Puhani, 2000; Lennox and Pittman, 2010; Lennox et al., 2011).   
The propensity score matching approach has therefore been found to be superior to 
the Heckman two-step model in the current context because it does not involve the 
identification of an exogenous variable that meets the required exclusion criteria 
(Lennox and Pittman, 2010; Eshleman and Guo, 2014).  Due to the challenges 
associated with the Heckman two-step procedure, recent studies have applied the 
propensity score matching approach to control for self-selection bias e.g., Clatworthy et 
al. (2009), Boone et al. (2010), Lawrence et al. (2011), and Eshleman and Guo (2014).  
The chapter therefore investigates the consequences of auditor switching after 
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controlling for self-selection using a propensity score matching technique.  Using this 
statistical technique, switching firms are matched to a non-switching firm with the 
closest propensity score in the year of an auditor switch, with regressions then 
performed on the matched-pairs sample of firms.   Any differences in credit ratings 
between switching and non-switching firms are then able to be attributed to changing 
auditor and not to a client-firm’s pre-existing characteristics (Lawrence et al., 2011).   
The analysis is conducted using a propensity score matched sample of 767 pairs of 
switching and non-switching private UK firms for the period 2006 - 2012.  The initial 
descriptive statistics show, that after matching on similar observable firm characteristics, 
companies switching auditor possess below average credit scores.  Regression results 
then show, after controlling for other known determinants of credit ratings such as 
profitability, switching auditor negatively affects a company’s credit score.  When the 
direction of the auditor switch is then taken into consideration, upward, downward or 
lateral movements between audit firm tiers, the results hold for the firms switching 
laterally between the same tier of audit firm.  The findings suggest that although an 
auditor switch can occur for a number of reasons, when a company changes to an 
auditor of the same tier, the reasons for the switch is harder to explain which 
subsequently transmits a negative signal about a company’s credit risk to those external 
to the firm.   
The remainder of the chapter is as follows.  Section 5.2 discusses prior literature and 
evidence, from which the hypotheses are determined.  Section 5.3 outlines the research 
design and propensity score matching procedure.  Section 5.4 provides descriptive 
statistics and Section 5.5 discusses the regression results.  Finally, Section 5.6 provides 
a summary and discussion of the findings.   
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5.2 Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
In contrast to public firms, private firms typically have more opaque information 
structures  (Brav, 2009; Langli and Svanström, 2013).  For private companies, debt 
contracting is therefore more sensitive to information relative to public companies, with 
lenders likely to demand higher yields on private company debt to compensate for the 
poorer information asymmetry (Fenn, 2000; Santos, 2006; Brav, 2009).  Relative to 
public firms, forms of bank financing such as bank overdrafts, credit cards and 
leasing/hire purchase are often the main source of financing for private firms (Cosh and 
Hughes, 1998; Cosh et al., 2009).  With access to such forms of finance largely 
dependent on a company’s credit rating.  Consequently, as a result of the opaque 
information environment, coupled with the greater reliance on the various forms of 
bank financing, the links  between auditing and credit ratings are likely to be strong in 
private companies (Lennox and Pittman, 2011).   
A small number of studies have previously examined the effect of voluntarily 
purchasing an audit, or audit presence, on a private company’s cost of capital or credit 
ratings.  Evidence from outside the UK suggests that client-firms voluntarily purchasing 
an audit benefit from increased access to capital and lower borrowing costs.  Blackwell 
et al. (1998) study the effect of voluntarily purchasing an audit on 212 revolving credit 
agreements from six banks in the US and find that audited companies pay significantly 
lower interest rates on their revolving credit agreements relative to non-audited 
companies.  Similarly, Allee and Yohn (2009) examine the financial reporting practices 
of privately held US companies which are not subject to regulation by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to test whether voluntarily purchasing an audit has an 
effect on a client-firm’s access to non-equity finance.  Using data on US private 
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companies from the Federal Reserve’s National Survey of Small Business Finances 
(NSSBF), they provide evidence to suggest that companies having their financial 
statements audited benefit in the form of greater access to credit.    
Kim et al. (2011) extend the research of  Blackwell et al. (1998) on a larger scale by 
exploiting the institutional setting of South Korea. In South Korea all companies are 
required to produce financial statements, with companies with total assets less than 7 
billion South Korean won (approximately £4.2million) exempt from the audit 
requirement.  After controlling for other company factors - such as size, leverage, 
profitability and growth - Kim et al. (2011) provide evidence to show private companies 
voluntarily purchasing an external audit benefit from significantly lower interest rate 
spreads by an average of 56-124 basis points.  
Using a large sample of US private firm data, Minnis (2011) examines whether the 
verification of financial statements influences debt pricing with an endogenous 
switching model and finds audited companies to have a 69 basis point lower interest 
rate compared to the unaudited companies in his sample.  Therefore further confirming 
the earlier findings of Blackwell et al. (1998) and Kim et al. (2011).    
In comparison to the non-UK evidence that focuses on borrowing costs, empirical 
research in the UK has focused on the effect of voluntarily purchasing an audit, or audit 
presence, on a company’s credit ratings.  Two studies by Lennox and Pittman (2011) 
and Dedman and Kausar (2012)  both exploit a natural experiment in which voluntary 
audits replaced mandatory audits for UK private companies in order to analyse the 
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economic outcome for private companies stemming from the regime switch. 39  Lennox 
and Pittman (2011) analyse a sample of 5,139 private companies and provide evidence 
to show companies that remain audited once exempt from the requirement enjoy 
significantly higher credit ratings.  Similarly, using a sample of 4,873 newly exempt 
private firms Dedman and Kausar (2012) find firms which retain an audit have 
significantly higher credit scores in comparison to those which opt out of an audit.  
Even after controlling for known determinants of credit score such as profitability, 
client-firm size, and liquidity.   
In addition to the question of whether audit presence has an effect on credit ratings or 
a company’s cost of debt, there is also the issue of auditor choice.  For public 
companies, prior research suggests that the Big Four audit firms supply ‘higher-quality’ 
audits relative to their smaller counterparts (e.g., Lennox, 1999; Peel and Roberts, 2003; 
Francis, 2004; Mansi et al., 2004; McMeeking et al., 2007).  However, evidence on the 
effect of a Big Four auditor on a company’s cost of capital or credit ratings is mixed 
depending on the type of client-firm in question, likely due to the significant differences 
between the public and private company environments (Chaney et al., 2004; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005).  For example, Mansi et al. (2004) use credit ratings to measure the 
perceived benefits to public US companies of employing a Big Four versus a non-Big 
Four auditor and find both auditor quality and tenure to be negatively and significantly 
                                                 
39 In 1994 the UK applied the EC 4th Directive which permitted the UK government to dispense with the 
requirement for small companies to undergo an audit.  Article 51 of the 4th Company Law Directive 
(78/660/EEC) requires all limited companies to have their accounts audited. However, Article 11 gives 
member states an option to exempt smaller companies.  In January 2004 the thresholds for defining a 
company as ‘small’ were raised to EU maxima (SI 2004/16), so a company qualified as ‘small’ if for two 
successive years it met two out of the three size criteria, turnover up to £5.6m, balance sheet total not 
exceeding £2.8m and average employees less than 50.  Consequently, companies qualifying as small, 
with a turnover of up to £5.6m and total assets value up to £2.8m were made exempt from statutory audit  
following the exemption change in January 2004.   
 
Chapter 5:  The Economic Consequences of Auditor Switching 104 
 
related to the cost of debt financing.  Similarly, Pittman and Fortin (2004) report that for 
a sample of newly public US firms, the choice of a Big Six auditor can reduce debt 
monitoring costs which in turn results in lower interest rates.  
In contrast to public firm studies, the evidence on the effect of a Big Four auditor on 
a company’s cost of capital or credit ratings is sparse for private companies.  Fortin and 
Pittman (2007) extend prior research on the role of auditor choice in debt pricing in 
public firms (e.g., Mansi et al., 2004; Pittman and Fortin, 2004) to private firms.   They 
estimate the influence of the presence of a Big Four auditor, along with control 
variables, on the credit ratings assigned to 144A bonds issued by US private firms.  
After controlling for other determinants of debt pricing and non-random selection of 
external auditors, Fortin and Pittman (2007) fail to find that choosing a Big Four auditor 
affects the yield spreads or credit ratings on 144A bonds issued by private firms.  
However, the authors acknowledge that the generality of the results are likely to be 
reduced because the study is based on the more litigious US environment and focuses 
on the 144A debt market.  Thus emphasising the need for similar UK based research. 
In the UK, although not a focus of their paper, Lennox and Pittman (2011) consider 
the effects of auditor choice on credit ratings by removing any observations in which 
there was a change in auditor and repeating their analysis on the reduced sample.  They 
find their results to be very similar and conclude that the change in credit ratings is 
driven by the signal stemming from the decision to remain audited rather than from a 
company’s choice of auditor.  However, Lennox and Pittman (2011) acknowledge that 
the companies in their sample are very small which will consequently impact on auditor 
choice and, as a result, their sample might not be very representative of UK private 
firms in general.  Similar to Lennox and Pittman (2011), despite investigating a 
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different regulatory environment, Kim et al. (2011) also report that for their sample of 
Korean private firms it is the external audit by itself which appears to be of information 
value to credit stakeholders, rather than whether the companies in their sample are 
audited by a Big Four or non-Big Four audit firm.     
Auditor presence and auditor choice have therefore been a focus of previous research, 
with mixed findings depending on the country and type of firm in question.  Existing 
auditing studies are, however, yet to investigate whether there are any economic 
consequences resulting from a change in the choice of auditor, or rather auditor 
switching, for a representative sample of private companies in the UK.  Changing 
auditor can have far reaching consequences for audit firms, client-firms, and other 
stakeholders (Stefaniak et al., 2009).  So it is important that this topic is given further 
consideration in the context of the private company audit market, especially as private 
firms make up the majority of the UK economy and can subsequently impact on its 
performance.  For listed firms, it is easier to investigate the economic consequences 
resulting from an auditor switch through analysing the reactions of capital market 
participants, with research finding that client-firms generally experience adverse capital 
market effects following a change in auditor (e.g., Fried and Schiff, 1981; Fisher and 
Fisher, 1993; Lu, 2006).  In contrast, due to the more opaque reporting environment in 
which they operate, it is more difficult to assess whether there are any economic 
consequences for private firms resulting from a change in auditor - hence the dearth of 
research in this area.   
As previously discussed, there are issues with using interest rates as a proxy for the 
economic consequences following a change in auditor.  Such as the fact that some 
companies do not require a loan and subsequently do not have an interest rate measure 
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and, for those firms with loans, there also exists the possibility that they are not 
necessarily renegotiated each year.  In addition, in the case of private companies, a 
director’s ability to provide personal security for business loans may influence the 
availability and cost of capital for private firms, a factor which does not affect company 
credit ratings constructed from publicly available information (Dedman and Kausar, 
2012, p.401).  Credit scores provided by an external credit ratings agency are therefore 
more likely to provide an objective measure of the solvency of the firm, thus resulting 
in credit ratings being a less noisy measure relative to interest rates.  Moreover, with 
access to the Bureau Van Dijk ‘Financial Analysis Made Easy’ (FAME) database, credit 
ratings are available to download for the majority of private companies in the UK. 
The study therefore initially investigates whether there are economic consequences 
stemming from a company’s decision to change their auditor.  Although there is 
purported to be a strong link between auditing and credit ratings in private companies, 
due to the limited empirical studies actually focusing on credit ratings and the mixed 
findings from extant studies it is difficult to propose a specific directional relationship 
with auditor switching.  Consequently, the following research question is proposed:   
RQ1: Does switching auditor affect a company’s credit ratings? 
As previously discussed, in addition to the question of whether audit presence has an 
effect on credit ratings or a company’s cost of debt, studies have also considered the 
effect of the choice of a particular auditor.  However, to date, there is yet to be a study 
that focuses on the economic consequences resulting from a change in auditor choice.  
With mixed evidence on the effect of a Big Four auditor on a company’s cost of capital 
or credit ratings, there exists the possibility that a switch to an auditor of a particular tier , 
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such as the Big Four, has different economic consequences depending on the direction 
of the switch in question.   
For example, a change between two different tiers of audit firm will involve a client 
moving between auditors of different reputations, such as changing from a higher tier to 
a lower tier auditor, thus potentially sending a specific signal to credit rating agencies.  
On the other hand, for lateral changes between audit tiers, significant differences in 
reputation or technological ability are less likely to be observed (Simon and Francis, 
1988).  Therefore the focus will largely be on the fact that the company has changed 
auditor, rather than ‘upgraded’ or ‘downgraded’ auditor and, in this instance, credit 
rating agencies may therefore discount the choice of auditor and focus on the act of 
switching itself.   
Distinguishing between upward and downward switches (where there is a change in 
auditor tier) and lateral switches (where the change is within the same tier) will 
therefore determine whether it is the choice of auditor that sends a signal to credit rating 
agencies, or whether it is the act of switching by itself.  This results in a second research 
question:   
RQ2: Does switching auditor affect a company’s credit ratings in different ways 
depending on the type of switch in question? 
 
5.3 Research Design and Data 
5.3.1 Sample 
Using the Bureau Van Dijk ‘Financial Analysis Made Easy’ (FAME) database all active, 
independent, private companies with audited financial statements for the period 2005-
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2012 are downloaded.40  The restriction is imposed that the company is independent due 
to the fact that the analysis focuses on firms changing their auditor and auditor hiring 
decisions are routinely made by the ultimate owner rather than at the company level 
(Lennox and Pittman, 2011).  The independence restriction therefore ensures that no 
firms in the sample have an individual shareholder with sole power to influence the 
choice of auditor when switching 
Firms identified as changing their company status from a private to public or public 
to private company during the sample period, firms without a valid SIC (2007) code and 
firms in the financial or utilities sectors are then removed from the initial download 
(Firth, 1997; Lennox and Pittman, 2011; Dedman and Kausar, 2012).  Firms in the 
financial or utilities sectors have unique operating reporting requirements and are 
subject to different audit requirements.  Next, firms without credit ratings or the 
necessary annual accounting data such as total assets, a minimum turnover of £1,000, a 
disclosed profit or loss figure, a minimum audit fee of £1,000, and a registered office 
location are removed. 41  A firm’s registered office location is taken into consideration 
because credit scores are not available for companies without a registered business 
name or business address.  Lagged accounting data is required for the first stage of the 
propensity score matching procedure, so companies without at least two consecutive 
years of data are also removed.  Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005), all firm-years 
                                                 
40  The FAME database characterises the degree of independence of a company with regard to the 
ownership of shareholders.  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
41 Oxera (2006) finds median audit fees as a percentage of company turnover for FTSE 100 firms to be 
0.05%, increasing to 0.20% for the smaller FTSE fledgling companies.  In a sample of smaller private 
firms, audit fees as a percentage of sales is expected to be higher than those for listed firms and a fees to 
sales ratio of 10% would provide us with a minimum fee threshold of around £1,000 (based on the 
minimum turnover in the final sample being £13,000). 
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where either the key accounting or audit information is missing or internally 
inconsistent are also removed.  
As the analysis is focused on companies changing auditor the definition of a change 
of auditor requires some care (Gregory and Collier, 1996).  Prior to identifying auditor 
switches, companies with joint auditors are excluded from the sample as a change in 
one auditor cannot be captured in a binary auditor switching indicator variable.  In 
addition, auditor switches as a result of audit firm mergers are removed, as are 
companies switching multiple times during the panel.  These companies are removed as 
not to confound the inferences being made from the switching models and to ensure 
switching rates only account for a client-firm changing their audit firm to another non-
related audit firm.  Following this, to identify instances where a change in auditor has 
taken place, using the individual company records, current and prior year auditors are 
compared with a binary indicator variable created to denote the occurrence of an auditor 
switch.  As a final data filter, accounting variables at the top and bottom 1% are 
trimmed.42   
The sample selection process results in an initial sample of 33,498 firm-year 
observations for the period 2005 to 2012.43  In total there are 7,825 unique private 
companies, of which, 940 companies switch auditor during the sample period.  The 
resulting sample is then used for the propensity score matching procedure. 
  
                                                 
42 For example, profit to sales ratio, fees to sales ratio, return on assets and percentage change in audit 
fees. 
43 As auditor information is not available for the year prior to 2005, firms switching auditors are unable to 
be identified in this year. Auditor switches in the final sample therefore span 2006-2012, with 2005 used 
to provide data for lagged variables for switching and control firms before removing the year from the 
final sample.   
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5.3.2 Propensity Score Matching  
A propensity score matching procedure is applied to the initial sample of private firms 
in order to obtain a matched sample of switching and non-switching firms.  Originally 
developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), propensity score matching is a statistical 
matching technique which attempts to estimate the effect of a treatment (for example, 
switching auditors) conditional on a vector of characteristics which predict receiving the 
treatment in the first place.  The first step in propensity score matching is to run a 
propensity score model on the complete sample of firms (switching and non-switching) 
within each year, on variables which prior research has shown to act as determinants for 
an auditor switch.  Following Eshleman and Guo (2014) a logit regression is used to 
estimate the model and is as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 1) = 
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛽𝑋
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 
 
𝛽𝑋 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛼5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑅𝐸𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑌𝑅𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
               (5.1) 
 
Where Treat = 1 if the firm is in the treatment group (i.e. switched auditor during the 
panel).  Subscripts i and t indicate firm and year respectively, IND is a vector of dummy 
industry variables and YR indicates dummy variables for the year of data.
 44   
                                                 
44 Industry groupings are according to 2-digit SIC codes. 
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Following prior studies a number of controls are included in the model (e.g., 
Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Chaney et al., 2004; Landsman et al., 2009).  The natural 
logarithm of total assets (LNASSETS) and the level of sales divided by total assets 
(ATURN) are included in the model to control for size (Chaney et al., 2004).  The 
current ratio (CURR), the ratio of debt to total assets (LEV),  and return on assets (ROA) 
are included to control for a client’s financial status (Landsman et al., 2009; Eshleman 
and Guo, 2014).  Receivables and inventory as a fraction of total assets (REC_INV) are 
also included in the model to control for the level of inherent risk (Landsman et al., 
2009).  Finally, a dummy variable (QUAL) is included to indicate the issuance of an 
audit opinion other than unqualified to proxy for risk in completing the audit (Krishnan 
and Krishnan, 1997; Landsman et al., 2009).  As with prior switching studies, the 
explanatory variables are one-year lagged.   
The fitted values of the logit model, or the propensity scores, represent the 
probability that a firm will switch auditor given the set of independent variables.  Once 
each firm has a propensity score it is used to match each treatment (switching) firm with 
a control (non-switching) firm with the closest fitted value in the same year.  During the 
matching process, following Lawrence et al. (2011), a caliper of 0.03 is imposed to 
ensure a close match is found.  Following DeFond et al. (2014) matching with 
replacement is used as it reduces the bias in the treatment effect because each treatment 
firm can be matched to the closest control firm even if that control firm is already 
matched to another treatment firm (DeFond et al., 2014, p.10).   
Of the 940 companies switching auditor 767 are matched to a suitable control firm 
using the caliper of 0.03.  The remaining 173 switching firms are not deemed to have a 
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match close enough, even with replacement, and are therefore not included in the final 
matched sample.    
5.3.3 Credit Ratings Model 
To analyse the consequences of switching auditor on a company’s credit ratings, the 
following credit ratings model is used: 
 
𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      
 (5.2) 
 
Where i and t denote company i in year t, and IND is a vector of industry dummy 
variables.45   
5.3.3.1 Credit Ratings 
A credit rating measures the level of credit risk and differentiates individual credits by 
the risk that they pose.  Credit rating systems can either be internal, for example to 
monitor and evaluate a financial institution’s credit portfolio, or external such as those 
developed by credit agencies as tools which can be used to measure the risk of any firm 
(Doumpos and Pasiouras, 2005).  Following Lennox and Pittman (2011) and Dedman 
and Kausar (2012) the credit ratings analysed are based on the credit ratings issued by 
Qui Credit Assessment Limited and are provided in the FAME database.46  The credit 
                                                 
45 Industry groupings are according to 2-digit SIC codes. 
46 Doumpos and Pasiouras (2005) provide evidence that the ratings provided by Qui Credit Assessment 
Limited are accurate indicators of default risk and reliably capture borrower credit quality (Lennox and 
Pittman, 2011).   
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ratings provided by Qui Credit Assessment Limited, or the ‘Qui Scores’ (QUISCORE ) 
are on a numerical scale from 0 to 100, and quantify the agency’s assessment of the 
likelihood of corporate failure within the next 12 months, with higher ratings 
representing a lower perceived risk of financial failure (Lennox and Pittman, 2011).    
5.3.3.2 Switch Variables 
The switch variable (SWITCH) is the main variable of interest in the model as it 
identifies whether a change in auditor has an effect on a company’s credit ratings.  It is 
important to remember that the coefficient on SWITCH captures the average effect of all 
switches and in the second set of regressions the SWITCH variable is replaced with 
more refined switch variables to denote the direction of a switch.   
To provide additional detail, the traditional distinction between the Big Four and 
non-Big Four audit firms is further refined into the Big Four, the Mid Four and the 
remaining Small-Tier audit firms.  In current studies, after the Big Four, the cut-off 
point for leading mid-tier auditors is optional.   The largest four auditors after the Big 
Four are therefore identified using the FRC’s ‘Key Facts and Trends in the 
Accountancy Profession’ reports for the relevant years covered by the sample period  
(Peel, 2013) and includes Baker Tilly, BDO, Grant Thornton and PKF (UK).  As well 
as being differentiated from other non-Big Four audit firms in terms of income, these 
four mid-tier auditors are the only non-Big Four auditors covered by the ICAEW Audit 
Firm Governance Code.47   
                                                 
47
 The Audit Firm Governance Code, published in January 2010, applies to eight audit firms that together 
audit about 95% of the companies listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. For these 
audit firms, the code sets a benchmark for good governance which other audit firms may wish to 
voluntarily adopt in full or in part (ICAEW, 2010). 
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The direction of a switch is then determined by considering the tier of the previous 
and the new auditor, with three types of auditor switches being identified: UPWARD = 
1 if a client-firm switches from a lower tier to a higher tier auditor, which includes 
changes from Small-tier to Mid Four or Big Four audit firms and changes from Mid 
Four to Big Four firms; LATERAL  = 1 if a client-firm changes auditor but both the 
previous and new auditor are from the same tier; DOWNWARD = 1 if a client-firm 
switches from a higher tier to a lower tier auditor, which includes changes from Big 
Four to either Mid Four or Small-tier firms, and changes from Mid Four to Small-tier 
audit firms.  Of the 767 auditor switches in the matched pair sample 88 are upward 
switches, 494 are lateral switches, and 185 are downward switches. 
5.3.3.3 Control Variables 
The set of control variables follows recent research on the determinants of credit ratings 
(e.g., Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Doumpos and Pasiouras, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Lennox and Pittman, 2011; Dedman and Kausar, 2012).  To control for the age of 
a company, the log of company i’s age in year t (LNAGE) is included in the model.  A 
positive association is expected with credit score because information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders is thought to decrease with firm age (Pittman and Fortin, 
2004; Dedman and Kausar, 2012).  To control for the adequacy of cash ﬂows generated 
through earnings in meeting debt and lease obligations, a company’s interest cover ratio 
(INTCOV) is included.  Credit ratings are expected to be higher for companies with 
greater interest coverage because it implies a better ability to meet obligations 
(Doumpos and Pasiouras, 2005).   
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To control for firm size the log of total sales (LNSAL) is included in the model. 48  
Credit ratings are expected to be higher for companies that are larger as suppliers of 
finance are more likely to retrieve their money even if the company runs into financial 
difficulties if there are more assets to sell (Dedman and Kausar, 2012).  To measure the 
liquidity of a firm, the quick ratio (QUICK) is included in the model.  As the quick ratio 
excludes inventory it is thought to provide more reliable information on the actual 
liquidity of a ﬁrm, relative to the alternative current ratio, with higher credit ratings 
expected for firms with greater liquidity (Doumpos and Pasiouras, 2005).   Finally, the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets (LEV) is included in the model.  If a firm has a 
lower amount of debt relative to its assets there is likely to be a lower risk of financial 
failure, thus a negative relationship between leverage and credit ratings is expected.   
During the period under study, economic conditions will have been mixed across the 
years of data, due to the Financial Crisis taking place around 2008, thus potentially also 
having an effect on a firm’s financial status and subsequent credit rating.  To control for 
this, the sample mean values of credit ratings are subtracted from the individual firm 
credit ratings for each year of the sample.  For example, the deviation between company 
i’s credit rating in 2006 and the mean rating given to every other company in the sample 
in 2006 is calculated as: QUISCOREi2006 – QUISCORE2006.  Similarly, following 
Lennox and Pittman (2011) all of the control variables are purged of any yearly effects 
(Xit – Xt), so when running the regressions the modified credit ratings model becomes: 
 
                                                 
48 In previous studies (e.g., Lennox and Pittman, 2011) to control for firm size the log of total sales 
(LNSAL) and also the log of total assets (LNASSETS) are included in the model.  Due to multicollinearity 
concerns only one size variable is included in the model.  This is discussed further in the results section. 
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𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡 ) +
 𝛽3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 ) + 𝛽4(𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑡 ) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑡 ) +
 𝛽6(𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 −  𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 ) +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
(5.3) 
 
In order to answer the second research question, the SWITCH variable will be 
replaced with the three separate variables to denote the direction of an auditor switch.  
So the regression equation becomes: 
 
𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 
=   𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑃𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽2 𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡 ) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 )
+  𝛽6(𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 −  𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑡 ) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑡 )
+  𝛽8(𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 ) +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(5.4) 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 Panel A provides the industry composition of the sample companies.  There 
are 1,534 companies, of which there are 23.01% operating in the business services 
sector and 20.73% operating in the wholesale and retail trade sector.  One fifth of 
companies (20.47%) also operate in the manufacturing sector.  The research design 
controls for differences between industries by including indicator variables for industry 
classification according to 2-digit SIC codes.  Table 5.1 Panel B details the frequency of 
auditor switches for each year in the sample, and subsequently the number of matched-
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pairs of firms for each year of the sample.  The number of auditor switches ranges from 
87 to 152 across the seven year period.  The increasing number of switches reflects the 
growing number of firms in the FAME database in more recent sample years. 
 
Table 5.1 Sample composition – industry comparisons and the yearly distribution 
of auditor switches 
Panel A: Industry composition     
Industry   Percentage of Sample 
Agriculture, hunting, farming and fishing 
 
 
1.56% 
Business services 
 
 
23.01% 
Construction  
 
 
11.67% 
Hotels and restaurants 
 
 
3.52% 
Manufacturing 
 
 
20.47% 
Mining 
 
 
0.59% 
Other service activities 
 
 
7.04% 
Transport, storage and communication 
 
 
11.41% 
Wholesale and retail trade 
 
 
20.73% 
    Panel B: Sample distribution of auditor switches     
Year Switches Treatment firms Total firms 
2006 95 95 190 
2007 87 87 174 
2008 89 89 178 
2009 101 101 202 
2010 111 111 222 
2011 132 132 264 
2012 152 152 304 
Table 5.1 shows the sample composition of the matched-pairs sample of 1,534 firms, for which there is 
one yearly observation – the year of the switch/match.  Panel A denotes the industry composition of the 
1,534 sample firms.  The broad industry classifications are based on the United Kingdom Standard 
Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (SIC) which is used to classify business establishments 
and other standard units by the type of economic activity in which they are engaged. The most recent 
version of these codes (SIC 2007) was adopted by the UK as from 1st January 2008.  Panel B details the 
number of firms switching auditor each year, after performing the propensity score matching procedure. 
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Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the pooled, switching (treatment) and 
non-switching (control) firms.  From looking at the descriptive statistics and comparing 
the two groups with the pooled statistics, it can be seen that, as expected following the 
propensity score matching procedure, both switching and non-switching firms are 
similar in terms of firm-characteristics.  In terms of size, switching companies have a 
log of total assets (sales) of 15.45 (15.62) and non-switching companies having a log of 
total assets (sales) of 15.78 (15.95).  Table 5.2 also shows that on average, companies in 
the sample are profitable with switching companies earning a mean (median) return on 
assets of 6% (4%) and non-switching companies earning a mean (median) return on 
assets of 7% (5%).  On average, both switching and non-switching companies are also 
similar in terms of liquidity (CURRENT and QUICK) and leverage (LEV).  On average, 
less than 1% of sample companies receive a qualified audit opinion (QUAL). 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics  
    
Pooled sample 
(n = 1,534) 
 
Switching firms 
(n = 767) 
 
Non-switching firms 
(n = 767) 
Variables 
 
Mean Med. S.D. 
 
Mean Med. S.D. 
 
Mean Med. S.D. 
QUISCORE 
 
85.90 90.00 12.18 
 
83.16 90.00 14.70 
 
88.63 91.00 8.11 
QUISCOREit - QUISCOREt 
 
0.00 3.90 11.97 
 
-2.74 2.45 14.22 
 
2.74 4.90 8.35 
ATURN 
 
1.88 1.56 1.64 
 
1.89 1.53 1.65 
 
1.87 1.60 1.63 
CURRENT 
 
2.19 1.36 3.54 
 
1.89 1.25 2.64 
 
2.49 1.46 4.25 
INTCOV 
 
0.62 0.19 0.79 
 
0.70 0.27 0.81 
 
0.54 0.13 0.76 
LEV 
 
0.62 0.60 0.43 
 
0.66 0.66 0.34 
 
0.59 0.53 0.50 
LNAGE  3.25 3.18 0.69 3.07 2.94 0.69 3.42 3.37 0.64 
LNASSETS 
 
15.61 15.69 1.73 
 
15.45 15.59 1.78 
 
15.78 15.82 1.65 
LNSAL 
 
15.78 16.04 1.74 
 
15.62 15.93 1.77 
 
15.95 16.14 1.69 
QUAL 
 
0.02 0.00 0.13 
 
0.01 0.00 0.11 
 
0.02 0.00 0.15 
QUICK 
 
1.64 1.05 2.43 
 
1.48 0.96 2.52 
 
1.80 1.15 2.34 
REC_INV 
 
0.27 0.22 0.24 
 
0.26 0.21 0.24 
 
0.28 0.25 0.24 
ROA 
 
0.07 0.05 0.17 
 
0.06 0.04 0.19 
 
0.07 0.05 0.13 
                          
Notes: The sample comprises 767 matched-pairs of switching and non-switching firms across the period 2006 – 2012.  Variable definitions: QUISCORE = the credit 
score (from 1 to 100), where a higher score implies a better rating for company i in year t; QUISCOREit - QUISCOREt = deviation of company i’s credit score in 
year t from the yearly average credit score of the sample in year t; ATURN = sales divided by total assets; CURRENT = current ratio (current assets/current 
liabilities); INTCOV = interest expense divided by earnings before interest and taxation (following Lennox and Pittman (2011) the interest cover r atio is capped at 
2.00, and a value of 2.00 is assigned if earnings before interest and taxation are negative); LEVERAGE = total liabilities divided by total assets; LNAGE = log of the 
age of company i in year t; LNASSETS = log of total assets; LNSAL = log of total sales; QUAL = 1 if the company has a qualified audit report, 0 otherwise; QUICK = 
quick ratio ((current assets - inventory)/current liabilities); REC_INV = trade receivables plus inventory divided by total assets; ROA = net income divided by total 
assets; TOTAL ASSETS = total assets; TURNOVER = turnover. 
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With regards to the credit ratings of the switching and non-switching firms, 
switching firms have lower credit ratings on average.  The average Qui Score for the 
sample of switching firms is 83.16 and the average for the sample of non-switching 
firms is 5 points higher at 88.63.  When the deviation of each company’s credit score 
from the average Qui Score is considered (QUISCOREit - QUISCOREt) Table 5.2 
shows companies switching auditor have, on average, a credit rating 2.74 points below 
the mean credit rating.  The standard deviation is also larger for the sample of switching 
companies, with the standard deviation at 14.22 in comparison to a standard deviation 
of 8.35 for the sample of non-switching firms, suggesting a greater variation in the 
credit ratings for the firms changing auditor.   
Figure 5.1 builds on the information regarding the Qui Score shown in Table 5.2 and 
presents the yearly average Qui Scores for the pooled sample of firms.  From Figure 1 it 
can be seen that average Qui Scores fluctuate across the sample period, with a 
significant decline in the year 2008 and with averages picking up again in the year 2009 
onwards.  This pattern most likely results from the fact that during the period under 
study economic conditions will have been mixed across the years of data due to the 
Financial Crisis taking place around 2008.  Thus potentially affecting a firm’s financial 
status and subsequent credit rating and hence why it is important to control for any 
economic effects such as this during the panel by purging the variables of any yearly 
effects. 
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Figure 5-1 Average yearly credit ratings measured by the Qui Score, 2006 - 2012 
Figure 5.1 displays the yearly average credit ratings or ‘Qui Scores’ for the matched-pairs sample of 
1,534 switching and non-switching firms for the period 2006 – 2012.  The Qui Scores are issued by Qui 
Credit Assessment Limited and are on a numerical scale from 0 to 100, and quantify the agency’s 
assessment of the likelihood of corporate failure within the next 12 months, with higher ratings 
representing a lower perceived risk of financial failure.   
 
Table 5.3 presents a correlation matrix for the variables in the credit ratings model.  
The main variables of interest (QUISCORE and SWITCH) are negatively and 
significantly correlated (-0.225), thus suggesting that a switch in auditor is associated 
with lower credit ratings.  Although judgement about the relationship between auditor 
switching and credit scores is reserved until the regressions have been conducted, the 
initial descriptive statistics (Table 5.2) and the correlation matrix (Table 5.3) appear to 
show companies switching auditor have poorer credit ratings in comparison to non-
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switching firms.  Despite both groups of firms being similar across a number of firm 
characteristics, such as size and profitability 
Table 5.3 also shows that, consistent with prior research (e.g., Lennox and Pittman, 
2011) credit ratings are significantly higher for companies that are older, larger and with 
better liquidity.  While credit ratings are lower for companies that have poor interest 
coverage and higher leverage.  These correlations are consistent with the evidence 
presented in Doumpos and Pasiouras (2005) that Qui’s credit ratings are accurate 
indicators of default risk.   
. 
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Table 5.3 Correlation matrix of key variables used in the credit ratings model 
 
QUISCORE SWITCH INTCOV LEV QUICK LNSAL 
  
     
 
 SWITCH - 0.225 
 
    
 
 
 
(0.000) 
     
 
 INTCOV - 0.284 0.103 
 
   
 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
    
 
 LEV - 0.292 0.083 0.254 
 
  
 
 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
   
 
 QUICK 0.037 - 0.066 - 0.059 - 0.297 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.146) (0.009) (0.021) (0.000) 
  
 
 LNSAL 0.459 - 0.097 - 0.049 0.019 - 0.206 
 
 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.467) (0.000) 
 
 
 LNAGE 0.358 - 0.259 - 0.065 - 0.344 0.080 0.078 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
This table shows the correlation between the key variables, with the p-values in parentheses.  The sample consists of 767 matched-pairs of switching and non-
switching firms for the period 2006 – 2012.  For variable definitions, please see Table 5.2. 
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5.5 Regression Results 
5.5.1 Binary Switch Variable 
Table 5.4 presents the regression results for the credit rating model for all types of 
auditor switch (SWITCH) in order to answer the first research question.  The table 
presents the mean coefficients, two tailed p-values, mean variance inflation factors (VIF) 
and R2 values.  In addition, the model includes controls for the industry classification, 
but these are not reported in the table for brevity.  Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior research that 
examines the determinants of private company credit ratings (e.g., Fortin and Pittman, 
2007; Lennox and Pittman, 2011).  For example, firms receive higher credit scores 
when they are older (LNAGE), larger (LNSAL) and have better liquidity (QUICK) 
(Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Lennox and Pittman, 2011; Dedman and Kausar, 2012).  49  
In line with Lennox and Pittman (2011), the negative and significant coefficient on 
INTCOV shows companies also attract lower credit scores when they have lower 
interest cover and when they are more highly leveraged (LEV). 
 
  
                                                 
49 In previous studies (e.g., Lennox and Pittman, 2011) to control for firm size the log of total sales 
(LNSAL) and also the log of total assets (LNASSETS) are included in the model.  Due to multicollinearity 
concerns only one size variable is included in the main credit ratings model.  For robustness, the model is 
re-run with LNASSETS in place of LNSAL and with both size variables in the model, with the results 
qualitatively similar.  Please see Section 5.5.3 for these results. 
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Table 5.4 The effect of switching auditor on credit ratings: binary switching 
variable 
𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡 ) + 𝛽3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −
 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 ) + 𝛽4(𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑡 ) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑡 ) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 ) +
 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Variables Expected sign Column (1) Column (2) 
    
Intercept  3.682** 1.983 
  (0.048) (0.288) 
SWITCH ? -5.310*** -2.159*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
INTCOVit - INTCOVt ‒  -3.020*** 
   (0.000) 
LEVit - LEVt ‒  -4.044*** 
   (0.000) 
QUICKit - QUICKt +  0.258*** 
   (0.006) 
LNSALit - LNSALt +  3.257*** 
   (0.000) 
LNAGEit - LNAGEt +  3.901*** 
   (0.000) 
    
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes 
VIF Mean  2.97 2.90 
n  1,534 1,534 
R-squared  0.155 0.453 
    
The regression is performed on the complete matched-pairs sample which includes 1,534 matched 
treatment and control firms for the period 2006 - 2012.  Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% percent levels respectively.  SWITCH = 1 if a company changed 
auditor, 0 otherwise.  For the remaining variable definitions please see Table 5.2.   
 
The first research question asks whether changing auditor affects a company’s credit 
ratings.  Starting with the model without controls in Column 1, looking at the SWITCH 
variable the coefficient is negative (-5.310) and statistically significant (p<0.01).  After 
the control variables are added to the model (Column 2) the coefficient on the switch 
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variable (SWITCH) remains negative and highly significant, (-2.159; p< 0.01).  This 
implies that for the companies that switched auditor, credit ratings decreased by over 2 
points.  This finding also reinforces the descriptive evidence in Table 5.2, that firms 
switching auditor have lower credit scores relative to those not changing their auditor.   
As the issue of self-selection has been controlled for using propensity score matching, 
the differences in credit ratings between switching and non-switching firms can be 
attributed to changing auditor and not to the financial characteristics of the client-firm.  
Moreover, the finding that the results are similar regardless of whether control variables 
are included in the credit ratings model is reassuring as it suggests that the results are 
unlikely to be affected by extraneous independent variables (Lennox and Pittman, 2011).   
The first set of regressions therefore provide consistent evidence that firms switching 
auditor experience a decrease in credit ratings compared to companies who do not 
change their auditor.  This initial finding provides further motivation for the second 
hypothesis to determine whether these results hold across the differe nt types of auditor 
switches.   
5.5.2 Switch Direction 
To answer the second research question the binary SWITCH variable is replaced by 
three separate variables to denote the direction of an auditor switch, with the direction 
determined according to the change in auditor tier.  As previously discussed, in order to 
provide additional detail, the traditional distinction between the Big Four and non-Big 
Four audit firms is further refined into the Big Four, the Mid Four and the remaining 
Small-Tier audit firms.  The direction of a switch is then determined by considering the 
tier of the previous and the new auditor, with three types of auditor switches identified.  
The first type of switch, an upward switch (UPWARD), is classified as a change from a 
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lower tier to a higher tier auditor, which includes a change from a Small-tier to a Mid 
Four or a Big Four audit firm and a change from a Mid Four to a Big Four firm.  Lateral 
switches (LATERAL) are classified as a change in auditor but both the previous and new 
auditor are from the same tier.  The final type of switch, a downward switch 
(DOWNWARD) is classified as a change from a higher tier to a lower tier auditor, which 
includes a change from a Big Four firm to either a Mid Four or Small-tier firm, and a 
change from a Mid Four to a Small-tier audit firm.  In the sample there are 88 upward 
switches, 494 lateral switches and 185 downward switches.   
Table 5.5 presents the regression results for the credit rating model with the 
directional switch variables included.  As with the first set of regressions, the 
coefficients on the control variables are consistent with prior research that examines the 
determinants of private company credit ratings (e.g., Fortin and Pittman, 2007; Lennox 
and Pittman, 2011).   
In answer to the second research question, s tarting with the regression minus the 
control variables, Column 1 of Table 5.5 shows the three directional switch variables to 
all have negative coefficients.  With the coefficients on both the LATERAL and 
DOWNWARD variables significant at the 1% level.  The insignificant coefficient on 
UPWARD implies that for companies moving up an auditor tier there are no effects to 
credit ratings resulting from the switch.  One possible explanation for this is that 
companies moving to a higher tier auditor do so for reasons such as growth or 
profitability (Johnson and Lys, 1990) and are therefore potentially less of a credit risk.  
For companies such as this, their reason for switching auditor can be more easily 
explained.  The results therefore suggest that companies switching upwards send a 
different signal about their credit risk relative to those switching downwards or laterally.    
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However, following the addition of the control variables (Column 2) the coefficients 
on the UPWARD and DOWNWARD variables are both insignificant.  In Table 5.5 the 
coefficient on the LATERAL switch variable is the only switch direction variable that 
remains negative and highly significant (-3.418; p< 0.01).  With a lateral switch, 
significant differences in reputation or technological ability are less likely to be 
observed between auditors of the same tier  (Simon and Francis, 1988) consequently 
leading to questions regarding the underlying reason for the change in auditor.   
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Table 5.5 The effect of switching auditor on credit ratings: switch according to 
direction 
 
𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑃𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽2 𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡 ) +  𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 ) + 𝛽6(𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑡 ) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 −
 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑡 ) +  𝛽8(𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 ) +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Variables Expected sign Column (1) Column (2) 
    
Intercept  3.483* 1.642 
  (0.050) (0.351) 
UPWARD ? -1.301 0.401 
  (0.198) (0.667) 
LATERAL ? -6.780*** -3.418*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
DOWNWARD ? -3.425*** 0.002 
  (0.000) (0.998) 
INTCOVit - INTCOVt ‒  -3.126*** 
   (0.000) 
LEVit - LEVt ‒  -4.053*** 
   (0.000) 
QUICKit - QUICKt +  0.245*** 
   (0.009) 
LNSALit - LNSALt +  3.150*** 
   (0.000) 
LNAGEit - LNAGEt +  4.050*** 
   (0.000) 
    
Industry dummies  Yes Yes 
VIF Mean  2.93 2.86 
n  1,534 1,534 
R-squared  0.168 0.462 
The regression is performed on the complete matched-pairs sample which includes 1,534 matched 
treatment and control firms for the period 2006 - 2012.  Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% percent levels respectively.  UPWARD = 1 if a client-firm switches 
from a lower tier to a higher tier auditor, which includes changes from Small-tier to Mid Four or Big Four 
audit firms and changes from Mid Four to Big Four firms; LATERAL  = 1 if a client-firm changes auditor 
but both the previous and new auditor are from the same tier; DOWNWARD = 1 if a client-firm switches 
from a higher tier to a lower tier auditor, which includes changes from Big Four to either Mid Four or 
Small-tier firms, and changes from Mid Four to Small-tier audit firms.  For the remaining variable 
definitions please see Table 5.2.   
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5.5.3 Robustness 
In previous studies (e.g., Lennox and Pittman, 2011) to control for firm size the log of 
total sales (LNSAL) and also the log of total assets (LNASSETS) are both included in 
regression models.  Due to multicollinearity concerns, only one size variable is initially 
included in the main credit ratings model, the log of total sales (LNSAL).  However, for 
robustness, the original credit ratings model is re-run with LNASSETS in place of 
LNSAL followed by the inclusion of both of the size variables (LNASSETS and LNSAL) 
in the model. 
As Table 5.6 shows, in both versions of the model the results for the control 
variables remain consistent with prior research that examines the determinants of 
private company credit ratings.  For the model in Column 1 which includes LNASSETS 
in place of LNSAL, the coefficient on the SWITCH variable remains negative (-2.356) 
and statistically significant (p<0.01).  The coefficient on the switch variable (SWITCH) 
also remains negative and highly significant, (-2.180; p< 0.01) when both size variables 
are included in the model (Column 2).   
Also reported in Table 5.6, are the mean Variance Inflation Factors (VIF), used to 
identify potential problems of multicollinearity.  Multicollinearity is usually regarded as 
being high when the VIF is above 10.  In Column 2 when both size variables are 
included in the model, the mean VIF is similar to the mean VIF when only one of the 
size variables is included in the model.  Thus, the results for the credit ratings model are 
qualitatively similar regardless of the size variable(s) included and multicollinearity 
does not appear to be an issue.   
  
Chapter 5: The Economic Consequences of Auditor Switching 131 
 
Table 5.6 The effect of switching auditor on credit ratings: alternative size 
measures 
Model 1: 
𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡  ) + 𝛽3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 )
+ 𝛽4(𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑡 ) +  𝛽5(𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 −  𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡 )
+ 𝛽6(𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 ) +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 2: 
𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡  ) +  𝛽3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 )
+ 𝛽4(𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑡 ) +  𝛽5(𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑡 )
+ 𝛽6(𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡 ) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 −  𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 ) +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Variables Expected sign Column (1) Column (2) 
    
Intercept  0.560 1.423 
  (0.722) (0.411) 
SWITCH ? -2.356*** -2.180*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
INTCOVit - INTCOVt ‒ -3.615*** -3.288*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVit - LEVt ‒ -2.984*** -3.538*** 
  (0.003) (0.001) 
QUICKit - QUICKt + -0.009 0.170* 
  (0.913) (0.072) 
LNSALit - LNSALt + - 2.022*** 
  - (0.000) 
LNASSETSit - LNASSETSt + 2.972*** 1.356*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
LNAGEit - LNAGEt + 3.694*** 3.764*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Industry dummies  Yes Yes 
VIF Mean  2.89 2.98 
n  1,534 1,534 
R-squared  0.445 0.461 
    
The regression is performed on the complete matched-pairs sample, which includes 1,534 matched 
treatment and control firms for the period 2006 - 2012.  Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% percent levels respectively.  SWITCH = 1 if a company changed 
auditor, 0 otherwise.  For the remaining variable definitions please see Table 5.2.   
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5.6 Summary and Discussion 
In light of the findings from empirical Chapter 4, regarding the high levels of supplier 
concentration and low frequency of auditor switches, this analysis provides an 
important first step in shedding light on the economic consequences to private 
companies resulting from a change in auditor by considering the effects of a switch on a 
firm’s credit ratings.   
To date, a number of studies have touched upon the consequences of auditor 
switching in a public firm context, with the empirical evidence generally supportive of 
the notion that switching auditor is met with negative responses from capital markets, 
such as a reduction in stock price (e.g., Knechel et al., 2007; Weiss and Kalbers, 2008).  
Relative to public firms, for which the consequences of switching can be measured via 
capital markets, there is minimal information known about the consequences of 
switching auditor in a private firm context.  Given their economic importance, and their 
reliance on bank-based forms of financing, it is important that private firms are properly 
informed of the economic consequences that might occur from switching auditor, 
especially while switching remains non-mandatory for this group of firms.  Although a 
change in auditor may occur for valid reasons, such as firm growth (Johnson and Lys, 
1990) the reasons underlying an auditor switch are still not readily available to outsiders. 
In the analysis, to control for the issue of self-selection involved in the auditor choice 
decision, a propensity score matching procedure is used on a sample of UK private 
firms to generate a matched-pairs sample of 1,534 switching and control firms for the 
period 2006 – 2012.  The initial descriptive statistics show both switching and non-
switching firms to be similar in terms of firm characteristics such as profitability and 
leverage but companies switching auditor possess below average credit scores.   The 
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initial regressions then present evidence to show that, after controlling for other known 
determinants of credit ratings such as profitability, companies switching auditor 
experience a significant decrease in their credit ratings compared to non-switching 
companies. 
When the direction of the switch is then considered, the results show that only 
companies switching laterally between the same tier of auditor experience a decrease in 
credit ratings.  Although it initially appeared that downward switches also attracted a 
significant decrease in credit ratings in the regression model without controls, this 
finding could be explained by the addition of the explanatory variables.  When a lateral 
change in auditor occurs differences in reputation or technological ability are less likely 
to be observed between auditors of the same tier consequently leading to questions 
regarding the underlying reason for the change in auditor.   
Although an auditor switch can occur for a number of reasons, when a company 
changes to an auditor of the same tier, the reason for the switch is harder to explain and 
it subsequently transmits a negative signal about a company’s credit risk to those 
external to the firm.  With credit ratings playing such an important role in the financing 
of private companies, it is therefore questioned what drives a company to switch auditor 
if they risk the chance of being penalised by credit ratings agencies.  This consequently 
leads to the question as to whether audit firms are doing anything to attract new audit 
clients through specific pricing strategies, given the lesser audit regulations present the 
in the private firm audit market. 
The final empirical chapter, Chapter 6, therefore examines whether the high levels of 
supplier concentration present in the private company audit market and the low 
frequency of auditor switches has resulted in audit firms attempting to attract new 
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clients via particular pricing strategies.  In particular whether there is discounting by 
audit firms on initial audit engagements, in addition to whether any discounts are 
followed by subsequent price recovery.  Should this be found to be the case, it raises 
concerns regarding competitive pricing and the level of auditor independence in the 
private company audit market.  Moreover, it reinforces the idea of extending some of 
the more stringent audit requirements introduced by the EU Regulation on the Statutory 
Audits of Public Interest Entities to ensure that these economically important firms have 
sufficient oversight.  
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6  
Playing Low-Ball: The Pricing of Initial 
Audit Engagements for UK Private Firms 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The pricing of initial audit engagements has been of interest to both academics and 
regulators for a number of years because of the potential threat to the independence of 
auditors.  In addition to the subsequent undermining of audit quality resulting from 
particular pricing strategies involving a discount in audit fees.  In initial audit pricing 
literature the terms ‘initial discounting’ and ‘low-balling’ are often used 
interchangeably despite referring to slightly different facets of pricing by a new auditor.  
A price discount or price cutting by a new auditor is an initial discount in audit fees for 
a new-client without explicit consideration of the relationship between the audit fee and 
audit costs.  Whereas in literature, the practice of ‘low-balling’ has been defined by 
DeAngelo (1981) as the setting of the initial audit fee below the sum of start-up costs 
plus normal profits.  Low-balling therefore takes audit costs into consideration with a 
critical aspect of the pricing strategy being the initial discounting of the audit fee 
followed by later price recovery (Gregory and Collier, 1996).   
With regards to low-balling, the main concern of regulators is that if an auditor  
accepts an engagement with the expectation that they can offset any losses resulting 
from an initial discount in audit fees with fees or services to be charged in future audits 
then it gives the auditor an interest in the financial success of the client-firm.  This 
could subsequently influence their objectivity when carrying out the examination 
because it creates an economic incentive for the auditor to give a more favourable audit 
Chapter 6:  Playing Low-Ball: The Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements for UK Private Firms 136 
 
opinion to ensure the client’s continued existence (Cohen Commission, 1978; Ghosh 
and Lustgarten, 2006; Huang et al., 2009).50  When severe price competition exists in 
the form of low-balling, concerns have also been expressed over the potential excessive 
time and budget pressures faced by an auditor, as such pressures are believed to 
heighten the incentive to ‘under-audit’ in an attempt to control costs (Stanley et al., 
2015, p.626).   
In reality, low-balling of audit fees (pricing below cost) cannot technically be 
evaluated without knowledge of an auditor’s costs.  In spite of the non-observability of 
auditor’s costs, research has examined if discounts are given in the initial year of an 
audit, with a reduction in fees taken to imply that the presence of low-balling is more 
likely (Huang et al., 2009).  Moreover, studies often conclude that if low-balling is 
found to be present that it is a competitive outcome aimed at securing future economic 
rents (DeAngelo, 1981; Peel, 2013).  Yet there has been very little empirical 
investigation specifically aimed at understanding or providing a link between initial 
audit engagement discounts and the adverse outcomes potentially associated with an 
initial discount, as it is often beyond the scope of analysis (Stanley et al., 2015). 
Of the literature examining the pricing of initial audit engagements, only a few have 
been UK based but provide findings to suggest that there is some form of price 
discounting in the UK listed company audit market (Pong and Whittington, 1994; 
Gregory and Collier, 1996; Peel, 2013).  However, largely due to data constraints, 
                                                 
50 Initial year audits typically involve additional effort from an auditor and if the extra start-up costs are 
not passed along to a client in the form of additional fees the extra costs can be viewed as an investment 
by the auditor who expects a return on these (Huang et al., 2009).  The theoretical model of DeAngelo 
(1981) argues that additional costs in the initial year are sunk costs and economic theory suggests that 
sunk costs should be irrelevant.  However, organisational behaviour research exists (Staw, 1976; Staw 
and Ross, 1987) to show that people do not ignore sunk costs, which forms the basis of the concerns of 
regulators about the impact of low-balling on auditor independence (Huang et al., 2009, p.172).  
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empirical UK-based analysis of the subsequent price recovery of initial audit fee 
discounts has only been considered on a pooled (Gregory and Collier, 1996) or single 
year (Peel, 2013) basis.  Therefore, a UK-based study that considers price recovery over 
a number of years is yet to be conducted. 
Of the UK-based studies, to date, only Peel (2013) has considered the pricing of 
initial audit engagements for a sample of private firms by investigating the extent of 
initial audit fee discounting by the largest eight audit firms.  Although Peel (2013) finds 
discounts to be present for larger quoted companies, the findings suggest that there is an 
absence of price rivalry between the largest eight audit firms to secure initial audit 
engagements in the private corporate market.  In comparison to the public firm audit 
market, the audit market for private firms is more heterogeneous and the overall share 
of audits carried out by the larger audit firms is significantly lower (Langli and 
Svanström, 2013).    
However, as shown in Chapter 4, market share varies according to the basis of 
measurement and the Big Four audit firms still dominate audits among the largest 
private firms.  As supplier concentration in the private audit market is more varied, 
considering the discounts associated with switches only involving the largest eight audit 
firms may not, therefore, provide a true picture of initial audit pricing in the private 
company audit market.  Moreover, recent research from the US presents evidence to 
show that switches between smaller auditors attract larger discounts because they are 
operating in a more competitive market segment (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  
Therefore, before it can be concluded whether competitive pricing or low-balling is 
present in the private firm audit market, a more comprehensive analysis of initial audit 
pricing and patterns of price recovery is required.   
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Regardless of the audit market in question, when determining the presence of an 
initial audit fee discount, an important factor to consider is the type of auditor change 
taking place.  Changes between two different tiers of audit firm will involve a client 
moving between auditors of different reputations, thus potentially introducing bias into 
the results (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  Although switches of different directions 
have been considered in previous studies, the potential bias resulting from reputational 
or quality differences is often overlooked or not properly factored in when analysing 
regression coefficients.   
For example, in the initial audit pricing literature, a significant and negative 
coefficient is taken to imply the presence of a fee discount.  However, in the case of 
downward switches, which involve moving from a higher- to a lower-tier auditor, a 
reduction in fees is to be expected because of the differences between the average 
client-size, as shown in Chapter 3, and the subsequent average audit fees in each tier.  In 
this instance, caution therefore needs to be warranted in interpreting a significant and 
negative coefficient as evidence of a price discount.  Similarly, the absence of a 
significant and positive coefficient is taken to imply that on average, initial start-up 
costs are being discounted because a premium has not been charged to cover them 
(Pong and Whittington, 1994; Peel, 2013).  However, in the case of auditor upgrades, 
on average, a higher tier auditor is expected to have higher fees because of their client 
base, thus increased fees are not necessarily a premium to recover start-up costs.   
In light of the above discussion, the aims of this chapter are threefold.  First, in line 
with the overarching aim of the thesis to provide more detail on the private company 
audit market, the chapter will provide a comprehensive analysis of initial audit pricing 
and price recovery for the three years following an auditor switch for a panel of private 
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UK firms.  Given the economic importance of private firms and the limited knowledge 
of their audit market (Francis et al., 2011) it is important that both academics and 
regulators are properly informed of audit pricing practices in the private firm audit 
market.  As noted by Peel (2013) there are few extant academic studies that have 
researched the initial pricing of audit engagements comprehensively.  Second, the 
chapter will assess the pricing of initial discounts relative to the type of auditor change 
that has taken place, in order to take account of the potential bias from audit quality and 
reputational differences.  This will enable conclusions to be made about initial discounts 
relative to a reduction in audit fees.   
Third, due to the focus on auditor switching, the results of the majority of prior initial 
audit fee literature are potentially confounded by self-selection problems.  A propensity 
score matching technique is therefore applied to take account of this potential bias.  
Using this statistical technique, switching firms are matched to a non-switching firm 
with the closest propensity score in the year of an auditor switch with regressions then 
performed on a matched-pairs sample of firms.   Any differences in audit fees between 
switching and non-switching firms are then able to be attributed to changing auditor and 
not to a client-firm’s pre-existing characteristics (Lawrence et al., 2011).   
The focus of the chapter is therefore on investigating audit pricing and recovery, the 
findings of which will provide valuable information to both academics and regulators 
regarding audit pricing in the private audit market, while also providing a 
comprehensive initial audit pricing study.  Though inferences about auditor 
independence and audit quality can be made in light of the findings of the chapter, it is 
beyond the scope of the analysis to test these directly, thus also providing a potential 
avenue for future research.     
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The analysis is conducted using a matched-pairs sample of 1,596 private UK firms 
spanning an eight year period from 2005 – 2012.  The findings show that a discount is 
associated with initial audit engagements for private firms in the UK.  When auditor 
switches are refined by direction, the results are mixed, with physical discounts present 
for companies switching laterally between audit firms of the same tier and implicit 
discounts present for companies upgrading their auditor.  When price recovery of these 
discounts is considered, for companies upgrading their auditor or switching laterally, 
audit fees increase over the following three year period, thus suggesting that low-balling 
is present in the private company audit market in the UK.  Not only do these findings 
have implications for the private company audit market in the UK, but they also 
demonstrate the importance of considering the type of auditor change relative to the 
potential bias that this might introduce to results. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  Section 6.2 provides a 
summary of prior theoretical and empirical literature on audit fee discounting.  Section 
6.3 poses research questions and Section 6.4 describes the data, variables and method of 
analysis.  Section 6.5 provides descriptive statistics and results, while Section 6.6 
concludes. 
 
6.2 Literature Review: Audit Fee Discounting  
6.2.1 Theoretical Explanations 
Academic research has used a number of theoretical models to explain the practice of 
cutting fees on initial audit engagements.  In one of the first theoretical models, 
DeAngelo (1981) defines the practice of ‘low-balling’ as the setting of the initial audit 
fee below the sum of start-up costs plus normal profits.  This practice of cutting fees on 
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initial engagements is said to arise because incumbent auditors have comparative cost 
advantages over successor auditors as a result of the significant start-up costs in audit 
technology and the transaction costs associated with switching auditors.  As a result, 
incumbent auditors can raise future audit fees above the avoidable costs of producing 
audits, subsequently earning client-specific ‘quasi-rents’ (DeAngelo, 1981).  A ‘quasi-
rent’ is defined by DeAngelo (1981) as the difference between the costs of subsequent 
audits and anticipated future fees,  and it is competition among auditors for this stream 
of future quasi-rents that creates the incentives for potential successor auditors to low-
ball.   
With regards to the implications of low-balling on auditor independence, DeAngelo 
(1981) argues that the initial price discount is actually a competitive response to the 
expectation of future quasi-rents and it is these anticipated quasi-rents that are the real 
source of impaired auditor independence, not the low-balling itself as ‘fee reductions 
are sunk in future periods’ (DeAngelo, 1981, p.113).  In an analysis of start-up costs on 
audit competition, Chan (1999) also argues that price cuts in the initial engagement year 
are a natural consequence of competition among audit firms but contrary to DeAngelo 
(1981) argues that low-balling only occurs in certain market segments where there is 
fierce competition between audit firms.   
Dye (1991) agrees with DeAngelo (1981) and concludes that low-balling should be 
observed in the pricing of audit services, but offers an alternative explanation as to how 
this comes about.  Dye (1991) argues that a critical feature of DeAngelo’s (1981) model 
is the assumption that the incumbent auditor has superior bargaining power relative to 
the client and that it is this power that allows them to raise fees above costs for 
subsequent audits.  Dye (1991) concludes that low-balling is actually driven by the non-
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observability of quasi-rents, rather than the transaction costs of providing the audit 
services.  Firms are then obligated to engage in low-balling to offset investors’ 
expectations that auditors have agreed to attest to ‘boosted’ financial reports (Dye, 1991, 
p.363).  Thus Dye’s (1991) model implies that the practice of low-balling occurs 
because quasi-rents are not publicly disclosed.  
An alternative theoretical explanation for the practice of cutting fees on initial audit 
engagements focuses on the information asymmetry between the incumbent and 
successor auditors.  Schatzberg and Sevcik (1994) modify DeAngelo’s (1981) model 
and posit that low-balling does not result from transaction costs but rather the 
informational advantage held by the incumbent auditor.  Using a similar theory of 
information asymmetry between incumbent and successor auditors, Coate and Loeb 
(1997) claim that audit costs include a component common to all auditors but that there 
is also a private component which varies across auditors.  It is this common component 
of audit costs which subsequently gives rise to a ‘winner’s curse’ scenario.  A winner’s 
curse is said to exist because if an auditor bidding for a new audit engagement does not  
consider the informational advantage held by the incumbent auditor (the private 
component) then they are expected to generate a loss from winning the audit 
engagement because they will subsequently bid a below cost price for the audit.  When 
sophisticated bidders compete for new audits, they raise their bids by an amount to 
compensate for this winner’s curse, and it is this adjustment in bids which is shown to 
play a signiﬁcant role in determining the degree of low-balling (Coate and Loeb, 1997).  
However, they do not associate low-balling with any loss in audit quality. 
The previous theoretical models have been used to explain the discounts associated 
with a general change in auditor.  For audit changes of a particular type, for example 
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movements between two different tiers of auditors, Experience Good Theory has been 
used to explain the initial discounting of audit fees.  According to the theory, brand 
name auditors, such as the Big Four, offer initial audit fee discounts to clients not 
previously audited by an auditor of the same tier in order to let them experience the 
quality of the audit services which they offer.  Discount pricing of higher-priced higher-
quality experience goods (such as a Big Four audit) therefore act as an incentive to 
purchase an audit because it helps to overcome the information asymmetry between the 
audit firm and the audit client regarding the quality of the services offered (Craswell 
and Francis, 1999).   
6.2.2 Non UK-based Empirical Evidence 
Empirical evidence on the initial discounting of audits fees tends to be both time and 
country specific and thus the findings largely depend on the audit market in question.  
For example, the Australian audit market studies by Francis (1984) and Butterworth and 
Houghton (1995) do not find any evidence of initial discounting of audit fees.  Whereas 
a later study by Craswell and Francis (1999) finds there to be some evidence of price 
discounting but in the case of upward switches from a non-Big Eight to a Big Eight 
auditor only. 
The US audit market has received the most attention from academics looking to 
research the pricing of initial audit engagements, and in some cases subsequent price 
recovery, with studies tending to report significant price discounts.  Prior to 2001 US 
firms were not required to publicly disclose audit fees, so studies carried out before this  
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date rely on private surveys.  51  Using a questionnaire survey of 440 publicly traded 
client-firms for the period 1979-1984, Simon and Francis (1988) find fees for initial 
audit engagements to be 24% lower than for continuing engagements.52  This discount 
then drops to 15% for the next two years and following this there is no evidence of a 
significant discount.  Simon and Francis (1988) also repeat their analysis on a sample 
limited to only those firms switching to an auditor of the same tier to mitigate any 
potential confounding effects due to either technological or auditor reputation effects.  
As the analysis using same-tier auditor changes produces the same results as their full 
sample tests, Simon and Francis (1988) conclude that fee cutting may actually 
aggravate the independence problem posed by the existence of quasi-rents discussed by 
DeAngelo (1981).  However tests to prove this were beyond the scope of the study.   
Extending the research of Simon and Francis (1988), Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) 
examine all auditor switches covered  in issues of the Public Accounting Report (PAR), 
an industry newsletter, for the period 1983 to 1987.  For the 389 firms that switched 
auditors, they also find the average discount for initial engagements to be 24%.  
Similarly Turpen (1990) also surveys a sample of publicly traded US companies for the 
period 1982-1984, which includes 57 initial and 89 continuing audit engagements.  
Audit fees for new clients are found to be significantly lower than those for continuing 
engagements (19%) with additional tests also indicating that the discount persists for the 
second year following an auditor change.   
                                                 
51 
On the 15th November 2001 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new auditor 
independence requirements which apply to all proxy statements filed on or after 5th February 2001.  Item 
9 of the SEC’s proxy regulations (Schedule 14a) requires firms to disclose information about the fees 
paid to an independent auditor (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006, p.347). 
52
 Using an unmatched control sample – Simon and Francis (1988) treat 226 firms that did not change 
auditors over the period as control firms.  
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More recently, using publicly disclosed audit fees from Standard & Poor’s, Ghosh 
and Lustgarten (2006) compare the initial discounts given to client-firms in different 
segments of the US audit market, namely the oligopolistic (containing the four largest 
auditors) and atomistic (containing the remaining auditors) segments.  Moreover, to 
overcome the potential biases arising from the impact of audit quality differences 
between auditors, in addition to considering aggregate switches, Ghosh and Lustgarten 
(2006) also focus on lateral switches within each market.  They find that rivalries 
among sellers are more intense among small audit firms and that audit fee discounting is 
actually more extensive in the atomistic segment, with clients receiving an initial 
discount of 24%, compared to a discount of 4% in the oligopolistic market.  Thus the 
findings imply that the magnitude of discounting varies according to the degree of 
competition among auditors.   
Using a similar methodology, for a sample of 17,602 public company firm-year 
observations for the period 2002 – 2005, Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) examine 
whether the practice of fee discounting on initial audit engagements changed following 
the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.    Similar to Ghosh and 
Lustgarten (2006) they present evidence of fee discounting prior to the implementation 
of SOX.  Following the enactment of SOX, however, price discounts only appear in the 
atomistic market segment, suggesting that post-SOX large audit firms in the US no 
longer provide fee discounts for new clients.  One of the explanations put forward by 
Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) for their findings is that the increased threat of litigation 
limits large auditors from offering price discounts to new clients on initial audit 
engagements in the post-SOX years.  However, although robust to alternative 
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specifications, their conclusions are based on an aggregate switch variable that does not 
take account of switch direction.   
A similar US-based study by Huang et al. (2009) also presents findings to further 
suggest that in the post-SOX period new clients of the Big Four audit firms no longer 
appear to receive a discount on their audit fees.  Moreover, for robustness Huang et al. 
(2009) also perform a matched-pairs test to ensure that their results are not being driven 
by industry clustering effects.  After matching each switching firm with a non-switching 
firm on the basis of year, industry and size their results further confirm their original 
findings. 
6.2.3 UK-based Empirical Evidence 
In the UK, only a few studies have examined the pricing of initial audit engagements, 
fewer still which concern private firms.  Pong and Whittington (1994) were the first to 
examine the pricing of initial audit engagements in the UK market.  Using a sample of 
577 large listed companies for the period 1981-1988 they document statistically 
significant price cutting behaviour - but only if a client-firm switched to a non-big eight 
auditor.  However, although the tier of the new auditor was considered, the direction of 
the switch is not able to be determined exactly, resulting in the potential for bias in the 
case of downward switches. 53  They also comment ‘it is also possible to argue that low -
balling takes place whenever a new auditor does not charge a premium to cover set-up 
costs’ (Pong and Whittington, 1994, p.1094).   
                                                 
53 Pong and Whittington (1994) interact the auditor change variable with a Big Eight variable.  Switches 
to a Big Eight auditor, for example, will be therefore be inclusive of both lateral and upward switches 
resulting in some of the switches potentially being affected by a positive bias (upward) and other switches 
(lateral) not. 
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 Building on the work of Pong and Whittington (1994), Gregory and Collier 
(1996) examine whether there is any evidence of fee discounting following a change in 
auditor, in addition to investigating whether there is any evidence of price recovery 
taking place in later years.  For a sample of 399 listed firms for the period 1987 - 1991, 
they find that the initial fee reduction is both large and significant at 22.4% but that it 
does not persist over the following three years. Gregory and Collier (1996) also 
investigate whether the type of auditor change makes a difference to the fee reduction 
experienced, with companies switching laterally between the Big Six audit firms 
benefitting from a discount of 20.2%, and companies changing from a non-Big Six to a 
Big Six auditor benefitting from a discount of 33.6%.  They take this finding to imply 
that in addition to offering initial fee discounts, large auditors have to forego the Big Six 
audit fee premium as an incentive for auditees of smaller firms to change to a premium 
auditor, similar to the theoretical explanation put forward by Experience Good Theory.  
However, due to sample selection issues and the small number of switches of a 
particular direction considered, they issue caution in applying their conclusions to the 
entire UK market for audits.   
 A recent study by Peel (2013) investigates whether there is competitive pricing 
for initial audit engagements between the Big Four and the largest four mid-tier auditors 
(the Mid Four).  To estimate the initial engagement models Peel (2013) uses a sample of 
7,651 companies, of which 6,084 are private and 1,555 are public, for the year 2007.  
More recent data for the year 2010 is then downloaded to test for evidence of price 
recovery.  Peel (2013) presents evidence to show quoted companies switching auditor 
benefit from an average discount of 18.2%.  When the switches are refined by direction 
Peel (2013) finds that larger quoted companies switching between the Big Four benefit 
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from substantial price discounts of 26.7%.  Although quoted clients switching to the 
mid-tier auditors also attract discounts, these are found to be smaller in magnitude.  
However, as previously discussed, a reduction in fees is expected for switches from a 
higher- to a lower-tier auditor, thus it is hard to distinguish between a discount and a 
reduction.  For the aggregate switches, Peel (2013) also provides evidence of price 
recovery in subsequent audits, although due to data availability he warrants caution 
when interpreting the results from particular price recovery years.54 
For the sample of private firms, Peel (2013) finds the evidence to be generally 
consistent with initial start-up costs being discounted, but there is an absence of low-
balling for switches to both Big Four and mid-tier auditors, which he attributes to 
factors such as the premium brand of these auditors, and the comparatively smaller 
market shares held by these large audit firms. 55  Despite the contributions to existing 
literature, Peel (2013) comments that further research on initial engagements is still 
warranted, particularly the use of panel models to estimate initial discount and price 
recovery models over a longer duration.   
 
6.3 Development of Research Questions 
Although Peel (2013) found there to be an absence of low-balling in the private audit 
market, it should be acknowledged that the sample was only inclusive of switches 
which involved the largest eight auditors.  By comparison to the listed company audit 
                                                 
54 Caution is warranted in interpreting the parameters of the variable denoting the year following the 
initial engagement due to limited observations.  For the price recovery model for all auditees there are 3, 
39, 188 and 9 observations for the first to fourth years following a switch respectively (Peel, 2013, 
p.654).     
55
 Due to data availability, Peel (2013) is unable to run a separate price recovery regression for the sample 
of private companies only. 
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market which is heavily dominated by the Big Four (Oxera, 2006), as documented in 
Chapter 4, supplier concentration in the private company audit market differs 
significantly depending on the size of the client-firm in question.  For example, for a 
large sample of private firms Peel (1997) found the Big Six to audit 28.6% of client-
firms, yet when the sample was divided by company turnover, the Big Six market share 
varied from 15.9% for the subdivision of the smallest to 94.1% for the subdivision of 
the largest private companies. 
Similar to Peel (1997),  Chaney et al. (2004) report that the Big Five audited around 
half their sample of private firms but when the sample was then divided by client-firm 
size the share of the Big Five varied from 28% for the smallest companies to 87% for 
the largest companies.  As with the listed company audit market, the Big N audit firms 
therefore dominate the audits among the largest private firms, with supplier 
concentration at the upper end of the market at concerningly high levels.  However, the 
market share of the Big N is considerably reduced when only smaller-client firms are 
taken into consideration.  As supplier concentration in the private audit market is much 
more varied across different size-segments of client-firm, an analysis of price 
discounting in the private firm audit market would therefore benefit from considering 
switches involving all types of audit firm and not just the largest eight.   
When it comes to changing audit firm a client will do so for a variety of reasons: 
audit opinions (Chow and Rice, 1982; Craswell, 1988; Citron and Taffler, 1992); a 
change in corporate management (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Hudaib and Cooke, 
2005); disagreements over reporting matters (DeAngelo, 1982); audit fees (Eichenseher 
and Shields, 1986; Magee and Tseng, 1990); and, financial distress (Schwartz and 
Menon, 1985; Hudaib and Cooke, 2005).  For auditor switches unconnected to fee 
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reduction, the reasons behind the switch are therefore likely to affect the type of switch 
that takes place.  In addition to the subsequent fees that are charged to a new client by a 
successor auditor relative to the incumbent auditor’s fees, thus affecting the 
interpretation of ‘price discounts’ on initial audit fees.  
As highlighted by Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006), if fees are on average higher for 
large auditors because of quality and reputational differences then estimates for auditor 
upgrades in a regression may be positively biased.  While the parameter estimates for 
auditor downgrades may be negatively biased (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006, p.359).  
The only way to mitigate any potential bias from audit quality differences resulting 
from a change in auditor tier is to therefore look at lateral audit switches rather than 
upgrades or downgrades (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  Lateral changes in auditor are 
unlikely to occur as a result of technological or reputation-related reasons because 
significant differences in reputation or technological ability are less likely to be 
observed between auditors of the same tier (Simon and Francis, 1988).56  The potential 
biases therefore call into question the sensibility of considering price discounts for 
initial engagements on an aggregate basis.  Following Simon and Francis (1988) and 
Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006), analysis on auditor changes according to tier are 
therefore likely to provide more information about price discounting in the private 
company audit market. 
However, predicting the direction of a fee change for each different switch direction 
and subsequently proposing why this might be the case is not easy to do.  For example, 
                                                 
56 This point was originally highlighted by Simon and Francis (1988) who repeated their analysis of price 
discounting using only observations auditor changes between the same tier of firm.  Their results suggest 
that initial discounts are not driven by firms which had technological or reputational reasons for changing 
auditors but that they are more consistent with price cutting on new engagements (Simon and Francis, 
1988).   
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if a company wishes to move up to a higher tier auditor because they believe that it will 
add credibility to the company’s reported profits in the financial markets the company 
may not seek a reduction in the audit fee at the time of change.  In fact they may even 
be prepared to pay a higher fee (Gregory and Collier, 1996, p.14).  Another factor to 
take into consideration is the purported fee premium involved with big brand-name 
auditors such as the Big Four (e.g., Pong and Whittington, 1994; Clatworthy and Peel, 
2007; McMeeking et al., 2007).  In a meta-analysis of 147 published audit fee studies,  
Hay et al. (2006) find that the results on audit quality strongly support the observation 
that an audit undertaken by the Big N is strongly associated with higher fees (Hay et al., 
2006, p.176) and in the UK the Big Four premium has been estimated as being as high 
as 18% (Oxera, 2006).  Moreover, for private companies in particular, because there are 
not any current requirements for audit committees or tendering, it is thought that leading 
auditors are more likely to be directly approached by clients.  Resulting in them being 
able to ‘cherry pick’ potential new clients and potentially resulting in less of a discount 
(Peel, 2013).   
On the other hand, according to Experience Good Theory, private companies 
considering moving to a higher tier auditor will have imperfect information about the 
true ‘superior’ value of the audit service.  In order to convince clients of their acclaimed 
brand name services, brand name auditors will therefore have to build their reputation to 
a potential private client.  This can be done via a low introductory price followed by a 
higher regular price in subsequent periods as soon as the consumer has experienced the 
higher (than initially perceived) value of the good (Craswell and Francis, 1999; 
Dutillieux et al., 2013).    
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Alternatively, along a similar premise to Experience Good Theory, a larger, more 
reputable audit firm could agree to continue to audit the company for the same price as 
their previous auditor in the client’s initial engagement year.  On paper this would 
appear as if the new audit firm had not given the new client a discount, thus not flagging 
any independence concerns by regulators.  However, the continuation of the previous 
auditor’s fees could actually be deemed to be an ‘implicit reduction’.  On average, fees 
are higher for larger auditors mainly because of the average size of their clients.  Thus 
when a new client moves to a larger auditor the apparent ‘no discount’ is actually a 
discount relative to the audit firm’s average fees.  Moreover, if fees then increase in the 
following years then the larger auditor could subsequently be accused of low-balling, 
despite not appearing to provide an initial ‘discount’.  The reason for this different 
approach for low-balling could be that as audit firms become larger, or more prominent, 
the level of litigation risk increases and auditors are subject to greater levels of scrutiny.  
In these situations, auditors will therefore want to remain to appear independent and not 
as if they are involved with low-balling as to not draw the attention of regulators.  
When moving to a lower tier auditor, the presence of lower audit fees will not 
necessarily be due to price cutting behaviour (Simon and Francis, 1988).  Fees might be 
lower because the reputation of the new auditor is lower.  Although the direction of 
auditor change has been considered in prior literature, potential bias from audit quality 
differences is often overlooked when interpreting the coefficients on different switch 
variables, particularly when a client-firm moves to a lower tier auditor when it is 
difficult to differentiate a reduction in audit fees from a genuine price discount.  Due to 
the potential bias to results from reputation and quality differences between auditors, 
when investigating initial audit pricing it is therefore important to take i nto account the 
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type of auditor switch that has occurred.  At present, this issue has not been considered 
for the private audit market in the UK.  The conflicting theories result in it being 
difficult to propose exact hypotheses to test so in light of the above discussion the 
following research question is therefore proposed for the private company audit market:  
RQ1:  Do private firms switching auditor receive a discount in the initial year?  
A critical aspect of low-balling behaviour is the initial reduction of the audit fee 
followed by later price recovery (Gregory and Collier, 1996, p.14).  In extant literature, 
the exact period of price recovery differs but tends to be over a period of 1 to 5 years 
(Simon and Francis, 1988; Gregory and Collier, 1996; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; 
Peel, 2013).  If discounts persist and audit fees do not recover to normal levels, an 
alternative conjecture put forward by Gregory and Collier (1996) is that this may 
actually represent ‘short-cutting’ of fees which might persist into future audits.  The 
potential for short-cutting means that it is essential to consider the price recovery of 
initial audit fees before any conclusions can begin to be made regarding low-balling.  
This results in a second research question: 
RQ2: Do any observed discounts provide evidence of price recovery?  
 
6.4 Research Design and Data 
6.4.1 Fee Discounting Model and Variables 
To answer the research questions the following regression model is used, with the 
variable definitions listed in Table 6.1:   
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𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑄𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝐼𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽10𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑌𝑅𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡             
(6.1)                    
 
Where i and t denote company i in year t, and IND is a vector of dummy industry 
variables and YR indicates dummy variables for the year of data.
57 
6.4.1.1 Switch Variables 
The switch variable (SWITCH) is the main variable of interest in the model as it 
identifies any initial discounting of audit fees.  In the regression models, relative to non-
switching (control) companies, a statistically significant and negative coefficient would 
imply that price-discounting is present (Peel, 2013, p.641).  However, as discussed, this 
should actually be interpreted in light of the direction of the switch in question.  
Following prior research (Simon and Francis, 1988; Gregory and Collier, 1996; Peel, 
2013) implied audit fee discounts are calculated via the following transformation: 
 
r = (ex) -1                   (6.2) 
 
Where x is the reported co-efficient on the SWITCH variable, for example, if the 
reported co-efficient is -0.064 the implied fee reduction is 6.20%.   
It is important to remember that the coefficient on SWITCH captures the average 
effect of all switches and in later regressions the SWITCH variable is replaced with 
                                                 
57 Industry groupings are according to 2-digit SIC codes. 
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more refined switch variables to denote the direction of a switch.  To determine the 
direction of a switch three separate tiers of auditor are considered: the Big Four, the Mid 
Four and Small-tier.  After the Big Four, the cut-off point for leading mid-tier auditors 
is optional.  Following Peel (2013) the group of Mid Four auditors is ascertained with 
reference to the FRC’s ‘Key Facts and Trends in the Accountancy Profession’ reports 
for the relevant years covered by the sample period and includes: Baker Tilly, BDO, 
Grant Thornton and PKF (UK).  As well as being differentiated from other non-Big 
Four audit firms in terms of income, these four mid-tier auditors are the only non-Big 
Four auditors covered by the ICAEW Audit Firm Governance Code.58     
The direction of a switch is then determined by considering the tier of the previous 
and the new auditor, with three types of auditor switches being identified: UPWARD = 
1 if a client-firm switches from a lower tier to a higher tier auditor, which includes  
changes from Small-tier to Mid Four or Big Four audit firms and changes from Mid 
Four to Big Four firms; LATERAL  = 1 if a client-firm changes auditor but both the 
previous and new auditor are from the same tier; DOWNWARD = 1 if a client-firm 
switches from a higher tier to a lower tier auditor, which includes changes from Big 
Four to either Mid Four or Small-tier firms, and changes from Mid Four to Small-tier 
audit firms. 
To test for price recovery, following Peel (2013) the SWITCH variable is replaced by 
binary variables (SWITCH1, SWITCH2 and SWITCH3) to denote the three years 
following the auditor change.  
                                                 
58
 The Audit Firm Governance Code, published in January 2010, applies to eight audit firms that together 
audit about 95% of the companies listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. For these 
audit firms, the code sets a benchmark for good governance which other audit firms may wish to 
voluntarily adopt in full or in part (ICAEW, 2010). 
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6.4.1.2 Control Variables  
The principal determinant of audit fees has been found to be client size (e.g., Pong and 
Whittington, 1994; Hay et al., 2006; Peel, 2013).  Pong and Whittington (1994) posit 
that audits have two broad dimensions, ‘an audit of transactions and ver ification of 
assets, with the former related to turnover and the latter to total assets’ (Pong and 
Whittington, 1994, p.1075).  Two size variables are therefore included in the audit fee 
model - the logarithm of total assets (LNASSETS) and the logarithm of total sales 
(LNSAL) (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; Peel, 2013).59  Using the natural logarithm of the 
raw data improves the linear relationship of the size variables with audit fees (Hay et al., 
2006).   
In addition to the size of the client-firm, the complexity of their audit may be seen as 
a dimension of the amount of work involved and a subsequent measure of the time 
required to complete the audit (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006).  In prior literature a 
number of proxies have been used to measure complexity, the model contains two of 
these: the square root of the number of subsidiaries (SQSUBS) and the amount of 
receivables and inventory scaled by total assets (REC_INV). 60  Certain parts of an audit 
require specialised audit procedures which subsequently act to increase audit fees and 
potentially pose a higher risk of error and the two areas most frequently cited as being 
difficult to audit are inventory and receivables (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006).  A 
                                                 
59 For robustness, in place of LNSAL, following Chaney et al. (2004), sales divided by total assets 
(ATURN) is included in an alternative specification of the model to help to attenuate collinearity with 
total assets.  This is discussed in more detail in the results section. 
60 Following Peel (2013) the square root of the number of subsidiaries is used, rather than the log of the 
number of subsidiaries as sometimes used in previous studies because 42% of the sample have zero 
subsidiaries.  The log of this variable would therefore result in almost half of the sample having missing 
values for this complexity measure. 
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combined measure is used as this has been found to act as a better proxy than 
considering these accounts separately (Hay et al., 2006). 
Risk is also an important consideration for auditors, bearing in mind the possibility 
of legal action for auditor negligence and the potential loss of income from future audit 
services, both of which could arise from the failure of the client-firm (Pong and 
Whittington, 1994, p.1076).  A client’s profitability is considered to be a measure of 
risk because it reflects the extent to which an auditor could be exposed to loss in the 
event that a client is not financially viable (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006).  Following 
Chaney et al. (2004) the return on assets ratio (ROA) is included in the model to proxy 
for financial risk.  In addition, leverage can also be used to measure the risk of a client 
failing because it potentially exposes an auditor to loss (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 
2006).  To control for this, the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEV) is also included in 
the model (Chaney et al., 2004).  If an auditor encounters problems when completing an 
audit it can also increase the risk assumed by the auditor due to the additional work 
required which can subsequently act to increase audit fees (Simunic, 1980).  The most 
common proxy for this is a dummy variable (QUAL) to indicate the issuance of an audit 
opinion other than unqualified (Hay et al., 2006).   
Prior literature also strongly supports the observation that the Big N audit firms are 
associated with higher audit fees (Hay et al., 2006).  Following Peel (2013) A binary 
variable denoting a Big Four audit firm (BIGFOUR) is included in the model. 
Following Clatworthy and Peel (2007), a dummy variable indicating a Mid Four auditor 
(MIDFOUR) is also included.  In addition to the type of auditor employed, a variable to 
denote whether a client’s year-end falls in December or March known as the ‘busy’ 
audit period is also included in the model (BUSY).  Any audits conducted during this 
Chapter 6:  Playing Low-Ball: The Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements for UK Private Firms 158 
 
time may be more costly if audit staff are required to work additional hours.  
Conversely, audit firms might offer discounted audit fees for work outside of this period 
(Hay et al., 2006; Peel, 2013).  A variable to denote whether the auditee is located in 
London (LOND) where fees are expected to reflect higher cost of living differentials is 
also included (Peel, 2013).  Audit fees have been reported to differ systematically by 
industry sectors (Gregory and Collier, 1996; Peel, 2013), following Peel (2013) the 
model also includes industry dummy variables (IND) based on a company’s 2-digit SIC 
code.  These variables are unreported for brevity.    
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Table 6.1 Variable definitions 
Variables Definition 
Audit Fee Related Variables 
AFEE  Audit fees 
CHG_AFEE Change in audit fees from previous year 
LNAFEE Natural log of audit fees 
  
Dependent Variables 
ASSET  Total assets 
ATURN Sales divided by total assets 
BIGFOUR 1 if the auditor is one of the Big Four, 0 otherwise 
BUSY 1 if a company has their year-end in March or December, 0 otherwise 
LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets 
LNASSET Natural log of total assets 
LNSAL Natural log of total sales 
LOND 1 if company is located in London, 0 otherwise 
MIDFOUR 1 if the auditor is one of the Mid Four, 0 otherwise 
QUAL 1 if the company has a qualified audit report, 0 otherwise 
REC_INV Trade receivables plus inventory divided by total assets 
ROA Net income divided by total assets  
SAL  Total sales 
SQSUBS Square root of the number of subsidiaries 
  
Switch Variables 
SWITCH 1 if a company switched auditor, 0 otherwise 
UPWARD 1 if a company switches auditor with the direction of the change being from a lower to a 
higher tier auditor.  This includes: Small-tier to Mid Four; Small-tier to Big Four; Mid 
Four to Big Four. 
LATERAL 1 if a company switches between auditors of the same tier.  
DOWNWARD 1 if a company switches auditor with the direction of the change being from a higher to a 
lower tier auditor.  This includes: Mid Four to Small-tier; Big Four to Small-Tier; Big 
Four to Mid Four. 
  
Price Recovery Variables 
SWITCH1 1 if the first year after an auditor switch has taken place, 0 otherwise. 
SWITCH2 1 if the second year after an auditor switch has taken place, 0 otherwise. 
SWITCH3 1 if the third year after an auditor switch has taken place, 0 otherwise. 
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6.4.2 Data  
Consistent with prior studies examining the audit market for private UK companies, the 
data for this sample is extracted from the Bureau Van Dijk ‘Financial Analysis Made 
Easy’ (FAME) database.  To ensure that no firms in the sample have an individual 
shareholder with sole power to influence the choice of auditor when switching, the 
sample is started by selecting all active independent, private companies with audited 
financial statements for the period 2005-2012.61  Next, firms identified as switching 
status from a private to public or public to private company during the sample period 
are removed.  Further, to identify and remove firms within the financial or utilities 
sectors only companies with a valid SIC (2007) code are retained.  Firms in these 
industries have unique operating and reporting requirements and are therefore subject to 
different audit requirements and regulations which could result in them being more 
inclined to choose a particular audit firm (Dedman and Kausar, 2012).   
From this sample, firms without the necessary annual accounting data such as total 
assets, a minimum turnover of £1,000, a disclosed profit or loss figure, a minimum audit 
fee of £1,000, and a registered office location are removed.62  A firm’s registered office 
location is taken into consideration because audit fees of firms located in particular 
regions, for example London, are expected to reflect the higher cost of living 
differentials (Peel, 2013) which may affect the fees charged should they switch audit 
                                                 
61  The FAME database characterises the degree of independence of a company with regard to the 
ownership of shareholders and included in the download are companies which do not possess a single 
shareholder with enough power to solely influence auditor choice.  This is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
62 Oxera (2006) finds median audit fees as a percentage of company turnover for FTSE 100 firms to be 
0.05%, increasing to 0.20% for the smaller FTSE fledgling companies.  In a sample of smaller private 
firms, audit fees as a percentage of sales is expected to be higher than those for listed firms and a fees to 
sales ratio of 10% would provide a minimum fee threshold of £1,000 (based on the minimum turnover in 
the final sample being £13,000). 
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firm.  Companies with non-consecutive panels of data are also removed as it prevents 
identification of a potential auditor change in the missing year.  Following Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) all firm-years where either the key accounting or audit information 
is missing or internally inconsistent are excluded.  As a final data filter, accounting 
variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.63   
Following this, using the individual company records, current and prior year auditors 
are compared to identify instances where a change in auditor has taken place.  
Companies with joint auditors are excluded from the sample as a change in one auditor 
could not be captured in the binary switching variable.  In addition, auditor switches 
resulting from audit firm mergers are removed, as are companies switching multiple 
times during the panel.  These companies are removed as not to confound the inferences 
being made from the switching models and to ensure switching rates only account for a 
client-firm changing their audit firm to another non-related audit firm.   
Moreover, by investigating the effect of involuntary auditor changes (as opposed to 
audit firm mergers) any price discounts and subsequent price recovery observed will 
provide evidence of low-balling rather than observing economies of scale or scope 
(Gregory and Collier, 1996).  The sample selection process results in a final sample of 
34,525 observations for 8,215 independent companies for the period 2005 to 2012, 
during which 981 client-firms switch auditors.64   
  
                                                 
63 For example, profit to sales ratio, fees to sales ratio, return on assets and percentage change in audit 
fees. 
64
 As auditor information is not available for the year prior to 2005, firms switching auditors are unable to 
be identified in this year. Auditor switches in the final sample therefore span 2006-2012, with 2005 used 
to provide data for lagged variables for switching and control firms before being removing the year from 
the sample.   
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6.4.3 Propensity Score Matching 
It is widely accepted in principle that clients self-select their auditors which 
subsequently results in the potential for coefficient bias in estimation procedures such as 
ordinary least squares (OLS) (Maddala, 1991; Chaney et al., 2004; Clatworthy et al., 
2009; Lawrence et al., 2011; Eshleman and Guo, 2014).  As the study concerns the 
decision to change auditors, the issue of self-selection is therefore relevant.  To address 
the issue of self-selection, much of the accounting literature uses the Heckman (1979) 
two-step procedure (e.g., Chaney et al., 2004; Mansi et al., 2004; Pittman and Fortin, 
2004).  However, successful application of this model relies on the identification of 
exclusion restrictions, for example (in the case of this study) finding an exogenous 
variable that is related to the probability of switching auditor in the first stage model, 
but that does not associate with the dependent variable in the second stage model.  In 
practice this is very difficult to do, being referred to as an ‘intractable task’ by Lennox 
and Pittman (2010).  In addition to the difficulties in implementing the two-step 
procedure the approach is susceptible to econometric problems (Puhani, 2000; Lennox 
and Pittman, 2010), with the Heckman two-step model recently shown to be sensitive to 
both model specification and sample composition (Lennox et al., 2011). 
Consequently, as a result of the challenges associated with the Heckman two-step 
procedure, many studies have applied a propensity score matching approach to control 
for self-selection bias e.g., Clatworthy et al. (2009), Boone et al. (2010), Lawrence et al. 
(2011), and Eshleman and Guo (2014).  Propensity score matching, originally 
developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), is a statistical matching technique which 
attempts to estimate the effect of a treatment (for example, switching auditors)  
conditional on a vector of characteristics which predict receiving the treatment in the 
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first place.  In the current context it has been found to be superior to the Heckman two-
step model because it does not involve the identification of an exogenous variable that 
meets the required exclusion criteria (Lennox and Pittman, 2010; Eshleman and Guo, 
2014).   
The first step in propensity score matching is to run a logit propensity score model 
on the complete set of firms (switching and non-switching) within each year, on 
variables which have been shown in prior literature to act as determinants for an auditor 
switch.  Following Eshleman and Guo (2014) a logit regression is used to estimate the 
model and is as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 1) = 
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛽𝑋
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 
 
𝛽𝑋 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼6 𝑅𝐸𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑌𝑅𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
   (6.3) 
 
Where Treat = 1 if the firm is in the treatment group (i.e. switched auditor during the 
panel).  Subscripts i and t indicate firm and year respectively, IND is a vector of dummy 
industry variables and YR indicates dummy variables for the year of data.  The 
remaining independent variables are defined in Table 6.1. 
Following prior literature a number of controls are included in the model.  The 
natural logarithm of total assets (LNASSETS) and the level of sales divided by total 
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assets (ATURN) are included in the model to control for size (Chaney et al., 2004).  The 
current ratio (CURR), the ratio of debt to total assets (LEV),  and return on assets (ROA) 
are included to control for a client’s financial status (Landsman et al., 2009; Eshleman 
and Guo, 2014).  Receivables and inventory as a fraction of total assets (REC_INV) are 
also included in the model to control for the level of inherent risk (Landsman et al., 
2009).  Finally, a dummy variable (QUAL) is included to indicate the issuance of an 
audit opinion other than unqualified to proxy for risk in completing the audit (Krishnan 
and Krishnan, 1997; Landsman et al., 2009).  As with prior switching studies, the 
variables are one-year lagged.   
The fitted values of the logit model represent the propensity scores, or the probability 
that a firm switches auditor, given the set of independent variables.  After obtaining the 
propensity scores each treatment (switching) firm is matched with the control (non-
switching) firm with the closest fitted value in the same year within a caliper of 0.03 
following (Lawrence et al., 2011).  The matching with replacement is used, with 
matches restricted to the common range of propensity scores.  Matching with 
replacement reduces the bias in the treatment effect, because each treatment firm can be 
matched to the closest control firm even if that control firm is already matched to 
another treatment firm (DeFond et al., 2014, p.10).  In effect, the propensity score 
matching procedure creates a pseudo ‘random’ sample that consists of two groups of 
firms – treatment and control.  Any differences between the two groups can therefore be 
attributed to the treatment effect and not to the client-firm’s pre-existing characteristics 
(Lawrence et al., 2011). 
The procedure results in a final sample of 798 pairs of treatment and matched control 
firms on which the regression analysis to test for the presence of price discounting will 
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be performed.65  Following an auditor switch, existing studies indicate that fees return 
to normal levels over periods of 1-5 years (Simon and Francis, 1988; Gregory and 
Collier, 1996; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  To test for price recovery, as the analysis 
will no longer be focussed on price discounting, the year of the auditor switch and the 
three years following a change in auditor will therefore be examined.  In order to be 
included in the price recovery sample companies are therefore required to possess 
complete data for the year of the switch and the following three years.  This restriction 
limits the switches that can be examined to the years 2006 – 2009 which reduces the 
sample to 246 matched-pairs of treatment and control firms.    
 
6.5 Descriptive Statistics and Results 
6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables used to investigate price 
discounting and  presents the mean, median and standard deviation for all variables for 
the matched-pairs sample of 1,596 treatment and control firms, containing 5,490 firm-
year observations for the period 2005 – 2012.  
Table 6.2 shows companies in the sample have average total assets and sales of 
£52.2 million and £31.7 million respectively, and average audit fees are around 
£23,000.  On average, approximately a third of current assets are made up of 
receivables and inventory and companies have a very small number of subsidiaries, the 
average likely being driven by the 42% that have no subsidiaries, hence the need for a 
second complexity variable.  Only a small number of firms receive an audit 
                                                 
65 Of the 981 companies switching auditor 798 are matched to a suitable control firm using a caliper of 
0.03.  The remaining 183 switching firms are not deemed to have a match close enough, even when with 
replacement is used, and are therefore not included in the final matched sample. 
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qualification during the panel and on average 60% of firm-year observations have audits 
during the ‘busy’ audit period.   
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics for the full matched-pairs sample 
 
Full matched-pairs sample 
 
(5,490 firm-years) 
Variables Mean Median Standard Dev. 
AFEE (£m) 0.023 0.012 0.058 
LNAFEE 9.439 9.393 1.024 
ASSETS (£m) 52.200 7.240 566.000 
SAL (£m) 31.700 9.705 148.000 
SQSUBS 1.065 1.000 1.207 
REC_INV 0.271 0.228 0.245 
ROA 0.050 0.033 0.156 
LEV 0.612 0.593 0.408 
QUAL 0.023 0.000 0.149 
BIGFOUR 0.182 0.000 0.386 
MIDFOUR 0.147 0.000 0.354 
BUSY 0.576 1.000 0.494 
LOND 0.202 0.000 0.402 
The table displays descriptive statistics for the 798 pairs of matched treatment and control firms for the 
period 2005-2012.  Please see Table 6.1 for variable definitions.   
 
Table 6.3 presents both a Spearman and Pearson correlation matrix for the main 
variables included in the fee discount models using the matched-pairs sample. 
Consistent with the expectation that larger firms will have larger audit fees, Table 6.3 
reports a high correlation between size (LNASSETS and LNSAL) and audit fees 
(LNAFEE).  The majority of the remaining correlations are below 0.30. 
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Table 6.3 Correlation matrix for the key variables used in the price discounting and price recovery models 
Spearman (below the diagonal) and Pearson (above the diagonal) correlations    
Variable LNAFEE LNASSETS LNSAL SQSUBS REC_INV ROA LEV QUAL BIGFOUR MIDFOUR BUSY LOND 
LNAFEE 
 
0.760* 0.786* 0.617* 0.056* -0.146* 0.003 0.021 0.254* 0.132* 0.083* -0.034 
LNASSETS 0.730* 
 
0.744* 0.521* -0.119* -0.206* -0.112* 0.036 0.235* 0.109* 0.060* -0.148* 
LNSAL 0.750* 0.720* 
 
0.449* 0.255* -0.086* 0.044 -0.051* 0.206* 0.058* 0.023 -0.159* 
SQSUBS 0.630* 0.552* 0.448* 
 
-0.050* -0.108* -0.043 0.050* 0.078* 0.142* 0.045 -0.097* 
REC_INV 0.131* -0.107* 0.324* 0.003 
 
0.037 0.142* -0.068* -0.060* -0.042 -0.042 -0.040 
ROA -0.137* -0.182* 0.00 -0.162* 0.119* 
 
-0.135* -0.024 -0.036 -0.042 -0.020 0.065* 
LEV 0.027 -0.078* 0.099* -0.031 0.182* -0.179* 
 
-0.055* 0.089* 0.009 0.003 0.040 
QUAL 0.029 0.048* -0.051* 0.059* -0.079* -0.015 -0.076* 
 
-0.025 0.043 0.040 0.002 
BIGFOUR 0.236* 0.212* 0.193* 0.072* -0.054* -0.034 0.066* -0.025 
 
-0.196* 0.067* -0.023 
MIDFOUR 0.146* 0.116* 0.057* 0.138* -0.034 -0.046* 0.021 0.043 -0.196* 
 
0.018 -0.007 
BUSY 0.067* 0.045 0.024 0.048* -0.045 -0.026 -0.007 0.040 0.067* 0.018 
 
0.054* 
LOND -0.034 -0.133* -0.159* -0.109* -0.069* 0.044 0.009 0.002 -0.023 -0.007 0.054* 
 Correlations are shown for the full matched-pairs sample containing 5,490 firm-year observations.  * denotes correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level for 
two-tailed tests. Please see Table 6.1 for variable definitions.   
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Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics: matched-pairs and price recovery sample 
Panel A: Matched-pairs sample (798 switches) 
 Switch type 
 Upward   Lateral   Downward   
       
Proportion of total switches (%) 11.40 
 
64.00 
 
24.60 
 
Audit fees (£m) 0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
Change in fees (%) 0.15 
 
0.04 
 
-0.10 
 
Assets (£m) 28.10 
 
64.60 
 
24.90 
 
Sales (£m) 42.60 
 
35.80 
 
22.90 
 
Return on Assets 0.03  0.07  0.02   
Panel B: Price recovery sample (246 switches) 
 Switch type 
 Upward Lateral Downward 
    
Proportion of total switches (%) 11.40 
 
50.80 
 
37.80 
 
Audit fees (£m) 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
Change in fees (%) 0.13 
 
0.08 
 
-0.05 
 
Assets (£m) 21.50 
 
39.60 
 
27.60 
 
Sales (£m) 27.30 
 
38.60 
 
27.80 
 
Return on Assets 0.04  0.07  0.01   
The figures shown for audit fees, change in fees, assets, sales, and return on assets are the averages for 
each switch type for the year of the switch only. 
 
Table 6.4 provides information on the composition of the different switch types, for 
both the matched-pairs sample and the price recovery sample, in addition to key size 
and profitability measures.  Table 6.4 Panel A shows that of the 798 switches in the 
matched-pairs sample, the majority are between auditors of the same tier (64.0%), with 
upgrades and downgrade accounting for 11.4% and 24.6% of total switches 
respectively.  On average, companies upgrading auditor see an increase in fees by 15% 
whereas companies downgrading auditor experience a decrease in fees by 10%.  To test 
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for price recovery, as previously mentioned, only the year of the switch and the 
following three years will be included in the regression model.  This restriction limits 
the switches that can be examined to the years 2006 – 2009, which reduces the sample 
to 246 matched-pairs of treatment and control firms.   
Table 6.4 Panel B shows the composition of switch types is relatively similar across 
the two samples, with the majority of switches being lateral switches (50.8%).  
Companies upgrading auditor still experience a similar increase in fees, 13% on 
average, and companies downgrading auditor experience a decrease in fees, 5% on 
average.  The average size of each company, and hence audit fees, also remains largely 
similar across the two samples, as does average profitability.   
6.5.2 Regression Results: Fee Discounting 
Table 6.5 presents the price discount regression models for all aggregate switches 
(SWITCH).   The table presents the mean coefficients, two tailed p-values, and R2 
values.  In addition, the models include controls for the industry classification and year, 
but are not reported in the table for brevity.  Standard errors are adjusted for firm level 
clustering, and are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  With reference to 
the R2s, all multivariate regression models appear well determined.   
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Table 6.5 Regression results: price discounting model for aggregate switches 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑄𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝐼𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑌𝑅𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Variables Exp. sign 
Column 
(1) 
Column 
(2) 
    
Constant  8.808*** 1.772*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
SWITCH ? -0.190*** -0.051*** 
  (0.000) (0.006) 
LNASSETS +  0.179*** 
   (0.000) 
LNSAL +  0.268*** 
   (0.000) 
SQSUBS +  0.216*** 
   (0.000) 
REC_INV +  -0.066* 
   (0.063) 
ROA -  -0.164*** 
   (0.000) 
LEV +  -0.006 
   (0.725) 
QUAL +  0.177*** 
   (0.000) 
BIGFOUR +  0.198*** 
   (0.000) 
MIDFOUR +  0.137*** 
   (0.000) 
BUSY +  0.052*** 
   (0.000) 
LOND +  0.258*** 
   (0.000) 
    
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
    
Obs.  5,490 5,490 
R-squared  0.140 0.781 
The regression is performed on the complete matched-pairs sample which includes 1,596 matched treatment and control 
firms and 798 switches for the period 2005-2012.  The results are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are 
reported after controlling for firm level clustering. Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% percent levels respectively.  For variable definitions see Table 6.1.  
 
With regards to the control variables, the model in Column 2 shows that the majority 
of the control variables attract coefficients with the expected sign and most are highly 
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significant.  The positive and significant coefficients on LNASSETS and LNSAL show 
that, as expected, the size of a company is a significant driver of audit fees.66  The two 
complexity variables provide mixed findings, the presence of subsidiaries (SQSUBS) 
increases audit fees, but the amount of receivables and inventory (REC_INV) do not, 
which suggests that these balance sheet items are potentially not as much of a factor for 
the audit fees of private companies relative to listed companies.  The coefficient on 
ROA is also in the expected direction and significant, thus implying that profitability 
helps to reduce fees.  Taken together, size and profitability both appear to be 
contributing factors when determining audit fees.   
In addition to the size of a client-firm, the presence the issuance of a qualified audit 
opinion (QUAL), if a client firm has their audit during the busy audit period (BUSY), or 
is located in London (LOND) also act to increase fees.  As previously discussed, larger 
client-firms are more likely to be audited by a larger audit firm so the average audit fees 
of larger auditors are likely to reflect the size of their clients which is reflected in the 
positive and significant coefficients on BIGFOUR and MIDFOUR.   
The first research question asks whether a price is discount associated with initial 
audit engagements, regardless of the type of switch in question.  Starting with the model 
without controls in Column 1, the coefficient on the SWITCH variable is negative (-
0.190) and statistically significant. Using this coefficient in the transformation in 
Equation (6.2) the 798 companies which changed auditors benefit from a mean discount 
of 17.3% relative to the matched sample of continuing audits, implying that price-
                                                 
66 To address the potential multicollinearity concerns associated with the inclusion of two size variables in 
the regressions in Table 6.4, following Chaney et al. (2004) the regressions are repeated with the 
logarithm of total assets (LNASSETS) and asset turnover (ATURN) to attenuate the collinearity with total 
assets.  This is discussed further in the robustness section.   
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discounting is present.  When the same model is run including the control variables, 
(Column 2) the coefficient on SWITCH is again negative (-0.051) and statistically 
significant, and implies a mean discount of 5.0% relative to non-switching firms.  These 
findings are in contrast to the findings of Peel (2013), who did not find a significant 
negative switch coefficient for his sample of private firms.  The differences between 
these findings and those of Peel (2013) can be attributed to the different groups of audit 
firms considered which, highlights the importance of considering price discounting for 
all audit firms and not just the largest eight when focusing on the private company audit 
market.  These results answer the first research question and imply that price 
discounting is present for private companies switching auditors.  However, the SWITCH 
variable needs to be refined before true price discounts can be identified and 
generalisations can be made.   
Although the coefficient on the aggregate switch variable (SWITCH) is negative and 
significant, as discussed in Section 6.3, a lower audit fee in the initial year with a new 
audit firm does not necessarily imply the presence of an audit fee discount.  Similarly, 
the lack of one does not imply the absence of a discount either.   Changes in audit fee 
need to be evaluated in terms of the auditor change in question.  Table 6.6 therefore 
presents the price discount regression models for the refined switch variables 
(UPWARD, LATERAL and DOWNWARD).   As with the first set of regressions, the 
majority of the control variables attract coefficients with the expected sign and most are 
highly significant.   
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Table 6.6 Regression results: price discounting model for directional switches 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑄𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝐼𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑌𝑅𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Variables Exp. sign 
Column 
(1) 
Column 
(2) 
Column 
(3) 
Column 
(4) 
Column 
(5) 
Column 
(6) 
        
Constant  9.905*** 9.357*** 8.389*** 1.996*** 1.860*** 1.887*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UPWARD ? 0.024   -0.052   
  (0.807)   (0.346)   
LATERAL ?  -0.233***   -0.057**  
   (0.000)   (0.016)  
DOWNWARD ?   -0.115*   -0.012 
    (0.069)   (0.739) 
LNASSETS +    0.186*** 0.173*** 0.193*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNSAL +    0.279*** 0.277*** 0.226*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SQSUBS +    0.221*** 0.215*** 0.207*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REC_INV +    -0.225** -0.067 0.055 
     (0.031) (0.138) (0.406) 
ROA -    -0.070 -0.073 -0.367*** 
     (0.702) (0.166) (0.004) 
LEV +    0.028 -0.019 0.009 
     (0.445) (0.357) (0.838) 
QUAL +    0.077 0.175*** 0.125 
     (0.590) (0.002) (0.229) 
BIGFOUR +    0.089 0.184*** 0.220*** 
     (0.104) (0.000) (0.000) 
MIDFOUR +    0.049 0.180*** 0.160*** 
     (0.316) (0.000) (0.000) 
BUSY +    0.115*** 0.036** 0.091*** 
     (0.009) (0.048) (0.001) 
LOND +    0.429*** 0.234*** 0.239*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Industry fixed 
effects 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed 
effects 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Obs.  620 3,348 1,522 620 3,348 1,522 
R-squared  0.322 0.186 0.291 0.844 0.798 0.778 
The regression is performed on the complete matched-pairs sample which includes 1,596 matched 
treatment and control firms and 798 switches for the period 2005-2012.  The results are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported after controlling for firm level clustering. Two-
tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% percent levels respectively.  For variable definitions see Table 6.1. 
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Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6.6 present the regression results for the price discount 
model using the refined switch variable UPWARD, excluding and then including the 
control variables respectively.  In the specification of the model without controls, the 
coefficient on UPWARD is positive but insignificant, whereas in the model with 
controls the coefficient is negative and insignificant.  According to traditional price-
discounting literature, the absence of a negative and significant coefficient on the switch 
variable implies that price discounting is not present.  However, it is also possible to 
argue that low-balling has taken place whenever a new auditor does not charge a 
premium to cover set-up costs (Pong and Whittington, 1994, p.1094).   
The findings could be indicative of larger audit firms using an alternative form of 
low-balling, as to prevent drawing attention to the fact that they are participating in 
something which could potentially be seen as impairing their independence.  Rather 
than reducing fees below the figure of the previous year, which would result in a 
negative and significant coefficient, the higher-tier audit firm agrees to carry out the 
initial year audit at the same price as the previous lower-tier auditor.  This is despite the 
costs to the auditor involved with a first-year audit and the higher average audit fees 
associated with higher-tier auditors, thus the discount is implicit.  Moreover, if the audit 
fees in subsequent years increase then it can be argued that the practice of low-balling is 
present.  The subsequent analysis on price recovery in the following section will be able 
to confirm or refute this supposition.   
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6.6 present the regression results for the price discount 
model using the refined switch variable LATERAL, excluding and then including the 
control variables respectively.  As aforementioned, the only way to mitigate any 
potential bias from audit quality differences resulting from a change in auditor tier is to 
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look at lateral audit switches rather than upgrades or downgrades because they are 
unlikely to occur as a result of technological or reputation-related reasons (Simon and 
Francis, 1988; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  For both specifications of the model, the 
coefficients on LATERAL are negative (-0.223, -0.057) and significant, implying 
average discounts of 20.0% and 5.5% respectively.   
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 6.6 present the regression results for the price discount 
model using the refined switch variable DOWNWARD, excluding and then including the 
control variables respectively.  For both specifications of the model, the coefficient is 
negative, and only just significant in the model without control variables.  When 
interpreting this coefficient it is important to remember that fees might be lower for 
firms who switch from a large to a small audit firm because the quality of the new 
auditor is lower and this lower fee can erroneously be interpreted as fee discounting 
(Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  For the downward switches, the absence of a significant 
coefficient in the model including controls is therefore in line with expectations.  The 
negative sign simply confirms (in this case) that audit fees are reduced relative to the 
fees of the previous year.  This is not necessarily a discount per se.   
In summary, of the three refined switch variables only the coefficients on LATERAL 
show there to be an initial price discount (in the traditional sense).  The negative and 
significant coefficient provides evidence of an initial price discount for clients moving 
between auditors of the same tier, i.e. from one direct competitor to another.  Although 
the coefficient on UPWARD is not significant, it does not imply that price discounts are 
not given to new clients upgrading their auditor.  Rather, it implies that instead of an 
actual discount being given to new clients, i.e. a reduced fee relative to the previous 
year’s fee, auditors hold audit fees constant for the initial year with a new client - thus 
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the discount is implicit.  In light of these findings, the next step is to determine whether 
audit fees increase in subsequent periods to identify whether there is evidence of price 
recovery of initial audit fee discounts – in terms of both actual discounts and implicit 
discounts. 
6.5.3 Regression Results: Price Recovery 
As Peel (2013) points out, previous studies test for evidence of price recovery by 
including variables to represent companies which had switched auditors in previous 
periods and they were not the same companies which had been the subject of the tests 
for initial audit engagement discounts (Peel, 2013, p.652).  This results in the possibility 
that tests for price recovery are being conducted on companies where initial discounts 
on audit fees were not actually received.  The sample used in this chapter is a panel, 
thus the same companies which were tested for initial discounts can be tested for price 
recovery.   
Using the same regression model as in Equation (6.1), following Peel (2013) the 
SWITCH variable is replaced with variables which are coded to denote whether a 
subsequent audit is for the first (SWITCH1), second (SWITCH2) or third (SWITCH3) 
year following the initial audit engagement.  In order to be able to follow the same 
company’s initial engagement audit fees and the subsequent recovery of these fees the 
three years following the switch are required.  This reduces the sample to switches 
which occurred between 2006 and 2009 and leaves 246 pairs of treatment and matched 
control firms in the sample, for which there is a similar composition of upward, lateral 
and downward switches as in the original matched-pairs sample.   
Although the requirement for three years of data following the initial engagement 
year reduces the number of switches for analysis, there are an equal number of 
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observations for each of the price recovery years.  A facet of price recovery analysis 
that is unique to this study.  Table 6.7 provides the regression results for the price 
recovery models.  In Table 6.7, Column 1, the recovery patterns of all aggregate auditor 
switches are reported.  Following the initial engagement year the coefficients on the 
SWITCH variables become positive, which implies that the initial discount given to 
firms following a switch is only provided in the first year with a new auditor. 
In the remaining Columns of Table 6.7, price recovery patterns for auditor switches 
refined with respect to direction are reported.  As discussed in the previous section, 
although companies upgrading their auditor did not receive a physical discount, the 
absence of a significant increase in fees implied that there could be a different form of 
low-balling present which could only be determined once the pattern of price recovery 
was also considered.  In the years following an upward switch (Column 2) the 
coefficients on the switch variables become positive.  This finding, coupled with the 
absence of an initial discount suggests that larger audit firms do take part in ‘low-
balling’ to secure new clients, albeit in a different form to the traditional physical 
discount focused on in the majority of prior literature.   
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Table 6.7 Regression results: price recovery model 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽6𝑆𝑄𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽10𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽11𝐵𝐼𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽𝑌𝑅𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Variables (1) All switches (2) Upward (3) Lateral (4) Downward 
     
Constant 1.316*** 1.694** 1.269*** 1.612*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
SWITCH1 0.001 0.022 0.022 0.003 
 (0.984) (0.798) (0.605) (0.954) 
SWITCH2 0.015 0.162 0.089* -0.031 
 (0.690) (0.147) (0.071) (0.610) 
SWITCH3 0.023 0.154 0.131** -0.023 
 (0.579) (0.281) (0.025) (0.750) 
LNASSETS 0.193*** 0.225*** 0.176*** 0.231*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNSAL 0.282*** 0.262*** 0.311*** 0.216*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
SQSUBS 0.207*** 0.233*** 0.202*** 0.201*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REC_INV 0.029 -0.032 -0.079 0.133 
 (0.610) (0.845) (0.317) (0.111) 
ROA -0.172** -0.938*** -0.072 -0.267 
 (0.034) (0.0014) (0.190) (0.234) 
LEV -0.114*** -0.307*** -0.084*** -0.136* 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.075) 
QUAL 0.106 0.145 -0.052 0.271** 
 (0.177) (0.585) (0.660) (0.017) 
BIGFOUR 0.133*** 0.073 0.141*** 0.027 
 (0.000) (0.485) (0.001) (0.712) 
MIDFOUR 0.064** 0.270*** 0.154*** 0.079 
 (0.024) (0.004) (0.001) (0.183) 
BUSY 0.018 0.261*** 0.010 0.030 
 (0.460) (0.002) (0.783) (0.458) 
LOND 0.260*** 0.380*** 0.222*** 0.245*** 
 1.316*** 1.694** 1.269*** 1.612*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,968 224 1,000 744 
R-squared 0.797 0.907 0.844 0.813 
     
The regression is performed on a sub-sample of the matched-pairs sample and includes matched treatment 
and control firms for the year of the switch and for the three years following the switch which includes 
246 switches which occur between 2005 and 2012.  The results are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation and are reported after controlling for firm level clustering. Two-tailed p-values are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% percent 
levels respectively.  For variable definitions see Table 6.1.   
 
As reported in the previous section, the only refined switch variable showing an 
initial price discount to be present (in the traditional sense) was LATERAL.  Table 6.7, 
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Column 3 reports that for the first year following a lateral switch the coefficient on 
SWITCH1 is positive and insignificant, suggesting that the discount does not carry on 
past the first year.  Following this in the second (SWITCH2) and third (SWITCH3) years 
the coefficients are positive and become increasingly significant, thus implying an 
increase in fees in these years.  These findings provide strong evidence of low-balling 
for private companies switching laterally.  Moreover, they also raise concerns regarding 
the independence and quality of auditors who are willing to discount the initial fees for 
client-firms previously audited by their direct competitors.   
For companies downgrading their auditor (Column 4) the coefficients largely remain 
negative and significant, thus suggesting that fees remain reduced in the years following 
a change to a lower tier auditor.  This finding is line with expectations, a company 
changing to a lower tier auditor receives lower audit fees to reflect this, and it is 
important to think of these reduced fees as a reduction rather than as a discount per se.  
As discussed, this concept is often overlooked by literature considering the low-balling 
of audit fees. 
6.5.4 Robustness 
To address the potential multicollinearity concerns associated with the inclusion of two 
size variables in the initial price discounting regressions, for robustness, following 
Chaney et al. (2004) the regressions are repeated with asset turnover (ATURN) in place 
of the log of total sales (LNSAL) to attenuate the collinearity with total assets.  Table 6.8 
therefore reports the regression results when the price discount regressions for the 
aggregate switch model (Column 1) and directional switch models (Columns 2 – 4) are 
repeated with the alternative size measure, asset turnover (ATURN).   
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Table 6.8 Additional price discount regressions: alternative size measures 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑄𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐵𝐼𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑌𝑅𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
Variables Expected sign     
Column  
(1) 
Column   
(2) 
Column  
(3) 
Column  
(4) 
          
Constant      2.250*** 2.377*** 2.588*** 1.893*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SWITCH ?     -0.056***    
      (0.006)    
UPWARD ?      -0.031   
       (0.611)   
LATERAL ?       -0.064**  
        (0.013)  
DOWNWARD ?        -0.010 
         (0.786) 
LNASSETS +     0.400*** 0.424*** 0.396*** 0.399*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ATURN +     0.031** 0.056** 0.023** 0.088*** 
      (0.020) (0.034) (0.030) (0.000) 
SQSUBS +     0.243*** 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.225*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REC_INV +     0.277*** 0.083 0.299*** 0.241*** 
      (0.000) (0.516) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -     -0.004 0.165 0.061 -0.256* 
      (0.940) (0.347) (0.286) (0.062) 
LEV +     0.045** 0.107** 0.030 0.006 
      (0.048) (0.014) (0.214) (0.894) 
QUAL +     0.111** -0.276** 0.120** 0.057 
      (0.024) (0.034) (0.032) (0.608) 
BIGFOUR +     0.216*** 0.086 0.213*** 0.222*** 
      (0.000) (0.137) (0.000) (0.000) 
MIDFOUR +     0.127*** 0.024 0.193*** 0.145*** 
      (0.000) (0.663) (0.000) (0.000) 
BUSY +     0.043*** 0.153*** 0.025 0.073** 
      (0.005) (0.001) (0.206) (0.013) 
LOND +     0.238*** 0.421*** 0.218*** 0.207*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Industry fixed effects     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations      5,490 620 3,348 1,522 
R-squared      0.746 0.817 0.763 0.758 
The regression is performed on the complete matched-pairs sample, which includes 1,596 matched 
treatment and control firms and 798 switches for the period 2005-2012.  The results are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported after controlling for firm level clustering. Two-
tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% percent levels respectively.  For variable definitions see Table 6.1.   
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As Table 6.8 shows, the results for the control variables remain consistent, with the 
majority attracting coefficients with the expected sign and significance from the 
previous regressions.  With reference to the R2s, all of the regression models appear to 
remain well determined.  For the model which includes the aggregate switches in 
Column 1, the coefficient on the SWITCH variable remains negative (-0.056) and 
statistically significant (p<0.01).  This implies a discount of 5.4% for the 798 companies 
that changed auditors relative to the matched sample of continuing audits.  For the 
directional switch models the coefficient on the directional switch variable (LATERAL) 
also remains negative and significant, (-0.064; p< 0.05), implying a discount of 6.2% 
relative to continuing audits.  Thus, the findings remain qualitatively similar regardless 
of the size variable(s) included in the model. 
In addition, to ensure the discounts genuinely reflect the change in audit fee at the 
initial engagement, the price discount regressions for the directional switch regression 
models are repeated on a reduced sample, which includes the year prior to the switch 
and the year of the switch only.  Table 6.9 reports the regression results for the reduced 
sample and shows the results to be qualitatively similar.  The majority of the control 
variables attract coefficients with the expected sign and significance from the previous 
regressions.  The coefficients and significance on the directional switch variables also 
remain largely similar.  For both specifications of the model, i.e. with and without 
controls, the only significant directional switch variable is LATERAL, with the negative 
coefficients (-0.223, -0.082) implying average discounts of 20.0% and 7.9% 
respectively.  The initial findings regarding price discounting therefore also hold for the 
reduced sample.  
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Table 6.9 Additional price discount regressions: reduced version of the matched-
pairs sample 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑄𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐵𝐼𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑌𝑅𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Variables 
Exp.  
sign 
 
Column 
(1) 
Column 
(2) 
Column 
(3) 
 
Column 
(5) 
Column 
(6) 
Column 
(7) 
          
Constant   9.796*** 9.192*** 8.521***  2.075*** 2.153*** 1.987*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UPWARD ?  -0.017    -0.097   
   (0.880)    (0.211)   
LATERAL ?   -0.220***    -0.082***  
    (0.000)    (0.002)  
DOWNWARD ?    -0.0833    -0.003 
     (0.2383)    (0.957) 
LNASSETS +      0.155*** 0.176*** 0.186*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNSAL +      0.305*** 0.255*** 0.225*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SQSUBS +      0.220*** 0.233*** 0.210*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REC_INV +      -0.320** -0.024 0.036 
       (0.030) (0.698) (0.706) 
ROA -      -0.247 -0.067 -0.344** 
       (0.349) (0.294) (0.035) 
LEV +      0.042 -0.005 0.071 
       (0.358) (0.857) (0.253) 
QUAL +      0.267* 0.203*** -0.055 
       (0.088) (0.002) (0.738) 
BIGFOUR +      0.175** 0.226*** 0.277*** 
       (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) 
MIDFOUR +      0.055 0.187*** 0.163*** 
       (0.460) (0.000) (0.001) 
BUSY +      0.112* 0.026 0.107*** 
       (0.051) (0.277) (0.009) 
LOND +      0.421*** 0.232*** 0.211*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   364 2,044 784  364 2,044 784 
R-squared   0.335 0.185 0.299  0.845 0.792 0.775 
The regression is performed on a reduced version of the matched-pairs sample.  This includes the 1,596 
matched treatment and control firms and 798 switches for the period 2005-2012, but only includes 
observations for the year prior to the switch and the year of the switch.  The results are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported after controlling for Two-tailed p-values are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% percent 
levels respectively.  For variable definitions see Table 6.1.   
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6.6 Summary and Discussion 
The high levels of supplier concentration and low frequency of auditor switching found 
to be present in the UK private company audit market, highlighted in Chapter 4, 
resulted in questions raised regarding the economic consequences to private firms 
changing their auditor.  Consequently, it was found in Chapter 5 that companies 
switching auditor suffered negative economic consequences to their credit ratings.  
This, in turn, resulted in the question whether audit firms are doing anything to attract 
new audit clients through specific pricing strategies.  In light of this, this chapter looks 
at the initial pricing of audit engagements for private companies changing their auditor.  
In particular, whether firms changing their auditor are provided with a discount on their 
audit fees and whether there are any patterns of price recovery in the following three 
years.   
In addition to questions raised in previous chapters, the pricing of initial audit 
engagements has been of interest to both academics and regulators for a number of 
years, predominantly because of the independence and quality concerns that can arise if 
auditors provide new clients with an initial discount on their audit fees.  To date a 
number of studies have touched upon this issue but UK evidence is limited and largely 
focuses on the listed company audit market.  Moreover, there has been confusion in the 
initial audit pricing literature regarding the presence of an initial discount versus the 
presence of low-balling.  A ‘price discount’ or ‘price cutting’ by a new auditor is an 
initial discount in audit fees for a new-client without explicit consideration of the 
relationship between the audit fee and audit costs.  Whereas in literature, the practice of 
‘low-balling’ takes audit costs into consideration with a critical aspect of the pricing 
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strategy being the initial discounting of the audit fee followed by later price recovery 
(Gregory and Collier, 1996).   
Yet, largely due to data constraints, not all studies that claim to provide evidence of 
low-balling consider the price recovery aspect, or those that do are limited to single or 
combined years – rather than on a panel basis where a pattern of price recovery can be 
properly identified.  Further, when considering the initial discounts potentially 
associated with an auditor switch, although switches of different directions have been 
considered in previous studies, the potential bias resulting from reputational or quality 
differences has often been overlooked.  With, for example, lower fees being erroneously 
interpreted as fee discounting (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).   
As audit pricing studies are both time- and country-specific this aim of this chapter is 
to fill the gap in literature for the private company audit market in the UK, whilst also 
aiming to overcome the short-comings of previous initial audit pricing studies.  Thus, 
although the analysis is UK-specific, the issues considered are relevant to future initial 
audit pricing work.  Using a large panel data set spanning an eight year period from 
2005 – 2012, private companies switching auditor are identified.  Using propensity 
score matching these companies are then matched to a non-switching company to create 
a matched-pairs sample of 798 pairs of switching and control firms.  The issue of self-
selection is also often overlooked in extant literature so the use of propensity score 
matching ensures that any differences in audit fees can be attributed to switching 
auditor and not a firm’s pre-existing characteristics (Lawrence et al., 2011). 
Using an audit fee discounting regression model, the findings show that a discount is 
associated with initial audit engagements for private firms in the UK.  However, when 
switches are refined by direction according to the tier of auditor which they move to, 
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physical discounts are only present for companies switching laterally between audit 
firms of the same tier.  In addition, the results suggest that although an initial discount 
does not appear to be present for client-firms upgrading their audit firm, when the 
direction of the switch and potential bias are taken into consideration an implicit 
discount is actually present. Following this, to identify whether low-balling is present, 
the price recovery of the initial discounts for the three years subsequent to the initial 
engagement year are considered.  For companies upgrading their auditor or switching 
laterally, audit fees increase over the following three-year period.   
The findings therefore provide evidence of price recovery for the firms receiving 
both physical and implicit discounts, suggesting that low-balling is present in the 
private company audit market.  This, in turn, raises concerns regarding competitive 
pricing and the level of auditor independence in this market, whilst also reinforcing the 
idea of extending some of the more stringent audit requirements introduced by the EU 
Regulation on the Statutory Audits of Public Interest Entities. Moreover, the findings do 
not only have implications for the private company audit market in the UK, but they 
also demonstrate for other initial audit pricing studies the importance of considering the 
type of auditor change relative to the potential bias that this might introduce to results.  
Otherwise, instances of low-balling could be incorrectly classified or, alternatively, they 
could be missed altogether. 
Although regulators have expressed independence and quality concerns stemming 
from the practice of low-balling, some of the prior studies providing evidence to suggest 
the presence of low-balling have argued that it is actually a competitive response aimed  
at securing future economic rents, thus downplaying any independence of quality 
concerns (DeAngelo, 1981; Peel, 2013).  However, studies focusing on initial audit 
Chapter 6: Playing Low-Ball: The Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements for UK Private Firms  186 
 
pricing do not go on to empirically investigate the link between audit fees and audit 
quality or independence on new engagements.  In general little research has been 
specifically aimed at understanding the potential impact of low-balling on audit quality 
(Watkins et al., 2004; Gramling et al., 2010).   
Moreover, organisational behaviour research exists to show that people do not ignore 
sunk costs, which goes back to the concerns of regulators about the impact of low-
balling on auditor independence (Staw and Ross, 1987; Huang et al., 2009).  Thus the 
presence of low-balling itself does not seem adequate to make a conclusion either way 
regarding whether the pricing strategy is solely a competitive response to securing 
economic rents or whether it leads to independence issues.  However, now that findings 
exist to show that low-balling is present in the private audit market in the UK, it is an 
issue that warrants further consideration.   
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7  
Conclusions 
 
7.1 Background to the Thesis 
Private firms constitute a significant portion of the UK economy and the market for 
audit services.  Yet, to date, largely as a result of data constraints, there is only limited 
knowledge available regarding the audit market for private companies in terms of 
supplier concentration, switching frequencies and audit fees - particularly since the Big 
Four audit firms came into power.  This has subsequently resulted in a shortage of 
research that focuses on private companies with respect to their accounting and auditing 
choices or the economic consequences of these choices (Francis et al., 2011).  In 
contrast, there have been a number of high profile regulatory investigations and 
academic studies focusing on the audit market for listed companies in the UK (e.g., 
Oxera, 2006; Abidin et al., 2010; Competition Commission, 2013c; Peel, 2013) 
resulting in a number of concerns being raised regarding the statutory audit market for 
listed firms.   
Consequently, in April 2014 the EU statutory audit market underwent a reform, 
which included a revised Statutory Audit Directive in addition to the introduction of a 
new EU Regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities.  In the UK the 
definition of a Public Interest Entity has been set at the EU level, with the more 
stringent audit requirements specified by the new regulation therefore only applicable to 
listed firms, banks and insurance undertakings.  However, because there has been very 
limited research carried out on auditing in private firms it could be said that private 
firms have been excluded from the more rigorous audit requirements without sufficient 
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evidence to justify the decision.  As a result, it remains an empirical question whether 
the definition of a Public Interest Entity in the UK is adequate or whether by excluding 
private companies has it excluded audit markets that potentially warrant similar 
regulatory changes?   
The overarching purpose of this thesis was therefore to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the private company audit market in the UK, in terms of supplier 
concentration, switching frequency and audit fees.  With a view to subsequently 
investigating issues related to market structure and the recent regulatory reform.  To 
undertake this analysis, the thesis examined a panel of independent private firms in the 
UK for the period 2005 to 2012.  The UK was chosen specifically because it is one of a 
number of countries that have chosen not to extend the scope of the definition of a 
Public Interest Entity despite private firms being the dominant form of entity and 
accounting for the majority of registered businesses.   
To examine the private company audit market in the UK, this thesis examined three 
research questions.  In doing so, this thesis provides the first empirical analysis of the 
private company market in the UK during a period in which the Big Four have been the 
dominant audit firms.  The three research questions are: (i) Does the audit market for 
large private companies require similar reforms to the auditing regulations applicable 
for Public Interest Entities? (ii) Are there economic consequences for private companies 
associated with an auditor switch and does this differ depending on the change in 
question? (iii) Is there initial discounting of audit fees and subsequent price recovery for 
the three years following an auditor switch by private firms? 
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7.2 Summary of Findings 
7.2.1 Regulation of the Statutory Audit for Private UK Companies  
Chapter 4 provides detailed information on the supplier concentration levels present in 
the private company audit market in the UK, therefore addressing the overarching 
research aim of the thesis.  The results provide evidence to show, similar to the listed 
company audit market, larger audit firms, and most notably the Big Four, audit the 
majority of private companies that provide the greatest economic rents.  With the audit 
market for the largest independent private firms characterised by a tight oligopoly, the 
same as the listed company audit market.  Further, when supplier concentration is 
measured based on the size, as opposed to the number, of clients the results demonstrate 
how key concentration measures based on the number of audit appointments 
significantly understate the market share of the larger audit firms.  Regardless of listing 
status, therefore, audit markets appear segmented with the dominance of the Big Four 
among the largest public and private firms.  
Chapter 4 also finds that switching rates for private companies are comparably low 
to those reported for the public firm audit market, suggesting that the private company 
audit market will continue to exhibit high levels of concentration for larger sized 
entities unless there is direct regulatory intervention.  Consequently, regulators should 
reconsider the risk of excluding these businesses from the more stringent audit 
regulations applicable to other Public Interest Entities.  Given the findings and the 
economic importance of private companies, it may actually be inappropriate to define a 
Public Interest Entity for the purposes of more stringent audit regulation based on a 
company’s corporate status without reference to its size.  The definition and scope of a 
Public Interest Entity, therefore, needs revisiting both within the UK and across all EU 
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Member States, with a view to including more of these economically important private 
companies.   
As the private company audit market was shown to be under-regulated, with high 
levels of supplier concentration and low rates of auditor switching, it also prompted 
questions regarding the economic consequences for a private firm switching in this type 
of audit environment.  This subsequently formed the basis of empirical Chapter 5. 
7.2.2 The Economic Consequences of Auditor Switching 
In light of the concerns raised following the findings from Chapter 4, Chapter 5 
provides strong evidence that there are economic consequences associated with a 
change in auditor by private companies.  The findings show that companies switching 
auditor have lower credit scores relative to those not switching auditor.  When the 
direction of the switch is considered, the results show that only companies switching 
laterally between the same tier of auditor experience a decrease in credit ratings.  
Although an auditor switch can occur for a number of reasons when a company changes 
to an auditor of the same tier, the reasons underlying the switch are more difficult to 
determine and it subsequently transmits a negative signal about a company’s credit risk 
to those external to the firm.  This prompted the question whether auditors are 
undertaking specific pricing strategies in order to attract new clients and encourage 
them to change auditors in light of the potential economic consequences.   
While switching remains non-mandatory for private firms, given their economic 
importance and their reliance on bank-based forms of financing, it is important that 
private firms be properly informed of the economic consequences that result from 
switching auditor.  It is important that private firms are not discouraged from switching 
auditor through the form of reduced credit ratings, as the low rates of auditor switching 
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will only act to sustain the high concentration levels present in the market.  The 
introduction of additional audit requirements, such as mandatory auditor rotation, as 
recently enforced on listed firms by the EU Regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public 
Interest Entities, could therefore be beneficial for the private firm audit market.   
7.2.3 Playing Low-Ball: The Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements for UK 
Private Firms 
The findings from Chapter 5 questioned whether audit firms were using particular 
pricing strategies to attract new clients.  Using an audit fee discounting regression 
model, Chapter 6 provides evidence to show that a discount is associated with initial 
audit engagements for private firms in the UK.  However, after refining switches 
according to the tier of auditor that they move to, physical discounts are only present for 
companies switching laterally between audit firms of the same tier.  In addition, the 
results suggest that although an initial discount does not appear to be present for client-
firms upgrading their audit firm, if the direction of the switch and potential bias are 
considered an implicit discount is actually present.   
In subsequent analyses, the audit fees for companies switching upwards or laterally 
are found to increase over the following three-year period.  The findings therefore 
provide evidence of price recovery for the firms receiving both physical and implicit 
discounts, suggesting that low-balling is present in the private company audit market in 
the UK, potentially raising related audit independence and quality concerns.  Moreover, 
not only do the findings have potential implications for the private company audit 
market in the UK but they also demonstrate, for future initial audit pricing research, the 
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importance of considering the type of auditor change relative to the potential bias that 
this might introduce to results. 
 
7.3 Policy Implications and Direction for Further Research 
In summary, the results of the thesis provide strong support that the definition and 
scope of a Public Interest Entity needs revisiting both within the UK and across all EU 
Member States, with a view to including more of these economically important private 
companies.  The aim of the recent audit reform is to provide a more robust auditing 
environment for Public Interest Entities whilst also reducing the systemic risk to 
Member States caused by a financial breakdown of one of these entities.  Yet the thesis 
shows UK private firms of a substantial size, and subsequent substantial economic 
importance, facing similar audit market concerns as listed entities, with no direct 
regulatory intervention planned to address these concerns.  Consequently, given that, to 
date, both empirical studies and regulatory investigations into the structure of the 
private company audit market in the UK are almost non-existent, this thesis provides a 
valuable contribution towards the ongoing debate of whether the more stringent audit 
regulations should be made applicable to additional entities outside of the EU Public 
Interest Entity definition.  
Moreover, while the thesis provides evidence to show the presence of initial 
discounting and subsequent price recovery of audit fees following a change in auditor, 
there is further scope to investigate whether such pricing strategies have an effect on 
audit quality.  Prior studies have found that people do not ignore the sunk costs involved 
in low-balling, thus the presence of low-balling alone does not seem adequate to make a 
conclusion either way regarding whether the pricing strategies observed in the audit 
Chapter 7: Conclusions  193 
 
market are a competitive response to economic rents or whether it leads to 
independence issues.  Though inferences about auditor independence and audit quality 
can be made in light of the findings of Chapter 6, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to 
test these directly, therefore providing a potential avenue for future research.  Given the 
focus of the recent audit reform on improving both audit competition and quality, a 
direction for future research would therefore be to examine the quality of audits for a 
similar period following a change in auditor.   
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